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ABSTRACT 
 
 
The study is based on the hypothesis that there are forces of influence that push a 
group from extremism to terrorism. While not all groups make the shift to terrorism, 
there are inherent forces within the radical group that influence the course of action 
undertaken by groups. The study examines 10 radical groups in Indonesia and 
explores the question: How do ideology, leadership and group dynamics play a 
significant role in the radical groups in Indonesia?  
 
The study explored groups within a broad cross-section of terrorist and extremist 
groups that have either been in operation or are currently in operation in Indonesia  
The groups examined were Lashkar Jihad (LJ), Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), Darul Islam 
(DI), Front Pembela Islam (FPI), Negara Islam Indonesia (NII), Hizbut Tahrir 
Indonesia (HT), Majelis Mujahideen Indonesia (MMI), Jamaah Anshorut Tauhid 
(JAT), Al Qaeda Indonesia (AI) and Mujahideen Indonesia Timur (MIT). 
 
The study highlights that groups are able to sustain themselves on the path of 
terrorism if there is a unique confluence of a politicised ideology, presence of 
influential leadership and group dynamics. Based on 124 interviews and 
questionnaires of terrorist and extremist leadership and cadre, the study sheds light on 
unique dynamics within these groups in Indonesia. In an examination of the 10 radical 
groups, this study shows that the very factors that often influences the radicalisation 
of individuals on the pathway of terrorism – ideology, charismatic leadership and 
community affiliation through group dynamics also in turn influence the course of 
action of groups as a whole. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
THE INTRODUCTION  
 
“All is a riddle, and the key to a riddle...is another riddle.” 
Ralph Waldo Emerson 
 
Fourteen years after the attacks on the World Trade Centre on 11 September 2001, 
and the subsequent demise of Osama Bin Laden in May 2011, the threat of terrorism 
remains unabated as acts of terrorism continue to take place. Academics, officers 
from law enforcement and the security services grapple with efforts to mitigate the 
threat of extremism and terrorism internationally. The world remains riddled with 
insecurity. While the phenomenon of terrorism is not new, the attacks on the World 
Trade Centre is analogous to a rent in the fabric of the security studies domain, a 
black swan event.
1
 The attack was a game changer, which brought to the foreground 
and cemented the dawn of a new era of perpetual insecurity. 
 
The threat of terrorism has continued to dominate the security agenda of nations. 
Innumerable resources have been spent by governments to dismantle the operational 
infrastructures of terrorist groups through kinetic countermeasures.
2
 In the fiscal year 
2013 alone, the intelligence community of the United States set aside USD16.6 
billion, more than a third of its annual budget on counter terrorism alone.
3
 The 
amount set aside was revealed in what was later known as the ‘black budget’ that was 
passed to The Washington Post by Edward Snowden, a defence contractor. Aside 
from the release of sensitive data to the press, the sheer quantum of the ‘black 
budget’, reiterates the continued importance placed on terrorism vis-à-vis defence two 
years after the death of the Osama bin Laden.  
 
On the global platform the threat of terrorism, looks poised to continue. The ensuing 
conflict in Syria, the present spiral downhill for Iraq, the instability in Pakistan, the 
wavering security of Afghanistan and its ripple effect on Africa and Asia present a 
sobering backdrop. Against the larger and more enduring threat of radicalisation and 
terrorism continues to thrive unabated globally.  
 
In exploring the growing heterogeneity of the threat of terrorism, Nesser points to the 
increase in attacks over the last few years as a ripple effect from “the ‘Arab Spring’, 
                                                 
1 Nassim Nicholas Taleb used this metaphor to refer to an unforeseen and unprecedented event that 
will have a large impact on the course of history. See Nassim Nicholas Taleb, The Black Swan: The 
Impact of the Highly Improbable, (UK: Penguin, 2008) 
2
 Kinetic Countermeasures in this instance refers to the use of force to apprehend, kill and disrupt 
terrorists, terrorist cells and terrorist plots.  
3 Drew Desilva, “U.S. spends over $16 billion annually on counter-terrorism”, Pew Research Centre, 
11 September 2013, (Accessed on 12 January 2014 at http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2013/09/11/u-s-spends-over-16-billion-annually-on-counter-terrorism/) 
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the death of Osama bin Laden and the weakening of al-Qaida’s Af(ghan)-Pak(istan) 
networks, and last but not least, the proliferation of jihadism in social media.”4 The 
heterogeneity of the threat emphasises the need to rethink establish means of 
mitigating the threat of terrorism, revisit assumptions and attempt to creatively 
construct new methods of handling an evolving threat landscape. 
 
As an extension from the time and investment towards the operational vanguard of 
terrorism, there have been attempts to nip the flourishing problem of terrorism in the 
bud, where possible. This has resulted in a proliferation of numerous studies on the 
processes surrounding the journey of individuals who have chosen to embrace 
violence as a means to an end. In bringing to a halt what is often thought of as a 
germination process, it is hoped that stemming this process would help prevent the 
eventuality that these individuals embark on a process of committing acts of 
terrorism.  
 
Comparatively fewer resources and even lesser effort have been channelled to 
dismantle the infrastructures that promote and sustain the processes of radicalisation. 
This study aims to shed light and fill the gap in the understanding of the processes of 
radicalisation of 10 terrorist and extremist groups in Indonesia through exploring the 
unique roles of ideology, leadership and group behaviour and their subsequent impact 
on a groups. Despite efforts undertaken, the continued and continuous regeneration of 
ideologues, leaders and fighters for a future generation is almost guaranteed through 
the sustenance of the fertile wellsprings of a permissive environment. Ironically, the 
only certainty in the study of terrorism thus far seems to be continued uncertainty. 
This seems to permeate the discourse as academics and practitioners alike as they 
attempt to contribute to the understanding of a much-debated field of terrorism 
studies. 
 
SITUATING THE DEBATE:  
TERRORISM AND THE NEW SECURITY PARADIGM 
 
The term security derives it etymological roots from “Latin secures safe, secure, se 
without + cura care – the quality or state of being secure or as a freedom from danger 
(freedom or fear or anxiety).”5 As a branch of the International Relations, security 
studies and strategic studies were in the 1990s and early 2000 analogous to siblings 
fighting to remain relevant in a fast changing world. Buzan opined that the “literature 
on strategic studies is too vast and so complicated that those wanting to understand it 
                                                 
4
Petter Nesser, Towards an Increasingly Heterogeneous Threat: A Chronology of Jihadist Terrorism in 
Europe 2008-2013, Studies on Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 37, No. 5, 2014, Studies on Conflict and 
Terrorism, p.25 
5
 P. H. Liotta, Boomerang Effect: The Convergence of National and Human Security, Security 
Dialogue, 2002 p. 477; See also Czeslaw Mesjasz, “Complexity Studies and Securitization in the 
Complex World: An Epistomological Framework of Analysis,” in Unifying Themes in Complex 
Systems, in (Eds), Ali Minai, Dan Braha and Yaneer Bar-Yam, (Germany: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 
2008) 
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cannot easily find a place to start”6  and that this very expansion of the strategic 
studies domain was as a result of being “driven by fast-moving developments in 
technology, conflict and politics.” 7  The work of realist scholars with a strong 
emphasis on the state was now giving way to the necessity for an expanded 
understanding of security.  
 
Buzan and Hansen identified four key themes in the changing dimensions of security 
studies in the post-World War II period. Drawing insight from the evolution of 
security studies, Buzan and Hansen identified four themes, first questioning the focus 
on the state as the sole referent object. Second, the emerging national and 
transnational nature of the security threat, third the necessity to widen or expand the 
ambit of security concerns and last but not least questioning the very concept of 
security in it of itself given that the concept of security studies is dependent on a 
referent object which keeps shifting
8
 In a growing consensus between the 
traditionalists such as Baylis, Wirtz, Cohen and Gray; and the proponents of an 
extended security studies in the 20
th
 Century otherwise known in circles as the 
wideners such as Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde
9
, today “security studies are viewed in 
their broader sense as an area focusing on a variety of threats and security aspects, not 
solely military ones.”10  
 
Stephen Walt in a seminal article in 1991 acknowledged the “resurgence of security 
studies” 11  as an “important positive development for the field of International 
Relations.”12 The full thrust of this renaissance as Walt had termed had achieved it 
fruition in the aftermath of the events on 11 September 2001. While terrorism as a 
strategy and a tactic had well existed before, the new paradigm of perpetual insecurity 
has resulted in the explosion of issues that fall under the expanding ambit of security 
has been on a steady rise. From state security, environmental security, human 
security, food security, energy security to financial security, the rubric of security 
today seemingly blankets a whole gamut of issues. 13  There is no agreed upon 
universal definition of security. “Security is a contested term, one with multiple 
                                                 
6 Barry Buzan, An Introduction to Strategic Studies: Military Technology and International Relation, 
(London: Macmillan, 1987) p.1 
7 Ibid 
8
 Barry Buzan and Lene Hansen, The Evolution of International Security Studies, (United States of 
America: Cambridge University Press, 2009) 
9 Peter Suchy, Role of Security and Strategic Studies within International Relations Studies, p.12; See 
also, Baylis, J., James J. Writz, Eliot Cohen, Colin Gray (Eds.) Strategy in the Contemporary World: 
An Introduction to Strategic Studies. (New York: Oxford Univeristy Press, 2006) 
10 Peter Suchy, Role of Security and Strategic Studies within International Relations Studies, Defense 
and Strategy, Vol. 2, 2003, p.12 (Accessed on 12 January 2013 at 
http://www.mocr.army.cz/mo/obrana_a_strategie/2-2003eng/suchy.pdf) 
11
 Stephen Walt, “The Renaissance of Security Studies,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 35, 
No.2, June 1992, p. 212, (Accessed on 12 January 2013 at http://www.jstor.org/stable/2600471?seq=2)  
12
 Ibid, p.21 
13
 Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations, 
(Brighton: Wheatsheaf, 1983)  
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meanings, some of which are not all logically linked to conventional 
understandings.”14 A generally accepted consensus of the idea or concept of security 
as one that is contingent on the generic notion of being or feeling safe from threat and 
danger.  
 
The study of security has been, is and will continue to be a central part of the lexicon, 
political discourse and analysis in International Relations. It is the crux of discourses 
of both International Relations and conceptual notions of power and politics. 
“Security is profoundly political; neorealist assumptions usually elide this basic point; 
what it is that should be rendered secure is an essential component of any discussion 
of security.”15 Security as a concept had its roots in World War 1 and later during the 
Cold War. It was initially channelled towards studying the causes of war in the hope 
of achieving an enduring and sustainable peace. Since then, from the bipolar 
structures of the Cold War to the ultimate ascension of a hegemonic superpower, the 
nature of security discourse between and amongst states has witnessed an 
unfathomable inclusiveness to all elements that affect security writ large. Today, the 
concept of security includes non-state actors and myriad of political, economic, 
societal and military issues that fall under this general rubric of security. In his 
recapitulation of security, Wæver notes that  
 
“with the help of language theory, we can regard ‘security’ as a speech act. In this 
usage security is not of interest as a sign that refers to something more real; the 
utterance itself is the act. By saying it, something is done (as in better, giving a 
promise, naming a ship). By uttering ‘security’ a state representative moves a 
particular development into a specific area, and thereby claims a special right to use 
whatever means are necessary to block it.”16 
 
As a general working definition, security today can be broadly defined as the ability 
of an actor to be comfortable that its survival is not in question. The expanding ambit 
of security helms the thrust of discussions in foreign policy. No longer is the notion of 
security limited to relations between states. The broader question often asked today is: 
Whose security is of concern? The differentiation lies in the changing referent object. 
The literary canon of the security discourses is entrenched in the work of a multitude 
of scholars. The work of Foucault on the interdependence between power and 
knowledge,
17
 post-war realist Hans Morgenthau on the notion of statesmen’s ability to 
define threats against the state
18
 and the Gramscian notion of the extended state
19
 in 
                                                 
14 Simon Darby, “Contesting an Essential Concept: Reading the Dilemmas in Contemporary Security 
Discourse”, in Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams (Eds.) Critical Security Studies: Concepts and 
Cases, (London: UCL Press, 1997) p. 6 
15
 Simon Darby, “Contesting an Essential Concept: Reading the Dilemmas in Contemporary Security 
Discourse”, in Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams (Eds.) Critical Security Studies: Concepts and 
Cases, (London: UCL Press, 1997) p. 22 
16 Michael C. Williams, “Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics”, 
International Studies Quarterly (2003) 47, p.513 
17
 Michel Foucault, “The Subject and Power”, Critical Inquiry, Vol. 8, No. 4 (Summer, 1982), pp. 777-
795 
18 Hans Morgenthau, Politics Amongst Nations, (New York: Knopf, 1973) 
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reference to non-governmental institutions that further the arm of the state, extended 
the notion that the referent object of much of the discourse rests with the state. “A 
constructed object that lies at the centre of much contemporary discourse in security 
studies is the state. In conventional studies of security, the state is treated as a natural 
fact, but any particular “state” is in fact a cultural production; it is in effect of a set of 
statist discourse.”20  
 
In terrorism studies, the referent object would typically been assumed to be the state. 
Reiterating the words of Michael Foucault
21
, David Campbell, noted that, “countries 
go to war, not for the purpose of defending their rulers, but for the purpose of 
defending ‘the nation’, ensuring that the state’s security, or upholding the interests 
and values of the people.”22 The statist nature of securitisation discourse has “thus 
become and remain dominant in part because of the power relations sustaining 
them.”23  
 
For states, the sovereignty of the land is an area of concern, for non-state actors, 
terrorist groups and single-issue groups, their ability to survive through sustaining the 
interest of their target audience who would buy into their cause. In very broad terms, 
the concept of security today highlights the value placed on the loose and intangible 
feeling of safety wherein the ultimate survival of an actor (state, organisation or 
individual) is not put to question.  
 
The ever-increasing ambit of security today propels the need for a reassessment of the 
security debate. As contemporary political discourse waltzes around security studies 
and critical security studies, there are overarching narratives that need to be 
addressed. These fundamental questions include: What does the notion of security 
comprise? Whose security do actors fight to secure? Today issues that fall under the 
parameters of security are merely limited by the imagination. The Copenhagen School 
for instance “defines securitization as an extreme version of politicization”24 Just as 
any given issue can be politicised, today any given issue of interest can be securitised.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                           
19
  ames artin , Antonio Gramsci: Critical Assessment of Leading Political Philosophers, Vol. IV, 
Contemporary Applications, (London: Routledge, 2002) 
20
 Jutta Weldes, Mark Laffey, Hugh Gusterson and Raymond Duvall, “Introduction: Constructing 
Security” in Cultures of Insecurity: States, Communities and the Production of Danger (Eds.) Jutta 
Weldes, Mark Laffey, Hugh Gusterson and Raymond Duvall,  (United States of America: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1999) p.18 
 
22
 David Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity, Revised 
Edition, (United States of America: University of Minnesota Press, 1998) p.201 
23
 Jutta Weldes, Mark Laffey, Hugh Gusterson and Raymond Duvall, “Introduction: Constructing 
Security” in Cultures of Insecurity: States, Communities and the Production of Danger (Eds.) Jutta 
Weldes, Mark Laffey, Hugh Gusterson and Raymond Duvall,  (United States of America: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1999) p.18 
24
 Ralf Emmers, “Securitization” in Contemporary Security Studies, (Ed.) Alan Collins, (London: 
Oxford University Press, 2013) p.136 
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HIERARCHY OF SECURITY 
 
Since any given issue can be an area of security concern, what then do governments 
and societies aim to secure? Within this already expanded ambit of security, unspoken 
rules still govern. At the top of the list of key security concerns, security concerns that 
directly affect the state remain paramount. It is within this realm that not only a 
disproportionately large amount of funds are still channelled but also a heightened 
reaction is undertaken. The militaristic posturing undertaken on terrorism is in itself a 
case in point.  
 
At times, the importance ascribed to terrorism is differentiated through the analogies 
used to describe the threat and by extension the means to deal with it. The war 
analogy comes with the assumption that a decisive military victory is possible and the 
criminal analogy on the other hand assumes that the fight against terrorism is a 
protracted problem that needs to be contained.
25
 Furthermore, it gives the notion that 
“this approach is a reactive one – criminals are normally caught after they have 
committed their crimes.”26 Terrorism while having been considered a non-traditional 
security threat in the past has edged its way towards what most states deem as a 
traditional threat. The police, military and security organisations are being trained to 
effectively mitigate this threat on the state, the region and the international system as 
a whole. Ramazan Erdag explores the importance of rethinking the concepts 
surrounding security with an emphasis on collective security through the use of 
institutions
27
 on a global level. 
 
German military theorist Clausewitz astutely emphasises that “Theory becomes 
infinitely more difficult as soon as it touches the realm of moral values.”28 As much 
as this is reflective of the ability to operationalise military tactics and strategy during 
war, this is also similar to the inherent hurdle in the terrorism studies literature on the 
definitions of terrorism. In the case of terrorism, the ascribing of moral norms and 
values to the individual as opposed to mere consideration of the tactic of terror used 
has further muddied the waters in this definitional debate. This will be explored in 
further detail in Chapter 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
25
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26
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27
 Ramazan Erdag, “Security Studies and International Terrorism” in European Scientific Journal 
Vol.9, Edition No.23, August 2013, p.63 
28 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Princeton University Press, 1989, p.136 
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SECURITY: OLD CONCEPT, NEW PARADIGM 
 
The new paradigm of security comprises a synergy between the perceptions of the 
current threats facing the state amidst an ever-changing world. However, the meaning 
of security as a fundamental concept has not changed. What has indeed changed 
instead is the perception of what needs to be included under the ever-expansive 
umbrella of security. Dalby highlights the dilemma of this extended security wherein 
“the process of providing various forms of security, insecurities are also produced, 
often in a way that either actually undermine the initial production of security or that 
merely perpetuate the problems to which they are supposedly providing solutions.”29 
 
This new paradigm has its foundations in the nature and the manner through which 
society as a whole has changed and will continue to change through the passage of 
time. Just as Hobbes wanted to ensure sustainable human security through the 
Leviathan, it remains that same logic that will guide and govern this new paradigm of 
security – a collective logic of survival. Terrorism has been considered amongst the 
foremost threat to state security and a sustained threat to world order. Sageman, a 
leading terrorism scholar, similarly argues that “a new type of terrorism threatens the 
world, driven by networks of fanatics determined to inflict maximum civilian and 
economic damages on distant targets in pursuit of their extremist goals."
30
  
 
Attempts to define terrorism have often resulted in an emotive response by scholars 
and both the religious and political elite alike. Distilling the terms and terminology 
that would be amenable to all parties concerned remains an uphill battle. Crenshaw 
astutely notes this uphill battle with the semantics and lexicon of terrorism whereby 
“the field is probably still plagued by challenges posed by a lack of definition (what 
terrorism constitutes), the inability to build a cohesive integrated and cumulative 
theory (built around larger data sets and over longer time periods) and the 'event 
driven character of much research'.”31 This challenge is further exacerbated by the 
tendency to ascribe to a moral and social meaning to terrorism. The multiplicity of 
definitions and the parallel definitional debates that follow has reiterated the necessity 
to be cognizant of ascribing an amoral definition to the term terrorism. Richard 
English notes that the while the challenge of multiple definitions will continue, the 
solution does not lie in a layering of yet another definition but instead to,  
 
                                                 
29 Simon Darby, “Contesting an Essential Concept: Reading the Dilemmas in Contemporary Security 
Discourse”, in Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams (Eds.) Critical Security Studies: Concepts and 
Cases, (London: UCL Press, 1997) pp.12-13 
30
 Marc Sageman, Understanding Terrorist Networks, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
2004), p.vii; see also, Richard  ackson, “Knowledge, power and politics in the study of political 
terrorism,” in Critical Terrorism Studies: A new research agenda, (Eds.) Richard Jackson and Marie 
Breen Smyth and Jeroen Gunning, (London: Routledge, 2009), p.71 
31
 agnus Ranstorp, “Introduction: apping Terrorism Research,” in Mapping Terrorism Research: 
State of the art, gaps and future direction, (ed) Magnus Ranstorp, (London: Routledge, 2007), p.4  
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“reframe this difficulty by stating that the ambiguity caused by the wide range of 
existing definitions, together with the impossibility of ever obtaining a universally 
agreed definition of such a contested term, paradoxically reinforces the need for any 
study of ‘terrorism’ to offer a clear statement of its understanding of the word.”32 
 
Distinguished scholar Bruce Hoffman identified five factors that are characteristic of 
terrorism thus setting it apart from rudimentary criminal activity. These factors are the 
political aims and motives, the use of violence, the innate psychological repercussions 
of the violent act that impact more than the victims, the group has an identifiable 
hierarchy and chain of command and last but not least, acts of terrorism are typically 
conducted by sub-national or non-state entities.
33
  
 
This study will provide a working definition on the use of terrorism. Despite its 
constant use, there remains no single widely accepted definition for terrorism; there is 
however three factors in defining terrorism as noted by Boaz Ganor. The factors listed 
by Ganor echo the early factors provided by Hoffman as the distinguishing 
characteristics of terrorism. First, Ganor terms, the “essence of the action”34 where 
violence remains as the distinguishing characteristic of an act of terrorism. Violence is 
defined as the use of physical force to coerce physically or psychologically.35The 
second factor that Ganor asserts is “the goal of underlying terrorism” 36  whereby 
terrorism always has a political objective.37 Finally, he argues that “the target of the 
damage,”38 is always non-combatants.39 Encompassing these three characteristics of 
terrorism, this study will define terrorism as the creation and psychological 
exploitation of fear through the deliberate use or threat of use of violence against non-
combatants in the hope of creating political change.40 
 
                                                 
32
 Richard English, Terrorism: How to Respond, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009) pp.24-25 
33
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34
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35
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“Correspondence,” American Journal of International Law, Vol.68, No. 3, (July, 1974) p.502, 
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36
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 R. Moss, Urban Guerillas: The New Face of Political Violence (London:Temple Smith, 1972) p.32; 
R. Clutterbuck, Guerillas and Terrorists (London: Faber and Faber, 1977) pp. 11-21; Martha 
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PARADOX OF TERMINOLOGY 
 
The rise of Islamism has thrust the debate on terrorism forward. It has stereotyped the 
debate and at times, it has aluded to the terms Islamism and terrorism as being 
synonymous. This is indeed a growing fallacy in a field where discussions on 
religiously inspired terrorism has encountered a hyperbolic spike. The literary corpus 
on terrorism has often used the terms fundamentalist, radical, extremist, terrorist and 
the recently minted term violent extremist almost interchangeably. It is generally 
assumed that the actors involved often possess a Manichean worldview coupled with 
strong irredentist ambitions. Islamism is “a religious ideology with a holistic 
interpretation of Islam whose final aim is the conquest of the world.”41 At its crux it is 
a type of terrorism - religiously inspired terrorism. The term Islamist underpins “the 
political nature of this movement within the Muslim world – as distinct from 
‘Islamic’, the culture and religion of Islam.”42 
 
All religiously inspired terrorism includes a degree of fundamentalism. 
‘Fundamentalist’ was a term initially coined by Curtis Lee Laws in 1920, the term 
was coined in reference to American protestants who were drawn to the fundamental 
elements of faith and were prepared to defend their faith against modernity and 
secularism. Scholars have constantly attempted to amalgamate the varied terms in a 
generalization that unfortunately provides limited insight with ambiguous language. 
Ben-Dor and Pedahzur for instance attempts to define fundamentalism “as a 
movement that is radical in terms of its goals, extremist in terms of its methods, and 
literalist in terms of its adherence to scripture.” 43  The definition albeit all- 
encompassing does not delineate between (extremist) thought and (extremist) action.  
Perhaps more importantly, it erroneously equates fundamentalism with extremist 
methods. In this study, contrary to Ben-Dor and Pedahzur definition, a fundamentalist 
would refer to individuals or groups who are merely literalist in interpretation of their 
respective faith- returning to the fundamentals of the faith, but it would not 
necessarily entail the manifestation of violence to a point of causing grievous danger 
to others.   
 
In the process of examining the 10 radical groups, this study will delineate this key 
difference and attempt to fill the gap in the theoretical understanding between belief 
system and manifestation of violence. History recognises individuals like Mahatma 
Ghandi who was a non-violent activist; he had deviated from mainstream political 
thought but has successfully managed to inspire revolutionary change without the use 
of violence. 
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 Gabriel Ben-Dor and Ami Pedahzur, “The Uniqueness of Islamic Fundamentalism and the Fourth 
Wave of Terrorism”, in Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions, Vol.4, Issue 3, 2003, p.73 
  
14 
 
Just like the term fundamentalism “has been stretched beyond its original meanings 
the more attenuated it becomes,”44 as seen in the definition by Ben-Dor and Pedahzur, 
the terms used to define individuals participating in acts of terrorism have shifted 
through the course of time as scholars and practitioners alike struggle with labels to 
define the threat in changing times. For instance, the term ‘countering violent 
extremism’45 was recently minted by the Obama administration to purge the ethnic 
and religious stereotypes associated with the term ‘terrorist’ in the recent decade. 
Individuals participating in acts of terrorism are now beginning to be known through 
more apolitical terminology as violent extremists, a term devoid of ethnic, religious, 
political and military undertones. 
 
The diagram below shows the definitional lens through which this study will be 
conducted. A fundamentalist person or group would refer to individuals who are more 
literalist in their religious interpretations. An extremist would refer to an individual or 
group that hold fundamentalist values, and sympathise with the cause of terrorism but 
refrains from engaging in violent acts – extremist ideology. The difference between 
the fundamentalist, extremist and a terrorist or violent extremist would be the use of 
violence to further their cause for radical political change. The process from 
(ideological) extremist to terrorist (violent action) in this case would be referred to as 
radicalisation. It is this shift that this study aims to examine. 
Figure 1: Conceptual Diagram 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Each of the concepts listed in the above conceptual diagram (Fundamentalist, 
Extremist/Ideological Extremist, and Terrorist/Violent Extremist) is rooted in some 
degree of political radicalism. The term ‘ideological extremist’ used here will refer to 
                                                 
44
 ichael Barkun, “Religious Violence and the yth of fundamentalism,” in Totalitarian Movements 
and Political Religions, Vol.4, Issue 3, 2003, p.60 
45
 arc Ambinder, “The New Term for the War on Terror,” The Atlantic, 20 May 2010, (Accessed on 
15 February 2012 at http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2010/05/the-new-term-for-the-war-
on-terrorism/56969/) 
 
                   Ideological Extremist/Extremist  
   (N
o
n
 –
 V
io
len
t) 
 
 
Terrorist / 
Violent Extremist 
   Ideological Extremist / Extremist 
 Radicalisation 
Fundamentalist 
 
 
              (N
o
n
 –
 v
io
len
t) 
Fundamentalist 
  
15 
all forms of ideology that an individual may possess or be partisan to include but not 
limited to religious, political ideology. While all religiously inspired terrorist/violent 
extremists are inherently fundamentalist, not all fundamentalist groups are terrorist in 
nature. At each sub-set, both individuals and the group aim to create the necessary 
social change to achieve their desired state of political affairs. The key difference 
would be the manner in which individuals or the group chooses to manifest this 
political radicalism. At the epicentre of the discourse on political radicalism, is the 
synergy between the desire for social change and the choice of tool utilised for 
creating the desired social change. In the case of terrorists, they move beyond just 
non-violent extremism and choose a pathway of violence to achieve the political end 
state desired.  
 
There is growing contention to identify the means through which radicalisation occurs 
within the two different schools - as a (1) process or (2) a conveyor belt. The former 
assumes that as a process, the radicalisation of individuals occurs gradually but does 
not necessitate the radicalisation to the extent of terrorism. Zeyno Baran used the 
metaphor of a ‘conveyor belt’46 to describe the tenuous shift and the danger posed by 
non-violent extremist who move on to become terrorists.  The metaphor of the 
conveyor belt assumes the movement from one stage to the next is seamless. Scholars 
who advocate that radicalisation occurs using the metaphor of a conveyor belt 
emphasize the underlying security concern that would arise from of non-violent 
extremists as this transition would be inevitable.  
 
Della Porta, Moskalenko and McCauley have argued that this transition is not as fluid 
and often occurs “as a response to perceived injustice inflicted by security forces.”47 
The schools of thought however are not altogether that different. The critical 
difference being the speed at which transition from non-violent extremist to terrorist 
takes place. Scholars like Githens-Mazer and Lambert warn against the blind 
parroting of what they have termed the conventional wisdom on radicalisation.
48
 
Taking into account the mildly reductionist nature of the process and conveyor belt 
models, this study will hence aim to identify and critically evaluate factors that 
generate a visible shift in a group’s pathway of radicalisation. 
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DRIVERS OF RADICALISATION 
 
The quest to identify the key drivers of radicalisation has brought to the foreground a 
nuanced debate on the definition, nature, process and means of radicalisation of 
individuals. Radicalisation remains a contentious subject within the scholarly 
community. The widely accepted working definition used by the European 
Commission refers to radicalisation as the “phenomenon of people embracing 
opinions, views and ideas that could lead to acts of terrorism.”49 Effective counter 
terrorism efforts need to take into account the kinetic efforts aimed at dismantling the 
threat through identifying, apprehending, neutralising and disrupting terrorists and 
terrorists’ cells. In addition to that the kinetic efforts, strategic counter terrorism 
efforts aimed at creating an environment that is hostile to the terrorists need to be 
undertaken. Understanding the processes of radicalisation is a cornerstone in the 
current effort to mitigate the terrorist threat. The factors that radicalisation exert 
significant impact on the internal dynamics of the radical group.  
 
Individuals are motivated to maintain and achieve a positive, more inclusive, self-
definition that fulfils several basic psychological needs such as a sense of belonging, 
distinctiveness, respect, understanding and agency.50 For members of terrorist groups, 
there is already an innate sense of achievement that is derived from merely being part 
of the group that derives legitimacy directly from God. The role that terrorist groups 
as a unique entity play in the radicalisation process has not been thoroughly explored.  
 
The study will evaluate the terrorist group as the principle agent of change. Reinhold 
Niebuhr notes that, “with communities, the self interest of the group is inevitably the 
predominant factor.”51 In this case, the role and decisions of an individual is tied 
intimately with the aims and ambitions of the group. The various processes of 
radicalisation and impact of collective behaviour will be explored later.  
 
OBJECTIVE 
 
This study endeavours to explore the inherent assumption within existing literature on 
radicalisation that the factors that drive the radicalisation of individuals and the 
factors that drive the radicalisation of groups from non-violent ideological extremism 
to terrorism are one and the same. Exponential emphasis has been given to factors that 
motivate individuals to join terrorist organisations. In comparison, little effort is 
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invested to understand if the factors that drive and sustain a group on the path of 
terrorism are similar to factors that motivate individuals on the path of terrorism. 
 
While a group is made out of many individual persons, the social and psychological 
dynamics within a group could dominate and perhaps even override the factors that 
motivate individuals.  Peer groups form a significant means through which 
individuals are socialized into norm and mores. A critical understanding of this 
difference is lacking in much of the current research in security and terrorism studies, 
which has traditionally focused on militant groups, their capabilities and ideologies 
and the government responses to threats they pose.  
 
Even most of the so-called ‘lone wolf’ terrorists at very least subscribe to an existing 
ideology, and/or act on behalf of the interests a larger group. Most terrorists are 
inadvertently part of a group either real or perceived as being member of a global 
ummah or community. As such, understanding individual pathways of radicalisation 
form only one part of equation. The individual pathways of radicalisation would only 
provide insights into why individuals embark on the path of terrorist activity. Little 
research has been done to identify key drivers of radicalisation of groups. The 
heightened radicalisation and violence of groups used in the study here refer to the 
role of a terrorist group as a collective entity to sustain interest, inspire change and 
direct the course of action of the group would provide extremely valuable insights on 
the reasons why some groups espouse radical ideology and why others very quickly 
move one step further to conducting violent acts of terrorism. The groups continue in 
engage in what Barkun terms the playing out of Apocalyptic Scripts whereby “the 
more firmly a group comes to believe that it controls the dynamics of prophetic 
fulfilment, the more likely that its actions will include or precipitate violence.”52 
 
TERRORIST GROUP AS A COLLECTIVE ENTITY:  
TO FORM, INFORM AND TRANSFORM  
 
Terrorist groups are able to not only form an organisation and act as a driver of 
extremist ideology but it also has a unique transformative quality that can direct the 
course of action of an individual and the group as a collective entity. The role of the 
group and consequently the leadership, structure of the group, group dynamics, 
ideological heritage and even the role of charismatic ideologues within an extremist 
or terrorist group are factors that will have an impact on the level and process of 
radicalisation of the group. In particular, the group’s propensity towards violence will 
depend on the group’s ability to harness the role of drivers from within. Using the 
Indonesian case, this study will explore the radical pathways of 10 radical groups in 
Indonesia. The 10 groups that will be examined are, Lashkar Jihad (LJ), Jemaah 
Islamiyah (JI), Darul Islam (DI), Front Pembela Islam (FPI), Negara Islam Indonesia 
(NII), Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HT), Majelis Mujahideen Indonesia (MMI), Jamaah 
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Anshorut Tauhid (JAT), Al Qaeda Indonesia (AI) and Mujahideen Indonesia Timur 
(MIT). Out of approximately twenty-nine groups espousing terrorism and extremism 
in Indonesia, 10 groups were chosen, taking into account the constraints of time 
required in the completion of the study. This study will then aim to “understand the 
nature of terrorist groups, including similarities and differences among them, terrorist 
groups and their warfare can be classifies according to general typologies.”53  
 
The study will highlight the drivers of radicalisation of groups and explore reasons 
why some groups have escalated their levels of violence through the course of time 
whilst others have remained extremists without engaging in acts of violence will be 
explored. In this new and evolving field of study, there is an acknowledgement that 
"additional social science research is needed to study how the ideas that shape the 
objectives of terrorist groups are capable of influencing the thinking and daily 
activities of new recruits and veteran operatives alike."
54
 As such, while shedding 
light on this gap in the literature on the process of radicalisation of groups, the study 
will also extrapolate lessons that would provide a holistic understanding on the 
processes of radicalisation. 
 
RESEARCH QUESTION 
 
Given the similar environment from which a burgeoning number of both extremist 
and terrorist groups thrive in a fertile and permissive environment of Indonesia, the 
study aims to examine 10 radical groups in Indonesia and explore the question: How 
do ideology, leadership and group dynamics play a significant role in the radical 
groups in Indonesia? 
 
To evaluate this phenomenon, the study conducted will build on previous scholarly 
research on radicalisation. The study will be based on the hypothesis that there are 
forces of influence that push a group from extremism to terrorism. Not all groups 
ultimately make that shift to terrorism. The study will explore the premise that 
amongst the forces that move groups along a path of increased violence is an extreme 
political ideology, presence of influential leadership and the role of group dynamics. 
 
This study will thereby examine of ten radical groups in Indonesia chosen from 
groups that were both established in the past to groups that were most recently 
established. While mapping the presence of radicalism in Indonesia through the 
course of history and exploring the connection between groups, the key players within 
the groups and the nature of their inter-group affiliations the study will endeavour to 
explore:  
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1. The identifiable factors make terrorist groups in Indonesia different. 
2. The unique dynamics within terrorist groups that can influence change from non-
violent extremism to terrorism within these 10 radical groups. 
Detailed understanding of these variables will add further insight into the paths of 
radicalisation undertaken by each group and the ability of the group to sustain itself 
on the path of terrorism. Hoffman points to “knowledge (that) is still lacking 
concerning reasons why many “fringe” movements or hitherto peaceful religious cults 
suddenly turn to violence or embark on lethal campaigns of indiscriminate 
terrorism.”55 This study makes an attempt to unravel and shed light on the gap in both 
the literature and understanding of the processes surrounding group radicalisation.  
 
The lessons learned from the Indonesian case study will provide a foundation that will 
be able to assist governments in the establishment of the necessary principles to 
combat radicalisation through a well-rounded strategy. This well-rounded strategy 
will entail a better understanding of the radicalisation process that will include not 
only individual motivations but the pertinent aspect of factors that sustain a group on 
radical pathways that ultimately influence the survival and sustenance of terrorist and 
extremist groups through the years. 
NAVIGATING THROUGH THE CHAPTERS 
 
In a calibrated attempt to unpack the intricacies of the complex riddle of group 
radicalisation. This first chapter has set the landscape and provided both the rationale 
and objective for the study. The next 7 Chapters will address several layers that will 
help shed light on the key factors behind the radicalization of groups. Chapter 2 will 
explore the dominant themes in the on-going discourse on radicalisation. Themes of 
the terrorism and the liberal state and the uniquely permissive environment within 
which terrorist and extremist groups thrive in Indonesia will be addressed in Chapters 
3. Chapter 4 will elaborate on the methodology undertaken in the conduct of the 
study. Chapter 5, 6 and 7 will expound on the three themes, namely the role of 
ideology, the role of leadership and the role of group dynamics within the 
organisation respectively. Thereafter, Chapter 8 will summarise and conclude the 
study expounding on the confluence of these three key themes against the existing 
literature on factors that sustain terrorist and extremist groups.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
“Complexity begets ambiguity, which yields in all ways to prejudice 
and avarice. Complication does not so much defeat Men as arm them 
with fancy.” 
R. Scott Baker 
 
Navigating through the labyrinth of decades of research undertaken by scholars in the 
field of terrorism studies, one line succinctly encapsulates this undertaking. 
The literary corpus on terrorism is simply complicated.   
 
It is simple only to the point that in essence there is a resounding agreement of the 
need for a continued search for answers as scholars and the security community 
grapple to comprehend and make sense of emerging realities. There has been a 
dogged attempt by scholars to try to understand terrorists, attempt to demystify their 
journeys towards terrorism, and at the heart of this literary corpus, struggle to identify 
both the causes and causal factors in the hope of making sense of the threat of 
terrorism.  
 
It is complicated, in that years of research and work by academics, policy makers, 
practitioners and the international community respectively have shed light in more 
areas of inquiry, surfaced more questions and at best produced no agreed upon 
definition. The desire to criminalise acts of violence seems simple, but reality as the 
work of scholars show stems from a deeper and more pronounced need that 
legislation in it of itself would be insufficient in addressing and mitigating the threat 
of terrorism and political violence.  
 
Ariel Merari acknowledges a similar difficulty in that “(t)errorism is a study area 
which is easy to approach but very difficult to copy within a scientific sense. Easy to 
approach - because it has so many angles, touching on all aspects of human behavior. 
Difficult to cope with – because it is so diverse.”56 Albeit there is truth in what John 
Horgan laments in that the field is theoretically underdeveloped and embryonic
57
 as a 
sub-discipline. Horgan’s words echoes the earlier work and words of Alex Schmid 
and Albert Jongman as they critique the discipline of terrorism studies as one that is 
“impressionistic, superficial and often pretentious, venting far reaching 
generalizations on the basis of episodic evidence.”58 In spite of these critiques, it is 
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pertinent to recognise the progress made thus far through the amalgamation of a 
variety of disciplines in the pursuit of acquiring a deeper understanding of the field, 
identifying causal relations amongst actors and exploring means to mitigate the threat 
of terrorism. The attempt to have a greater understanding of the phenomenon of 
terrorism is one that has its roots in history. Rather than concede defeat, what it 
warrants instead is continued research in an ever-evolving field of study. This Chapter 
will comprise two sections. The first section will focus on the complicated labyrinth 
of terrorism studies. The second section of this chapter will explore and expound on 
present models and conceptual frameworks of radicalisation that have arisen in the 
search for answers in the face of a continued threat of terrorism. 
 
TERRORISM STUDIES: THE COMPLICATED AND THE COMPLEX 
 
The repertoire of literature on terrorism and radicalisation bears the hallmarks of both 
the complicated and the complex. “Complex systems theory stands for an approach in 
the social as well as natural and computational sciences that studies how interactions 
between parts give rise to collective behaviors of a system, and how the system 
interacts and forms relationships with its environment.”59 The difference behind these 
deceptively similar concepts was well elaborated by Roberto Poli, the UNESCO 
Chair in Anticipatory Systems. His golden rule on distinguishing between 
complicated and complex systems was aimed at leadership and the ability of leaders 
to find effective solutions to problems.  
 
Poli defined “Complicated problems (as those that) originate from causes that can be 
individually distinguished; they can be addressed piece by piece; for each input to the 
system there is a proportionate output; the relevant systems can be controlled and the 
problems they present admit permanent solutions.”60  This differentiation can also be 
used in the ongoing work in the field of terrorism and studies on radicalisation in 
general, in the hope that it can illuminate and provide a different perspective of the 
ongoing debates in the field. Attempts will be made to unpack the epistemologically 
dense and complicated labyrinth literature through the lens of time. Thus showcasing 
lessons that can be drawn from a historical and macro-understanding of the threat of 
terrorism and its roots.  
 
The first section of this chapter will explore the current scholarship on terrorism, 
through the lens of chronology in what has come to be known in the terrorism studies 
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as waves of terrorism. This refers to the periodic spurts of terrorism related activity 
through time. This section, will additionally highlight the predominant challenges 
within terrorism studies, explore Jason Frank’s notion of terrorism theory vis-à-vis the 
manner in which orthodox, radical and moderate terrorism theory address the root 
causes debate and finally situate the study of radicalisation within the expansive root 
causes debate in terrorism literature. 
 
The second section of the Chapter will explore the realm of the complex. Poli refers 
to  
 
“complex problems and systems (as those that) result from networks of multiple 
interacting causes that cannot be individually distinguished; must be addressed as 
entire systems, that is they cannot be addressed in a piecemeal way; they are such 
that small inputs may result in disproportionate effects; the problems they present 
cannot be solved once and for ever, but require to be systematically managed and 
typically any intervention merges into new problems as a result of the interventions 
dealing with them; and the relevant systems cannot be controlled – the best one can 
do is to influence them, learn to “dance with them”, as Donella Meadows aptly 
said.”61 
 
Even the sentence structure of his definition alludes to a multi-layered process of 
understanding complexity – where one riddle will almost inevitably lead to another. 
The section will shed light on the prominent radicalisation models and processes that 
have gradually surfaced in recent years especially in the aftermath of the attacks of 
September 2001. Each model time and again is resplendent with unique and 
individualised complexity.  
 
At no point in the history of the literature of terrorism has there been such a surge of 
attempts by officers in the security services, law enforcement and academics to 
understand terrorism and pathways of radicalisation. Understanding this unique and 
complex dynamic of radicalisation is a layered and multi-pronged process. This 
chapter will aim to provide a refreshing perspective of several established models and 
perspectives of radicalisation that have come to dominate the discourses in the field 
over the course of time.  
 
THE COMPLICATED: TERRORISM STUDIES THROUGH THE YEARS 
 
Key themes, critiques and the general foundation of the root cause debate within 
terrorism studies will be explored in this first section. It will underscore the 
foundational search for the root causes of terrorism – an old debate that has once 
again resurfaced in approximately the mid-2000 amidst the quest to understand the 
puzzle of radicalisation that has dominated the discourse of terrorism and security in 
recent history. 
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Chronological Understanding: The Four Waves of Terrorism Research 
 
Amongst his seminal works, was featured one of the most comprehensive summations 
of international terrorism through the lens of history, David Rapoport identified four 
waves of terrorism research. These waves were the anarchist, nationalist, 1960s leftist, 
and the current religious waves; each wave had its own unique ideological 
underpinning.
62
  Rasler and Thompson attempted to test and later affirmed Rapoport’s 
notion of the four waves of terrorism. Their work was based on an empirical study of 
groups from 1968-2004.
63
  
 
On one end of the spectrum were scholars like Rapoport, Rasler and Thomson who 
iterated the notion of the four waves of terrorism and posited that it aptly presented 
the discourse over time. On the other end of the spectrum were scholars like Kaplan 
who saw the four waves of terrorism as a necessary but insufficient means of 
explaining terrorism as it changed through the ages. Kaplan, while acknowledging the 
academic and visionary prowess of Rapoport extends his four waves of terrorism 
theory to include a fifth wave modern terrorism as the earlier exposition did  
 
“not account for groups that begin on an international wave—indeed, some of such 
groups may even be the creations of foreign patrons or the result of foreign 
educations or the influence of foreign ideas or religious beliefs on founders of 
groups—but which for some reason have turned inward, cut ties to their 
international benefactors or ideological/religious bedfellows and sought to realize a 
utopian vision of a radically perfected society on the local level”64 
 
It is hence the groups that operate on the periphery that Kaplan and later Lizardo and 
Bergesen
65
 highlight were what they felt as being part of this fifth wave.  
 
Sedgick on the other hand brings to the fore an alternative means of categorising the 
four waves. Contrary to Rapoport, the categorisation of the waves would not be based 
on ideological underpinnings. Sedgewick sees the categorisation based on ideology as 
an “optical illusion”66, whereby it is not so much the role of ideology as noted by 
Rapoport but instead the importance of what he sees as four waves of groups 
underpinned by their ability to inspire other groups to take over their strategy.  The 
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concept of ideology and its role in radicalisation surfaces once again in the models 
and processes of radicalisation. This concept of ideology as a binding factor will be 
explored in greater detail in Chapter 4 of this study. 
 
Furthermore, Harrow, in developing a model on the changing effects of terrorism, 
explores not only “why a wave of terrorism emerges, but most often does not, and 
what goes on inside a wave of terrorism.”67 He notes that, “positive feedbacks of 
terrorism create an emergent identity which facilitates the factors needed for 
terrorism.”68 According to Harrow, it is this positive reverberation that eventually 
results in the creation of a common identity between members of a group. Scholars 
such as Kumar Ramakrishna has emphasized that the notion of the echo-chamber 
effect
69
 in radicalising individuals with a uniform, repetitive and unifying message 
especially in the cyber realm. In this instance, the notion of the echo-chamber would 
equally extend within the parameters of a group. 
 
Old Terrorism and New Terrorism 
 
The present “understanding ‘new terrorism’ are still located in the Cold War state-
centric, realist and positivist perception.” 70  The state centric means of viewing 
terrorism is seen in not only terrorism literature but even at the policy level wherein 
law enforcement and security have a strong role in protecting against acts of 
terrorism. 
One thing that has been certain is the need for value neutrality in the field of defining 
terrorism, the emotive nature of the subject matter, the multiplicity of referent objects 
from government, terrorist groups to victim continues to plague the field. As a result, 
“the meaning and usage of the word have changed over time to accommodate the 
political vernacular and discourse of each successive era, terrorism has proved 
increasingly elusive in the face of attempts to construct one consistent definition.”71 
As such, despite the fact that “the historical origins of the concepts of ‘terror’ and 
‘terrorism’ are relatively uncontroversial, their contemporary moral and substantive 
load and scope are matters of continuing debate.”72 The attempts and “trend toward 
ever more convoluted semantic obfurscations to side-step terrorism’s pejorative 
overtones has, if anything, become more entrenched in recent decades.”73  
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Constant Critique within the Literature on Terrorism and the Birth of a Sub-field 
 
There have been a number of critiques that have surfaced in the literature of terrorism. 
Amongst these critiques is the inability to have a universal definition, the low barriers 
to entry and intellectual myopia of the field after many years of work by scholars. In 
recent times, there has been a birth of a new sub-field of research within terrorism 
studies that could be touted as the new wave that aspires to herald a new dawn of 
research in terrorism studies.  
 
No Universal Definition  
 
In an academic discipline that has long been established, the level of uncertainly with 
basic concepts that continues to thrive has been both a wonder and an impediment. It 
is a wonder that despite the efforts undertaken by the international academic 
community and policy makers alike, the problem of definitions continue to be an 
impediment. The lack of a universally agreed upon definition of terrorism will 
continue to be a haunting echo and a bitter aftertaste amidst both the academic 
discourse as well as the policy domain not only in the near future but almost certainly 
in years to come.  
 
Low Barriers to Entry and Intellectual Myopia 
 
The insufferable reality to terrorism academicians and practitioners alike is that 
despite the inability to agree upon a definition, terrorism has been a field that has 
experienced a phenomenal thrust in the volume of work done but curiously enough 
has managed to stagnate just as quickly. Certainly enough has been done by exploring 
the intelligence failure in the lead up to September 2011, Hoffman highlighted that 
while failure in the intelligence community was critiqued, academic failure present in 
the field of terrorism studies, especially the level of “intellectual myopia that 
characterised the field.” 74  He notes that while this failure was “patently less 
consequential, they were no less significant: calling into question the relevance of 
much of the scholarship on terrorism during the years leading up to 9/11.”75  
 
In 1988, Schmidt and Jongman commented that, “more than 85 percent of all books 
on the topic have been written since 1968.”76 They strongly critiqued the existing 
literature, noting that despite the volume in literature increasing after the 1970s, most 
of the areas of terrorism research was “impressionistic, superficial, and at the same 
time often also pretentious venturing far-reaching generalisations on the basis of 
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episodal evidence.”77 Despite what Sheperd78 in 2007 referred to as a golden age in 
terrorism literature after September 2001, the dearth of scholarship based on new 
evidence was observed was later made by Silke in 2008. He drew attention to the fact 
that “one new book on terrorism is being published every six hours. And this is just 
English-language titles.”79 In 2011, Dolnik goes further to state that only three books 
evaluating the state of the field and its future directions have been published in the 
last 10 years.”80  
 
A recurrent theme over the past three decades since then is the simmering frustrations 
in a field where the low barriers to have meant that writers in a multitude of fields of 
expertise and journalists alike compete with academics and policy makers on the 
same playing field. As such, news articles on terrorism by journalist tethering 
academic and scholarly literature and eventually becoming the pool of primary data 
acquired. The low barriers to entry have been a critique that scholars in terrorism have 
long held in the field of terrorism. This never ending cycle has in turn yielded never 
ending critique on the nature of data acquisition that has influenced both the quality 
and the type of discourse undertaken by scholars in the field. This aspect will be dealt 
with in some detail in the next chapter on methodology.  
 
Birth of a Sub-Field of Critical Terrorism Studies 
 
This revivalist search of answers founded on the aspiration to almost whip into shape 
a discipline whom in the eyes of prominent Critical Terrorism Studies scholars such 
as Franks, Jackson, Gunning and Smith amongst others as having bordered on 
becoming undisciplined in the search for knowledge within the domain of terrorism 
studies. This has therein led to the birth of Critical Terrorism Studies. As a field of 
study, “(f)rom its earliest inception, the critical theory of the Frankfurt School 
rejected the notion that it is possible to circumscribe the particular, socially and 
historically situated responsibility of each individual discipline independently of the 
other – thus the need for rigorously interdisciplinary perspective.”81 It is with this 
same desire for an interdisciplinary platform that this study aims to rest its 
foundations upon. Paul Wilkinson posited that one of the fundamental reasons 
Terrorism Studies did not emerge as a field of study was in part due not only because 
of the level of conviction amongst scholars that Terrorism was of little strategic 
consequence amidst the dominant discourse of the Cold War but also due to “the 
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hostility of many established university departments to multi-disciplinary studies of 
any kind.”82 Jackson emphasizes,  
 
“that the present historical juncture presents an extraordinary opportunity to 
develop a critically-oriented approach to the study of political terrorism, in large 
part because disillusionment with the existing field of knowledge and practice has 
opened up the intellectual, political and discursive space that is necessary for the 
articulation of new ideas, questions, approaches, and paradigms.”83  
 
For what better time is there than the present to reassess what has now come to be 
assumed as infallible truths within terrorism discourse amongst generations of 
scholars in the field of terrorism studies. The strongest critique of this sub-field is the 
feared moral repugnance when embarking on a critical evaluation of terrorism 
wherein the referent would not be the state but which could also include terrorist 
groups as well, is that it will appear morally repugnant to take the side of the 
terrorists, or that research might point to their claims being justified. A justified claim, 
does not in turn justify the violence in order to achieve it.  
 
As opposed to being derided, as a sub-field that questions for the sake of questioning, 
this study hopes to embrace these very differences within the field, while exploring a 
few themes in the discourse of terrorism that has been often spoken as accepted truths 
about but remain unexplored through either quantitative or qualitative research. The 
bridge between orthodox and traditional terrorism research and critical terrorism 
studies lies in the ability to form a middle way between these sub-fields, 
acknowledging the limitations and embracing the differences. For it remains only in 
highlighting these differences can true progress be made in contributing a small drop 
to a vast ocean of research amidst years of work done in the field of terrorism studies.  
 
Root Causes of Terrorism Debate 
 
Central to the terrorism discourse is the role of human interaction vis-à-vis a group 
and vis-à-vis the society as a whole. Thomas Mockaitis highlights the sense of 
alienation from communities, the frustration and the humiliation that these individuals 
experience as being the principal driving forces toward joining a terrorist group. “The 
answer to that question lies not in the disciplines of history and politics but in the field 
of human psychology.”84 The human element and its interaction with the community 
has been, is and will continue to be a fundamental thread in the terrorism studies 
discourse. 
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At the core of this study is the intricate weave of the historical attempts of the root 
causes debate and the revival of the key theme that has dominate terrorism discourse 
over the past few years on radicalisation. Sarah Marsden and Alex Schmid iterate that 
this very  
 
“debate on ‘root causes’ and terrorist group justifications is one, and it necessitates 
multiple levels of analysis, implicating historical, social, political, ideology and group 
psychology. What would be most helpful is a layered approach allowing the 
exploration of different levels of analysis within a framework of hypothesised causes 
and justifications of terrorism. The difficulties in this endeavor are numerous and 
implicate a plethora of variables, making parsimonious aetiological typology 
particularly challenging. However, the explanatory weight, and the possibility or 
theory generation makes it an aspiration worth pursuing in future typological 
efforts.”85 
 
Despite the initial difficulties faced in gleaning empirical data necessary for this 
study, the next Chapter will elaborate on the empirical data and interviews that form 
the foundations of this study. While acknowledging the work of past scholarship, 
through an exploration of the core themes of this root causes debate, themes of 
poverty, liberal democracy, nation-centrist views of the policies through the course of 
the chapters to come; this study will move away from the theoretical generalisations 
of evolution of terrorism as a field of study, and explore the phenomenon of terrorism 
through the lens of a single country case study of Indonesia. 
 
As part of the root causes debate, this study aims not to look at the question - why 
terrorism occurs per se. The focus will be how escalation to violence occurs within 
the context of a group. The hope would be to identify the factors that lead to the 
escalation of violence within the realm of a group. This would translate to a better 
understanding of the nature of the threat and thereby help to influence policy making 
to better mitigate the threat in the future.  
 
3 Types of Terrorism Theory and the Root Causes Debate 
 
In contrast with the historical lens use by scholars such as Rapoport and Kaplan, 
Jason Franks draws attention to what he posits as three types of Terrorism Theory. He 
differentiates his three theories based on the manner in which they address the root 
causes debate through the course of time. As a collective while the three types of 
theories agree with the general challenges that underscore the terrorism as a field of 
study, the manner in which scholars engage with the debate on the specific area of 
root causes provides a refreshing perspective and lens to look at the type of 
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scholarship that have therein dominated the field amidst the waves of terrorism and 
the “approaches to explaining the root of terrorism.”86  
 
Differentiating between these three theories, Franks notes that the first Orthodox 
Terrorism Theory, attempt to view acts of terrorism through the perspective of the law 
and legality surrounding acts of violence. In this instance, theories within the 
Orthodox band, “does not engage in a roots debate as it favours the illegal and 
illegitimate approach to explaining terrorism that mirrors the realist, state-centric 
understanding.”87 Here, the legal instruments of the states would look upon terrorism 
not only acts of violence that harms life and property but also as an activity that is in 
opposition to state governance tantamount to treason. The Internal Security Act in 
Singapore and even the Patriots Act in the United States is an example of this.  
 
In comparison with the legal lens used in Orthodox Terrorism Theory, Radical 
Terrorism Theories on the other hand, “explains and understands terrorism largely 
from the perspective of the terrorist”88 as such the tendency for the authors to use the 
root causes debate a means for the “justification of violence.”89 The authors of these 
would include the literature from prolific authors who are usually part of the terrorist 
or extremist movements who write in support of terrorism and empathise with the 
necessity to fight for a cause that they perceive to be just.  
 
In Indonesia, the ideologues from terrorist and extremist groups have taken to writing 
books and spreading their ideology through writings and publications. Approximately 
three years ago in Indonesia, at its height, there were dedicated publishing houses for 
extremist literature that began surfacing to feed this industry. Until today, terrorist in 
Indonesian prisons continue to write books that are then published for mass 
consumption and sold in bookstores in Indonesia. Several of these books will be used 
as part of this study to understand their justifications for the path of violence that they 
have undertaken. 
  
Last but not least, in Moderate Terrorism Theory, “attempts are made to explain and 
understand the roots of terrorism in relation to socio-economic and structural as well 
as political causes.”90 In this case, theories within this moderate bracket attempt to 
highlight the root causes and explore means through which terrorism can be 
mitigated. The underlying assumption here is that these root causes can be addressed 
to some degree and as such the rationalising of the causes of terrorism.  
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In this first section, the“ “Complicated” refers to a system having many parts, making 
it somewhat harder to understand, whereas “complex” refers to a system being not 
fully predictable.”91 The overarching historical perspective provides an overview with 
a sufficient degree of clarity through the broad brushstrokes of history. As such, in 
spite of the critiques and the challenges in even defining terrorism the “weight of the 
literature is focused upon terrorism rather than radicalisation”92 
The process of radicalisation on the other hand is complex. The unpredictability of the 
process of radicalisation is especially telling in the fact that to date, there is no means 
to definitively identify if the journey of an individual will ultimately lead to an act of 
terrorism. This complexity is increased by the sheer subjectivity surrounding what is 
seen to be the insidious nature of radicalisation and the unpredictable nature of human 
behavior.  
 
THE COMPLEX: RADICALISATION THE PUZZLE OF OUR TIME 
 
In studying the process of radicalisation, sensitisation to the complexity of the human 
person and the socio-political interaction within and amongst groups of actors are 
pertinent.  
“We can understand simple and complicated systems by taking them apart and 
analyzing the details. However, we cannot understand complex systems by applying 
the same strategy of reductionism. But we can achieve some understanding by 
watching and studying how the whole system operates.”93  
This section will highlight the attempts to identify models that aim to draw lessons 
from larger social systems and explore its impact on the process of radicalisation.  
Radicalisation and the Root Causes Debate 
While there have been attempts at a meta-analysis on the subject of radicalisation, 
little effort has been made through the years to identify a definitive process through 
which radicalisation occurs. The beacon of hope in policy circles has been that by 
understanding radicalisation, it will help guide not only preventive efforts prior to 
individuals being radicalised but will also influence efforts to counter violent 
radicalisation. One of the initial assumptions and perhaps more simplistic definitions 
on radicalisation have referred to radicalisation as a process preceeding violent 
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extremism. This definition propagates a “systematic bias in the literature” 94 as it is 
premised on the assumption is that the process of radicalisation should inadvertently 
lead to violence. The definition of radicalisation needs to be nuanced and include the 
understanding that radicalisation does not necessarily equate to or result in violence.  
In a paper released by the European Commission to the European Parliament, noted 
that the “trends, means and patterns of radicalisation have evolved and broadened.”95 
Broadly, the study of radicalisation aims to understand the process of how persons 
that get involved in terrorism, stay involved in terrorism and thereafter potentially 
leave terrorism is unique to individuals, groups and the context within which this 
occurs.
96
 
Eminent scholars such as Alex Schmid and Peter Neumann iterated that while the 
literature on radicalisation has begun to surface increasingly in approximately 2004, 
the fact was the radicalisation debate has its beginnings in what was the waning 
debate on root causes. It is the resurrection of an old undercurrent that has meandered 
its path through history and the multiple waves of terrorism that was explored in the 
section above. 
The radicalisation debate sprung from a growing consciousness that through 
understanding as Charles Tilly aptly noted the reasons “why” and the processes “how” 
terrorism occurs, the solutions created to mitigate the threat can be better shaped to 
affect a greater impact in a shorter time. This growing consciousness additionally 
stemmed from the acknowledgement that efforts other than kinetic means against 
terrorism needed to be sought and put to into action. The understanding of the 
processes of radicalisation would thereby help not only to mitigate acts of terrorism 
but would simultaneously influence the counter terrorism policies. In short, the impact 
of earnestly understanding radicalisation was a tall order. It was hoped that this 
understanding would affect multiple ends of the spectrum - enable the critical 
evaluation of current measures in place, create new and effective measures to counter 
radicalisation and ultimately also influence the efforts at de-radicalisation.  
This study will highlight the unique factors within groups in Indonesia that move the 
group from radical thought to violent action. This study will aim to explore the 
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various journeys and pathways undertaken by individuals and possibility that the push 
and the pull factors are only important when individual join the group. Heightened 
violence on the other hand may depend on other factors within the group. For 
instance, the role of group dynamics, wherein the strength of influencers within the 
group can not only dominated the discourse within a group but could ultimately alter 
the pathways of a given group or organisation towards violence.  
Building on the Work of Scholars  
Clara Volintiru’s work in 2010 explored the necessity to build what she referred to as 
a dynamic model of terrorist radicalisation. In essence it would be a model that 
“accounts for the interaction between an individual’s motivation and the determining 
factors surrounding context.”97 Her work while applied to the case studies of Kosovo 
and Chechnya, put forth a case extolling the benefits of creating a synthesis between 
and amongst models that have often been used in the field. The idea of amalgamating 
theories that support the process of radicalisation is not new. As with most cases of 
radicalisation the answer is almost never mono-causal. In an early evaluation of 
Jemaah Islamiyah a prominent terrorist group in Indonesia, it was noted that, “the 
transnational, networked and non-state threat of Jemaah Islamiyah arises from the 
specific conjunction of localized contextual factors, social psychological variables, 
and specific ideological impulses.”98 
 
In a collection of articles in 2011, Randy Borum was the first to put together one of 
the more comprehensive compilation of theories and concepts on radicalisation by 
scholars in a single series to date. In 2012, Kris Christmann building on Borum’s 
work, compiled  “scholarly literature on the process(es) of radicalisation, particularly 
among young people, and the availability of interventions to prevent extremism.”99 
Certainly while the models that were highlighted in Christmann’s was not altogether 
new, the aspect that he focussed was on radicalisation as a process.  
 
This section will build on the work of Borum and Christmann and showcase the 
models and conceptual frameworks of radicalisation that have over time come to 
dominate discussions in this field. Borum and Christmann’s excellent work have laid 
the foundation having thematically dealt with the various models and conceptual 
frameworks of radicalisation respectively.  
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In this review, not only will these radicalisation models be addressed and expanded 
upon, they will additionally be chronology arranged in accordance to the years that 
they surface. Chronology in this instance, will offer what is hoped to be a refreshing 
perspective to the manner in which these models of radicalisation have surfaced over 
time. These models and conceptual frameworks appeared against a backdrop of on-
going terrorist threat and attacks. The models appeared not in a time space vacuum 
but against a dynamic environment, where globalisation and technology appears to 
have led to the increased speed of radicalisation. The earlier work by Borum and 
Christmann while thematically arranged, does not account for the dynamic 
environment where there was a surge in models within a short span of 2 years. What 
they have managed to highlight is that at the core, there are commonalities between 
and amongst models and conceptual frameworks of radicalisation over the years.  
 
A Crucible of Explanations: Models and Conceptual Frameworks of Radicalisation 
The efforts made towards understanding the processes and models of radicalisation 
thus far have been rightfully derived from an amalgamation of multiple disciplines. 
Embroiled in a layered complexity, attempts to demystify radicalisation have resulted 
in the depiction of this journey as stages, processes, phases, pathways, mechanisms 
and even metaphorically as a staircase and a conveyor belt. These conceptual 
frameworks, diagrams and metaphors aimed not only to explain the radicalisation 
through organising thought, providing possible action plans but also to some extent 
wanting aspiring to be predictive in nature. This struggle to make sense of the threat is 
especially seen in the proliferation of models and concepts. 
 
These models and conceptual frameworks have grown amidst almost entrenched 
problems in the discipline. These have included amongst others differing definitions 
and terminology, debates on definition, the lack of empirical data and resulting 
rehashing of old data and last but not least the intrinsic challenge of access to 
interviewees amongst others. The dominant models and conceptual frameworks of 
radicalisation that have surfaced over the past few years have focused the threat of 
Islamist radicalisation. As a result, amidst a growing homegrown threat of terrorism, 
governments in the west in particular were accused of using the notion of 
radicalisation as a “master signifier of the late ‘war on terror’ and (that it) provided a 
new lens through which to view Muslim minorities.” 100   This was amongst the 
critiques raised of the impact that these models and conceptual frameworks of 
radicalisation played on operational counter-terrorism measures.  
 
In the attempt to reduce abstraction, conceptual models aim to identify key concepts, 
showcase inter-connectivity between concepts and map the application of these 
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concepts within the parameters of given scenarios and contexts.
101
 A conceptual 
framework by extension is “the system of concepts, assumptions, expectations, 
beliefs, and theories that supports and informs your research.”102 Like the notion of 
the paradigm addressed later in Chapter 3, a conceptual framework forms “the entire 
constellation of beliefs, values, techniques, and so on shared by the members of a 
given community”103  
  
PROMINENT RADICALISATION MODELS AND CONCEPTUAL 
FRAMEWORKS  (1980 – 2014) 
 
For ease of understanding, these models on radicalisation surfaced gradually over a 
period of time against the backdrop of an evolving threat landscape over close to 35 
years. The various models of radicalisation have been divided into 4 phases mirroring 
the backdrop against and nature of the models and conceptual frameworks and the 
speed in which they had surfaced. The Phases are as follows, Phase 1: The Enquiry 
(before 2000), Phase 2: The Struggle to Understand (2001-2005), Phase 3:The 
Proliferation of Models and Conceptual Frameworks (2006-2009) and finally Phase 
4: The Quest (2010 – 2014). While not every radicalisation model and conceptual 
framework that has surfaced will be discussed given constraints of space, the table 
below provides a relatively expansive list of the models and conceptual frameworks 
that have gained much prominence in the discipline. These models and conceptual 
frameworks will be discussed in this Chapter are listed for ease of reference in the 
table below.  
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Table 1: Radicalisation Models and Conceptual Frameworks 
 
The 17 models and conceptual framework on radicalisation begin with the 
foundations that were laid by prominent scholars in the field.  Central to this is the 
underlying current that all the models collectively aim to develop and enhance the 
understanding of the process of radicalisation. After the NCTC model in 2011, there 
were fewer models that gained prominence in recent years.  
 
Phase 1: The Enquiry (Before 2000) 
 
The first phase looks at the inquiry into the processes of radicalisation prior to the 
surge in radicalisation models in the aftermath of the attack of the World Trade 
                                                 
104
 Michael Taarnby, “Recruitment of Islamist Terrorists in Europe. Trends and Perspectives,” 
Research report funded by the Danish Ministry of Justice, 14 January 2005 
NO YEAR MODELS AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORKS AUTHOR 
Phase 1: The Enquiry (before 2000) 
1 1981 Process of Terrorism Martha Crenshaw 
Phase 2: The Struggle to Understand (2001 – 2006) 
2 2003 4- stages in ideological development Randy Borum 
3 2004 Al-Muhajiroun Model of Radicalisation Quintin Wictorowicz 
4 2005 Phases of Islamic Radicalisation Michael Taarnby
104
 
5 2005 Staircase to Terrorism Model Fathali Moghaddam 
6 2005 Conveyer Belt Zeyno Baran 
7 2006  ‘Continuum’ of Salafi-Jihadi 
radicalization 
Jeffry Cozzens 
Phase 3:  The Proliferation (2007 – 2008) 
8 2007 4-Stage Process of Radicalisation of Al 
Qaeda influenced radicalisation 
Mark Sageman 
9 2007 NYPD Model Silber and Bhatt 
10 2007 FBI Model  FBI Department 
11 2008 ACPO Prevent Pyramid ACPO 
12 2008 4-Stage Pathway Model for suicide 
bombers 
P. Gill 
13 2008 12 Mechanisms of Political 
Radicalisation 
McCauley and 
Moskalenko 
14 2008  Integrated 6 stage model of radicalisation Savage and Liht 
15 2008 Recognising Radicalisation (RECORA) Meah Yousif and 
Collun Millis 
Phase 4: The Quest (2009 – 2014) 
16 2009 Root Cause Model of Radicalisation Tinka Veldhuis and  
Jorgen Staun 
17 2011 U.S. NCTC Dynamic Framework NCTC 
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Centre on 11 September 2001. One of the early articles on the processes of 
radicalisation that was put together was in 1981 by eminent scholar Martha Crenshaw. 
Her work on the Process of Terrorism focused on the psychological variables that 
influenced an individual to participate in acts of terrorism. The process as Crenshaw 
referred to was analysed on three levels, “first on situational variables, then on the 
strategy of the terrorist organization, and last on the problem of individual 
participation.” 105  Central to her work is the notion of rational choice wherein a 
“terrorist group reasons that there is no alternative”106 and as a result will pursue a 
process that will ultimately involve them conducting acts of terrorism in order to 
achieve their goal.  The process would be triggered by a sense that violence in the 
only means possible. 
 
While Crenshaw’s work did not explicitly use the word radicalisation, her use of the 
word process of terrorism ties in to the same conceptual understanding of this very 
process of radicalisation that has come to dominate contemporary terrorism studies 
literature as a whole. Her work highlighted one of the key themes on causes the 
influence the role of individual choice and the group mechanisms that influence and 
ultimately sustain the choice of an individual.  
 
Crenshaw posits that“(t)here are two fundamental questions about the psychological 
basis of terrorism. The first is why the individual takes the first step and chooses to 
engage in terrorism: why join?”107 The second question she emphasizes “is more 
appropriate: Why does involvement continue? What are the psychological 
mechanisms of group interaction?”108 Both the questions form the foundations of the 
discourse even in the literature on terrorism close to three decades on. This study will 
hope to explore what Crenshaw raises early on – why do individuals continue within 
the group? What factors in the group’s interactions inspires sustainability of the 
terrorist or extremist group in the face counter terrorism efforts by governments 
globally.  
 
Central to the early discourse on processes was the notion of rational choice. This was 
an aspect that Crenshaw has also emphasised. It was also a theme that criminologists 
have explored at approximately the same time. Clarke and Cornish’s Rational Choice 
Theory argue that individuals are always seeking to be rational. They iterate that not 
only are there choice-structuring properties at play with the array of cost benefits 
analysis, however there is a need to explore mitigating factors at play that will affect 
the choice undertaken by an individual. Applied to radicalization, one of the strongest 
mitigating or sustaining an individual’s involvement could be that of the group.  
 
Phase 2: The Struggle to Understand (2001 – 2006) 
 
In the immediate aftermath of September 2001 there were 6 dominant models of 
radicalisation that had surfaced over the span of approximately 5 years. These models 
had a strong ideological and social network slant within the discourse. The work of 
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the scholars behind these initial models of radicalisation were focussed on Salafi-
Jihadi ideology, the role of the global threat landscape with an emphasis on the 
Soviet-Afghan War in 1979 and the on-going strife in Bosnia and Chechnya amongst 
others.  
 
Amidst the strong struggle to understand and rationalise the attacks of terrorism that 
were devastating the world, these models highlighted a paradigm of recruitment and 
alluded to the role of the grassroots and a bottom-up strategy of recruitment by 
terrorist groups. A subtle current that underscored these models was the emphasis on 
the role of minority groups were being recruited from Europe. These early studies on 
radicalisation were based on the recruitment and radicalisation strategies of Al-
Muhajiroun and the Hamburg Cell. 
 
In 2003, Randy Borum highlighted the 4-stages in ideological development, in an FBI 
bulletin. These stages were aimed to be a heuristic tool that would aid law 
enforcement and investigators. The 4 stages are as follows: It’s not right, It’s not fair, 
It’s your fault, You’re evil. The first stage would be to have an issue at hand, perhaps 
a sense of disenfranchisement, the second stage “begins by framing some unsatisfying 
event or condition as being unjust, (the third stage) blaming the injustice on a target 
policy, person or nation, and then (finally stage four) vilifying it, often demonizing, 
he responsible party to facilitate justification for aggression.”109 Borum notes that 
“understanding, anticipating and forecasting another’s behavior, demands not only an 
ideological understanding but a behavioural one as well.”110 
 
Based on insights gleaned from a study of Al-Muhajiroun, Quintan Wictorowitz 
highlights the role of social influence
111
 in radicalisation. Wictorowitz refers to a four 
stage process of (a) cognitive opening where a person is open to new ideas, (b) 
religious seeking, where the individual uses a religion to justify actions, (c) frame 
alignment where the frame of religion and current state of world affairs are enmeshed 
to produce a common narrative and (d) socialization wherein indoctrination and 
change in identity and values occur.
112
  
 
Taarnby’s model was based on lessons learned from the Hamburg cell. It comprised 8 
stages beginning with individual alienation and thereafter leading onto a string of 
stages such as the need for a spiritual quest, a process of radicalisation, meeting with 
individuals who are of the similar disposition, formation of cells, accepting violence 
as the only means to an end, connecting with someone from within an established 
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terrorist organization and culminating in a terrorist operation.
113
  At its core, these 8 
stages, highlighted the “existence of a strong social affiliation between a group of 
Islamists. Often this affiliation is shaped by close friendships, kinship or 
discipleship.”114 The emphasis in Taarnby’s study was the role of social networks and 
ideology. 
 
 oghaddam’s model conceptualised the process of radicalisation as synonymous to 
that of a staircase. He highlights “an urgent need for greater attention to the social and 
psychological processes that lead to terrorist acts.” 115  Using the metaphor of a 
staircase with a ground floor and five higher floors, Moghaddam explores the 
psychological processes that surround the movement to each “floor.” In this instance, 
terrorism is constructed within the frame of a “moral problem with psychological 
underpinnings; (Moghaddam notes that) the challenge is to prevent disaffected youth 
and others from becoming engaged in the morality of terrorist organizations”116 At the 
ground floor were the vast majority of people occupy what he terms as the 
“foundational” ground floor, where what matters most are perceptions of fairness and 
just treatment. Here the focus of the individual would be on material conditions and a 
generic sense of the need for justice in what is perceived to be an unjust society.  
 
At the first floor, individuals then explore their perceived options to mitigate unfair 
treatment. After a period of explorations the second floor, looks at the individual’s 
readiness to engage in acts of aggression and as such seek to move higher on the 
metaphorical staircase. In the search to do more, the individual morally engages with 
terrorist organisations that ideologically justify their struggle to achieve an ideal 
society, in this instance through any means possible. The fourth floor, refers to the 
stage when an individual joins and is part of a terrorist organization and due to the 
secrecy surrounding the group, exiting the group would no longer be an option.  At 
the fifth and final level would be the individual crossing the threshold of inhibition 
and conducting acts of terrorism.
117
  
 
Another metaphor that has gained prominence is that of the conveyor belt. In 2005, 
Zeyno Baran’s Seminal work on Hizbut Tahrir presented this metaphor. He noted that 
while “HT is not itself a terrorist organization, but it can usefully be thought of as a 
conveyor belt for terrorists. It indoctrinates individuals with radical ideology, priming 
them for recruitment by more extreme organizations where they can take part in 
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actual operations.”118 Glees and Pope concur and following the metaphor note that 
“their research found that there is a parallel between the activities of the extremist 
Islamist group Hizbut-Tahrir and Islamic student societies at London university 
campuses (and else-where in the UK) and the recruitment of British Muslim students 
into terrorism.”119  
 
In 2006, Cozzens’ aimed “to generalize and expand Taarnby’s phases of 
radicalisation to more explicitly highlight the function of ideology while adding a 
further layer of analysis to capture its ability to shape jihadi violence and legitimize it 
after the fact.”120 Following in the earlier work of Wictorowitz and Sageman on the 
role of salafi-ideology, Cozzens acknowledged that “Ideology is not the only element 
critical to address through development initiatives designed to counter the Salafi-
Jihadi world-view.”121 The “‘continuum’ of Salafi-Jihadi radicalization – a system 
spanning from an individual’s initial embrace of the Salafi-Jihadi worldview to the 
commission of violence and its sub-sequent legitimization. This model provides a 
more structured approach to discerning the multiple roles that Salafi-Jihadi ideology 
plays within the radicalization process.”122  
 
The models of radicalisation proposed by Wictorowitz, Taarnby and Cozzens would 
inadvertently influence much of the discourse that would follow in the years to come. 
Despite the assumed strong emphasis on the European experience that lubricated the 
general understanding of radicalisation, the general lessons that were expounded by 
all three scholars, were especially pertinent in the radicalisation processes of terrorists 
in Indonesia. This was especially seen in the radicalisation processes during the 
Christmas Day bombings in 2000, Bali Bombings in 2002 and 2005, the attack on the 
Australian Embassy in 2003 and the attack on the JW Marriott hotel in 2005. The 
initial assessments by scholars and security community on the attacks in Indonesia 
was the role of ideology and the strength of the social networks that influences 
recruitment strategies of the operatives in Southeast Asia. 
 
Phase 3: The Proliferation of Models of Radicalisation (2008-2009) 
 
Between 2007 and 2008 there was a proliferation of radicalisation models that aimed 
to understand this unique process of movement from violent ideas to violent action, 
with 8 models within the course of 2 years. The dominant discourse at this phase was 
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the discussions on the need to tease the intricate difference between individuals that 
possess violent thoughts and the necessity to stop potential acts of terrorism. In this 
phase, the proliferation of models of radicalisation could be seen to stem from the 
desire to nip the problem of terrorism in the bud.  
 
It could be posited that this proliferation could have arisen from the frustration that 
kinetic measures in itself would have limitations. The desire to understand and 
showcase process and journey towards activism formed the underlying focus of these 
models. Substantial resources were poured by governments into research that would 
help identify patterns of radicalisation, in part due to assumption that the models of 
radicalisation could facilitate better understanding and facilitate action from the legal 
dimension. Furthermore, the surge of models of radicalisation could be seen in rise in 
the focus of governments, founding of research centres dedicated to radicalisation. 
The proliferation of research centres and the proliferation of terminology by 
international institutions such as UN’s violent extremism and radicalization that lead 
to terrorism (VERLT), even Obama’s change in rhetoric to violent extremism and not 
terrorism, highlight the need for a more nuanced understanding of the process of 
radicalization – for not all who follow on the path of radicalization become terrorists, 
while motivated, they may not engage in acts of terrorism. 
 
In 2007, in the aftermath of the London Bombings an area that has gained much 
importance is the emergence of what Aidan Kirby calls indigenous radicalisation of 
self-starter cells
 123
 where the role of globalisation and the Internet plays a pertinent 
role in the creation of networks. It was against this backdrop of an urgent need for 
answers that there was a surge in models of radicalisation.  
 
The Marc Sageman 4-Stage Process of Radicalisation  
 
In the aftermath of the failed plot in Fort Dix in May 2007 to kill U.S. military 
personnel, was Marc Sageman’s June 2007 testimony to the United States Senate 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. Sageman drew 
attention to the “process of radicalization as consisting of four prongs: a sense of 
moral outrage (to perceived major violations); a specific interpretation of the world 
(typically seen as a War Against Islam); resonance with personal experiences 
(especially how they perceive themselves to be treated in their daily lives); and 
mobilization through networks (either through real world activity or through the 
online realm).”124 Like scholars before him albeit showcasing the idea through the 
concept of phases or stages, he added that the “four factors are not stages in a process, 
nor do they occur sequentially. They are simply four recurrent phases in this 
process.”125 
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New York Police Department (NYPD) 4-Stages of Radicalisation  
Silber and Bhatt’s NYPD model that was published in 2007, drew inspiration from 
Sageman’s earlier work on terrorist networks. The model that the NYPD created was 
based on their analysis of “three U.S. homegrown terrorism cases and two New York 
City based cases namely, Lackawana, New York; Portland, Oregon; Northern 
Virginia; New York City - Herald Square Subway and New York City – The Al 
Muhajiroun Two.
126
 The model was tested against case studies of attacks in Madrid 
2004, Amsterdam 2004, London 2005, Sydney and Melbourne 2005 and Toronto 
2006.  At the heart of this model was the aim to develop strategies for law 
enforcement to mitigate the terrorist threat in both an efficient and effective manner.  
“Understanding this trend and the radicalization process in the West that drives 
“unremarkable” people to become terrorists is vital for developing effective counter- 
strategies and has special importance for the NYPD and the City of New York.
127
  
The model comprised four distinct stages, Stage 1 - Pre-Radicalisation wherein 
individuals who are susceptible to terrorist and extremist ideology are vulnerable, 
Stage 2 - Self-Identification whereby the individual identifies with not only a new 
identity but new groups of individuals who reflect this change in themselves, Stage 3- 
Indoctrination where the individual embraces salafi-jihadi ideology more often than 
not through a person who is a religious leader and finally culminating in Stage 4 – 
Jihadisation where the individual acting often though not always as part of a group to 
carry out acts of violence.
128
  
Silber and Bhatt identified several catalysts that could propel individual through the 
stages, including political, economic and social factors. 3 factors were emphasised as 
essential to the incremental movement through the stages was the first, (a) Group 
Think that was deemed “as a force-multiplier for radical thought while creating a 
competitive environment amongst the group members for being the most radical.”129 
The second factor, (b) was a spiritual sanctioner  “who provides the justification for 
jihad—a justification that is especially essential for the suicide terrorist. In some cases 
the sanctioner was the nucleus around which the cluster formed.”130 Finally, (c) an 
operational leader “who is essential as the group decides to conduct a terrorist act--
organizing, controlling and keeping the group focused and its motivation high.”131 
Silber and Bhatt’s model of radicalisation was the only one thus far that provided and 
estimate on the duration through which the radicalisation process would take.  
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)   
In December 2007, the FBI published their 2-pronged approach that they had 
developed. The approach sought to “(1) identify early indicators of those who 
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demonstrate the potential for violence and (2) engage in extensive outreach to Muslim 
communities to dispel misconceptions that may foster extremism.”132   
Similar to the NYPD odel, the FBI’s model also had four stages. “pre-radicalisation 
(wherein there are patterns of behavior that make the individual vulnerable), 
identification (where the person accepts the cause), indoctrination (the individual is 
filled with conviction and engages in training), and action (where the individual 
conducts acts of terrorism). Each one is distinct, and a radicalized individual may 
never reach the final stage.”133 This was very much in line with the call for a more 
nuanced understanding of radicalisation towards violence. 
Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) Prevent Strategy and Delivery Plan 
 
Published in 2008, The ACPO Prevent Strategy and Delivery Plan stems from a law 
enforcement based approach that was created as part of UK’s four-pronged Contest 
Strategy. This model was an outcome of the UK experience of the London Bombings 
in 2005. Initiated in 2007, this model work alongside the four prongs of the UK’s 
CONTEST Strategy namely, Pursue to halt attacks, Prepare to have sufficient 
measure in place to mitigate the effects of an attack, Protect to intensify the levels of 
protection against attacks and Prevent to help bring to a halt individuals from 
becoming terrorists and providing support to terrorist and extremists groups. While all 
four prongs were to function simultaneously, this last prong was aimed at nipping the 
problem of terrorism in the bud.
134
 It “contains a four-tiered delivery framework for 
the police, and their partners.”135 The four-tiered pyramid assumed that at base of the 
pyramid is Tier 1, representing the base of the pyramid is the community. Moving up, 
Tier 2 were the vulnerable group, those who were easily inspired and influence by the 
ideology and actions of terrorist groups, moving upwards at Tier 3 were individuals 
who were deemed to be sympathetic to the course of terrorists but who may not 
belong directly to a group but were willing to offer some support. At the apex of the 
pyramid at Tier 4 were the smallest group but those who are active terrorists, 
conducting acts of violence.
136
  
 
The ACPO model is based on Prevent, the aim of the strategy was to follow the 
underscoring rationale behind the understanding of radicalisation proposed by 
radicalisation models that dominated Phase 2 between 2001-2006. It is an 
interventionist approached based on notion that ideology and social networks are key. 
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The focus was to challenge extremist ideology and disrupt those that promote violent 
extremism. Moreover, to simultaneously strengthen and support the institutions and 
infrastructure that could help prevent future acts of terrorism.   
 
The Paul Gill 4-Stage Pathway Model for Suicide Bombers  
 
Paul Gill initially “proposed a theoretical prism to view suicide bombing by 
incorporating the interactions between the suicide bomber, the terrorist organisation 
and the surrounding society from which suicide bombing emerges.”137 The interaction 
between the individual, the organisation and the society would influence the manner 
through which suicide bombers eventually undertake their journeys to violence 
eventually.  
Later building on his multi-dimensional theoretical prism, Gill developed the 4-Stage 
Pathway Model for Suicide Bombers in 2008. The “pathway model proposes that 
certain socialisation processes predispose audiences towards participating in 
violence.”138 Furthermore, his “model proposes that individuals experience four key 
stages on their path to a suicide bombing: broad socialization processes and exposure 
to propaganda, experience of catalysts, pre-existing familial or friendship ties and 
ﬁnally in-group radicalization. These four stages are pre-requisites that all suicide 
bombers experience. The order with which differing suicide bombers experience these 
stages changes from bomber to bomber.”139 
 
The McCauley and Moskalenko 12 Mechanisms of Political Radicalisation  
 
In 2008, McCauley and Moskalenko identified that thus far the “focus (was) on the 
common usage in which radicalization refers to increasing extremity of non-state 
challenges to state authority. (They) aim to show, however, how state action can 
contribute to radicalization of non-state group.”140 As opposed to the idea of stages or 
phases, their 12 mechanisms refer to the “the means or manner in which something is 
accomplished. Thus, the mechanism of vision includes the physical stimulus and the 
physiological and neural processes involved.”141  
 McCauley and Moskalenko metaphorically used a pyramid to explain their 12-stages. 
“From base to apex, higher levels of the pyramid are associated with decreased 
numbers but increased radicalization of beliefs, feelings, and behaviors. Thus one way 
of thinking about radicalization is that it is the gradient that distinguishes terrorists 
from their base of sympathisers.”142  
According to McCauley and Moskalenko, at the Individual Level, the means toward 
the radicalisation could have surface from a number of facets, (1) a sense of personal 
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victimization that is either real or perceived, (2) political grievance against the state 
resulting from political trends or events, (3) the joining of an established radical group 
that would lead the individual down a slippery slope of radicalisation by moving from 
sympathiser to activist, (4) joining a radical group because of the power of love 
wherein to prevent dissension and ensure loyalty, family members, friends and lover 
are recruited and finally, (5) the force multiplier of the extremity shift in like-minded 
groups where similarities in opinion of the group results in decisions made without 
consideration of alternative scenarios.
143
  
Following from the Individual level, at the Group Level, McCauley and 
 oskalenko’s model are 4 mechanisms or means that could result in increased 
radicalisation at the Group Level. These were, (6) an extreme cohesion and solidarity 
that groups build amongst its members when they come under isolation and threat (7) 
an increase in level of violence to gain more sympathisers given competition for the 
same base of support, (8) an increase in level of violence when the group competes 
with state power resulting in what is known as condensation. This play on the 
sympathies of the masses when the state uses what is seen to indiscriminate use of 
force. Finally (9) fissioning amongst members given in-group competition especially 
when differences in opinion amongst members surface.
144
   
Moreover the third level of mechanisms of radicalisation occurs at the level of the 
masses.  (10)  ujitsu politics refers to the act of using the enemy’s strength against 
him. In this instance, in the face of an external threat, the effect would be increased 
cohesion and solidarity amongst group members. In addition, (11) hate in this 
instance would refer to the dehumanisation of the out-group especially in the face of 
prolonged violence. Last but not least, (12) Martyrdom as the act that would create 
mass support for an assumed worthwhile cause that is seen to be important enough to 
sacrifice one’s life.145  
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Table 2: McCauley and Moskalenko’s Pathways to Violence Mechanisms of Political Radicalization at 
Individual, Group, and Mass-Public Levels146  
LEVEL OF 
RADICALIZATION 
MECHANISM 
 
INDIVIDUAL 
1. Personal victimization 
2. Political grievance 
3. Joining a radical group - the slippery slope                    
4. Joining a radical group - the power of love                       
5. Extremity shift in like-minded groups 
 
GROUP 
6. Extreme cohesion under isolation and threat                                                                 
7. Competition for the same base of support 
8. Competition with state power - condensation                                                     
9. Within-group competition - fissioning  
 
MASS 
10. Jujitsu politics                                                             
11. Hate 
12. Martyrdom 
 
Unlike McCauley and Moskalenko’s all-encompassing model on 12 mechanisms, 
Sara Savage and John Liht’s intergrated model of radicalisation in 2008 ends abruptly 
with the acceptance of radical ideology. Moving through the 6 stages, of self-
uncertainty, absence of cultural worldview, joining a fringe group, heightened inter-
group comparisons, demonizing and deligitimising the out-group and finally, the 
acceptance of radical ideology.
147
  Savage and Liht’s model of radicalization stops at 
the acceptance of radical ideology, perhaps with the assumption that acceptance of 
radical ideology would implicitly assume the individual’s engagement in violent 
extremism.  
 
With a similar focus on the role of radical ideology is the Recognising Radicalisation 
(RECORA) Model, otherwise also known as the Amsterdam Radicalisation Model by 
Meah Yousif and Collun Millis in 2008, focused on what they called the “supply and 
demand scheme” 148  wherein, the “demand of the seekers, the supply of radical 
ideology and the breeding ground of frustration and injustice.”149  They posit that 
radicalization occurs because of the steady interest in extremist ideology. 
 
Phase 4: The Quest (2009 – 2014) 
 
The models that dominate the years after 2009 have a broader focus on the processes 
of radicalisation. These models broadly show an understanding the complexity of the 
process of radicalisation, have attempted to incorporate numerous trigger causes for 
the process of radicalisation in their respective models. 
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Tinka Veldhuis and Jørgen Staun’s 2009 Root Cause Model of Radicalisation, almost 
harks back to the initial discussion on root causes. Veldhuis and Staun focus on the 
notion of the embedded individual. While the focus is on the individual, the close 
societal and group level interactions are emphasised. This model “distinguishes causal 
factors at the macro-level and the micro-level, and argues that macro-level factors are 
preconditions for radicalisation, but that in order to explain why some people do 
radicalise, and other people do not do so, a scrutiny of micro-level variables is 
essential.” 150  At the macro–level were larger geopolitical issues including 
International Relations, poor levels of integration amongst migrants and the diaspora 
community and globalisation and modernisation. The micro-level causes are divided 
into two segments. The first segment, entails the social realm which would include 
social identity, social interactions and group processes and relative deprivation 
amongst communities. The second segment, is the individual level wherein personal 
characteristics and experience play a fundamental role in an individual’s sustenance 
within the organisation.
151
 
 
The United States National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) released a 
Radicalisation and Mobilisation Dynamics Framework in 2011. The framework 
“represents how individuals radicalise, mobilise, and in some cases, commit violence 
and describes radicalisation as a dynamic and multi-layered process involving several 
factors that interact with one another to influence an individual. There is no single 
factor that explains radicalisation and mobilisation” 152  This framework identifies 
several factors that radicalise and mobilise individuals to conduct acts of violence. 
These factors include amongst others, personal factors, community factors, group 
factors, socio-political factors and ideological factors.  
 
This notion of ideation mobilised into action has dominated discourse in the US in 
particular, with the emphasis of trying to identify early warning signs and indicators 
that could preceed action. The NCTC mobilisation to action diagramme aimed to 
identify the means through which individuals could be mobilised to action.  
KEY THEMES FROM RADICALISATION MODELS AND CONCEPTUAL 
FRAMEWORKS 
 
Essential to the body of literature on terrorism thus far, are the attempts to shed light 
on the intentions of terrorists, what terrorists want; the capability of terrorists, the 
means that terrorists undertake to achieve their desired ends and the opportunity that 
terrorists are able to capitalise onto achieve their tasks. Over the course of the past 
few decades, the prominent radicalisation models and conceptual frameworks 
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explored and noted above have focused predominantly on the role of the indvidual’s 
pathway of radicalisation.  
 
What has evolved instead is the pace and speed of radicalisation given the ease of 
transference of ideas in an increasingly permissive cyber milieu against a backdrop of 
continued acts of terrorism. While “the style du jour is to point to ‘‘permissive’’ 
factors that help establish an environment in which terrorism is more likely to 
occur,”153 collectively, several themes have remained congruent with the dominant 
discourse on radicalisation.  
 
Identify Trends 
 
In the absence of meta-models or meta-conceptual frameworks of radicalisation, is the 
need to identify trends in radicalisation. It is only in identifying these trends, is there 
hope of influencing possible and probable scenarios in the hope of mitigating the 
threat in the future. Ultimately any success that can be achieved can only be done by 
“identifying patterns and trends of extremist behavior in its early stages.”154 Through 
the course of the four phases identified, the multiplicity of models and frameworks all 
aimed to identify trends using past experiences. The challenge lies in the fact that it is 
done against the backdrop of an evolving terrorist threat.  
 
As a collective the models and conceptual frameworks have ranged from the 
simplistic to the complex. The dangers that arise from reductionist models were 
evident in light of the manner in which the surge of models in 2007 when they were 
rapidly presented by law enforcement agencies grappling with the issue of 
radicalization, each with the notion of a staged and sequential process. These models 
included amongst others the NYPD model, the FBI model and the ACPO model. It is 
possibly in recognition of these very dangers of a reductionist understanding of 
radicalization model, that Silber and Bhatt forewarned that “although this (the NYPD) 
model is sequential, individuals do not always follow a perfectly linear progression. 
However, individuals who do pass through this entire process are quite likely to be 
involved in a terrorist act.”155  
 
This fear of reductionism later made way for presence of more complex models in 
2008 with the work of McCauley and Moskalenko of the12 mechanisms, Veldhuis 
and Staun’s Root Cause Model and NCTC’s dynamic framework of radicalisation. 
Either way the contribution to the field in general has been immense. The presence of 
key trends highlighted by scholars far through the course of the four phases listed 
explored above reiterate the fact that these catalysts play an essential role.  
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The radicalisation models and frameworks over time have highlighted the role of 
ideology, the social environment, and factors within a terrorist or extremist group that 
sustain participation of the individual. It is arise from the initial work of scholars and 
practitioners that the conceptual model was envisioned and created to assess group 
radicalisation in Indonesia. This will be explored in greater detail in the next Chapter. 
 
Transformational Process  
 
Radicalisation is a process and not an event. Broadly, radicalisation can perhaps be 
summed best as a process of “change and transformation that involves different 
stages. However, it is not a linear process and the stages are not clear-cut, nor 
necessarily sequential. The acceleration, slowing down, or even abandonment of the 
process depends on internal and external variables.”156 It is a transformational process 
that sets individuals and groups on a pathway of increased violence. Despite the 
presence of an event that can catalyse an activities very much like the notion of 
cognitive opening by John Horgan or McCauley and Moskalenko notion of unfreezing 
that sometimes leads may lead to an escalation of violence. The seminal work done by 
Randy Borum, highlight the need to separate radicalisation as a process that could 
potentially lead to non-violent action as well. As such, the need for the differentiated 
terminology for radicalisation to violent extremism.  
 
Almost 14 years after the attack on the World Trade Towers on September 2001, The 
U.S. based Asymmetric Warfare group released a tactical reference guide in August 
2011. The reference guide titled Radicalisation into Violent Extremism was an 
indicator chart that provided a “step-by-step process for identifying, evaluating, and 
responding to possible indicators”157 of radicalisation. In this instance, Radicalisation 
was defined as “the process by which an individual, group or mass of people 
undergoes a transformation from participating in the political process via legal means 
to the use or support of violence for political purposes.”158 Borrowing from McCauley 
and  oskalenko’s earlier work, this guide highlighted the various mechanisms of 
radicalisation from the individual, group and mass radicalisation.
159
   
A majority of the models cited thus far have focused on the study of radicalisation 
ofindividuals as opposed to that of a group. While undoubtedly a transformational 
process, increasing levels of violence of an individual does not necessarily translate to 
increasing violence of a group as a collective.  Building on the work on radicalization 
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of individuals by scholars thus far, this study will identify factors that result in the 
transformation of groups on a pathway of violence as a collective. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
CASE STUDY OF INDONESIA 
 
“This country, the Republic of Indonesia, does not belong to any 
group, nor to any religion, not to any ethnic group, nor to any groups 
with customs and traditions, but the property of all of us  
from Sabang to Merauke!” 
     Sukarno
160
 
 
Indonesia’s case study is unique. It epitomises intrepid nationalism and showcases 
valiant efforts at religious plurality through a uniquely indigenous blend of 
democracy. However, Indonesia remains plagued by a continued cycle of extremism 
and terrorism since its independence. Asia has the highest concentration of Muslims 
in world with Indonesia having the largest Muslim population within a country 
globally.
161
 Since 2008, opinion surveys have indicated that Indonesians were 
concerned about the rise on extremism in Indonesia. In 2008 it was reported that 60% 
of Indonesians were concerned about extremism. This was a sharp increase from 2006 
where only 43% were concerned about extremism in their country. 162  The 2010 
opinion poll indicated that 59% on Indonesians were concerned about extremism.  
 
While the survey does not indicate the nature of the sample group, the numbers 
provide a glimpse into the increasing concerns of heightened extremism in Indonesia. 
Foiled terrorists plots including the spate of book bombs in March 2011 targeting key 
personalities and the Good Friday attempted attack on a Church in April 2011 
continue to dominate the terrorist threat landscape. To date, in Indonesia attacks still 
continue with increased vigour and has recently culminated in the call by the Islamic 
State of Iraq and Syria also known as the Islamic State (IS) to support the on-going 
conflict. 
 
In Indonesia where approximately 90% of the electorate are Muslim, the growing 
religious conservativeness that has been observed has not been translated in the polls.  
Despite the Muslim majority of the voters, an Islamic Party has never won at the 
polls.
163
 What the polls fail to take into consideration is that most “Southeast Asian 
groups would renounce violence and focus on political means as long as the end result 
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is the establishment of an Islamic state or the implementation of Islamic 
jurisprudence. There is no explicit aversion (at least historically) on their part to 
achieve these objectives through the existing political framework.” 164 The penetration 
of the Indonesian extremist groups in the political sphere is testament to this. For 
example, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, the Spiritual leader of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), 
established a new organization, Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT), after resigning from 
Majlis Mujahideen Indonesia (MMI) in July 2008 citing that leadership in MMI was 
chosen on the basis of democracy. Acharya and Acharya astutely highlight that 
“Southeast Asia’s terrorist presence is far from monolithic and does not directly 
correlate to the Middle Eastern version, as groups vary in their purpose, targets, and 
geographic reach.” 165  Thus while some groups maybe willing to use peaceful 
democratic means of achieving their end, others pursue a much more violent means 
instead. 
 
Terrorist and extremist groups in Indonesia fall on a spectrum ranging from non-
violent extremists to those who engage in violence and have conducted vicious acts of 
terrorism. As such not every group advocates the conduct of terrorist activities to 
achieve their goals. The JI faction led by the late Noordin Mohamed Top for instance 
believed in targeting the west and western interests. He masterminded several of the 
most devastating terrorist operations, which included Bali Bombings in 2002 and 
2005, the Australian Embassy attacks in 2004 and even the attack on the JW Marriott 
in 2003 and later both the JW Marriott and Ritz Carlton in 2009.   
 
A terrorist groups’ willingness to engage in the political process acknowledges the 
plausibility that they are able to employ various means to achieve their end goal – the 
formation of an Islamic Country or a Caliphate. Whilst the JI faction that was led by 
Noordin Mohamed Top conducted attacks against western targets, there are groups in 
Indonesia such as Majlis Mujahideen Indonesia (MMI) and Hizb-ut-Tahrir Indonesia 
(HT) that do not overtly advocate the use of violence to achieve their ends. 
 
POLITICAL ISLAM AND THE INDONESIAN STATE 
 
Indonesian history is rife with tensions amongst the political elite as they attempt to 
negotiate the place of religion as well as religious values within the parameters of the 
constitution. Like the work of Benedict Anderson on nations as an imagined 
community, he defined “a nation an imagined political community – and imagined 
both as inherently limited and sovereign.”166 Based on Anderson’s definition of a 
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nation, Indonesia as a nation has existed long before they received Independence
167
 
from the Dutch. This notion of the community or the ummah was entrenched because 
of the strong religious bond of Islam. Thus, “despite the acknowledged hegemony of 
the secularist ideal, religion continues to provide a framework”168 for action even 
prior to the establishment of an independent state.            
 
Pancasila: Foundations of the Indonesian State 
 
It was against a backdrop of War and fighting for independence from the Dutch that 
Indonesia’s first President, Sukarno who was in office from 1945-1967, shared the 
conceptualised the ideal of Pancasila (five principles) on 1 June 1945 during a public 
speech known as The Birth of Pancasila delivered to the Independence Preparatory 
Committee. Pancasila refers to the five tenets that underpin the Indonesian 
constitution namely, God, justice, state unity, democracy and social justice. These 
tenets were based upon common values that were shared across the board by all 
Indonesians. Sukarno is believed to have included the notion of belief in God, (which 
definitively includes religion into the foundations of the state) due to the strongly 
entrenched religious nature of the populous. The concept of Pancasila was and still is 
a creative, indigenous idea that remains distinctively Indonesian.  
 
As Pancasila was initially envisioned on 1 June 1945, the notion of religion was 
added to feature religious plurality based on common and shared principles.  The idea 
of Pancasila cemented almost three weeks later through the Jakarta Charter on 22 
June 1945, however whilst keeping with the other four tenets included with particular 
specificity the role of religion. The first tenet now read, belief in the one and only 
Almighty God with the obligation for Muslims to adhere to Islamic Law. After 
petitions and discussion with several non-Muslim and moderate Muslim leaders, the 
final version that eventually made it to the constitution of Indonesia on 18 August 
1945 while retaining belief in God, had removed the inclusion of shari’a in order to 
respect citizens from other faith backgrounds. Hence, “the removal of seven words 
stipulating that all Muslims should observe Islamic law, was significantly to reduce 
the proposed formal role of Islam in Indonesian political and social life.”169 As much 
as the hold of both the Dutch and the Japanese influenced its past, the delicate role of 
religion and democracy continues to affect the plethora of events of that were to 
follow from its inception to date. 
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Managing Islam Through the Years 
 
Since its very inception, Indonesia, the world’s third largest democracy had to 
negotiate its way through the role of religion and politics quickly. The strength of the 
Indonesian case study lies in a Muslim dominant country embracing a religiously 
pluralist system upon which Indonesia is governed through Pancasila. Despite the 
fact that the Indonesian state embraces religious plurality, ideological extremism and 
terrorism have crept into society.  
 
Through the course of Indonesia’s history, religion and politics meandered like 
parallel streams through the course of time. Islam as a religion in Indonesia is far 
from monolithic and from its very beginning, merged with the local culture and 
traditions of the Indonesian people.  In the colonial era, during the time of the Dutch, 
religious leadership was marginalized. Religious leadership whose position was 
rooted in much of daily living of people was given little importance as the Dutch took 
over key positions in the governance of Indonesia. Muslim leaders especially the 
ulama “displaced that elite (who handled administration in government circles) in 
exercising political authority over the peasantry.”170 In the attempt to secularise the 
administration they had “destroyed imperial Islam, undermined the authority of native 
rulers, and unwittingly reinvigorated popular Islam.”171   Islam survived and grew 
from strength to strength unchecked in the private realm through madrasahs and 
pesantrens within villages. Within these circle Muslim religious elite survived 
autonomously untouched for many years.  
 
During the time of the Japanese, they were wise to include religion in support of what 
was framed to be a national cause in a carefully calibrated manner. Thus “while 
Indonesia was under Dutch rule, Islam had been excluded from politics. However the 
Japanese recognised the importance of religion in society and were careful to 
accommodate, rather than marginalize, Islam.”172  This calibrated manner of using 
established Islamic local, social and institutional networks helped to ensure Japanese 
control of Indonesia. The informal religious networks were used by the Japanese to 
spread propaganda and influence against possible Dutch reclaiming rule over 
Indonesia. This unique balance was achieved by capitalising on the angst felt by the 
Muslims for having been sidelined in positions of administration and military by the 
Dutch thus far.  
 
Indonesia’s first President Sukarno (1945-1967) initiated a process of what he called 
guided democracy between 1956-1959. Democratisation in Indonesia has proven to 
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be a challenge as the Islamic Constituency had great political clout and hence the 
inability of the Indonesian government to deal with hard line Muslims. Muslim 
religious elite was once again relegated to the sidelines. The presence of “weak 
central governments, poor local governance, massive numbers of internally displaced 
communities and continuing poor economic conditions in the region, including up to 
40 million people unemployed in Indonesia, these radicals are assured a receptive 
audience.”173 
 
One of the first extremist groups that arose was that of Darul Islam (DI). “In West 
Java the Darul Islam movement was more a product Kartusowirjo’s disagreement 
with the leaders of the Republic than his theological-political consciousness.” 174 
Kartosuwirjo led the Darul Islam (DI) movement from 1948-1962.
175
 A foremost 
lesson from DI and its subsequent offshoots including Jemaah Indonesia (JI), and 
Ring Banten was that “perceived inattention by the center to discontent in the 
periphery can be a potent driver of rebellion.”176 
 
The continued tension between religion, politics and nationalism was evident, for 
even “Kartosuwirjo’s own writings from the late 1920s-1930s highlight both this 
tension and the gradual transformation of pan- Islamism from a goal of the anti-
colonial struggle to a tool with which to achieve national freedom.”177 It was only the 
Darul Islam movement that was “waged under the banner of Islam.”178 However, this 
was short-lived when Indonesia was declared independent three days after 
Kartosuwirjo had declared West Java an Islamic State on 14 August 1945. With 
Indonesia declared Independent on 17 August 1945, Kartosuwirjo sided with the 
republic of Indonesia and channeled grievances politically through the Masyumi 
Party.
179
  
 
Suharto’s New Order between 1967-1998 saw another attempt to suppress political 
Islam. From Suharto’s brazen and calculated arresting of power from Sukarno, to his 
strong grasp of the reins of power thereafter, Suharto was shrewd at quelling potential 
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dissention that may arise. Suharto realised the underlying ability of Islam to mobilise 
the population and as such in a carefully calculated manner, “Islam continued to be 
marginalized and limited to the private religious sphere, as Suharto was determined to 
prevent it from becoming a powerful political force.”180 Suharto fearing the strength 
of mobilization under the banner of religion used Pancasila as a tool to manage the 
rise of political Islam. “Suharto’s use of Pancasila for political purposes culminated 
in the formulation of Pancasila as the only basis. At this point, indeed Pancasila 
could be easily manipulated. With the government as the sole interpreter of 
Pancasila, any perceived opponents could simply be labeled as “anti-Pancasila,” and 
thus be banned.”181 
 
Through the years the failure of Islam to gain national power has enhanced the tacit 
sense of society under siege and as a result the necessity to fight back to achieve its 
ends. Expounding on the concept of Talibanisation, by Kouser Azzam, Bilveer Singh 
highlights that “(i)n essence, Talibanisation encompasses aspects from symbolic 
group politics and communal definitions through “authenticity” – that is, a specific 
reading of Islam and reconstructing Islamic tradition to actual practices such as the 
institution of an Islamic state.”182 The underlying quest for an Islamic State and the 
years of struggling to manage religion coupled with a global climate of unrest, 
resulted in a unique development and birth of extremist and terrorist movements in 
Indonesia. “What distinguished the new movements were their intense militancy, 
extremism, and increasing popularity to resort to or condone violence to achieve their 
political goals.”183 This was especially seen in the most recent split in the groups with 
the formation of Jamaah Anshoru Shari’a in 2014, a splinter group formed in support 
of and pledging allegiance to IS. 
 
The Call to Jihad  
 
In Indonesian history, there were several separate instances during its contemporary 
history when there was a distinctive call to jihad. At each of these instances, the 
aspiration to have Islam play a larger role in politics and governance of the state, led 
to a revitalisation within the terrorist and extremist movement in Indonesia. Often 
enough this led to the proliferation of terrorist and extremist activities with vigour. 
Inspired by radical utopianism, they felt that the problems that arose in Indonesia 
could be solved by the one means of governance that Indonesia as a state had not seen 
to fruition – the formation of an Islamic State.  
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Nationalism and the Call to Jihad 
In the 1940s, S. M. Kartosuwirjo saw the on-going developments in Indonesia as the 
start of was he referred to in his writings as the seeds of World War Three. In 1926 
Sukarno identifies Islam, nationalism and Marxism as the three streams of the 
Indonesian anti-colonial movement. Kartosuwirjo on the other hand, considered it a 
fight between the three great ideals of the time namely, Islamism, Nationalism and 
Communism. In his eyes, the only way forward as such was to establish a system of 
governance under the rule of God.
184
 There was no other conceivable option. In an 
article written in March 1949, Kartosuwirjo further emphasised that the journey 
towards the establishment of what he called Negara Islam Indonesia (Islamic State of 
Indonesia) was through revolution and martyrdom where the “enemies of Allah, 
enemies of Islam, the enemies of the establishment of an Islamic State in Indonesia 
should be destroyed in order to fulfil the destiny of a nation governed by the rule of 
law.”185  Kartosuwirjo’s envisioned ideal of an Islamic State was especially seen in a 
collection of documents on DI. 
“The military publication Penumpasan pemberontakan D.I./T.I.I., S.M. Kartosuwiryo 
di Jawa Barat, itself a collection of Darul Islam documents’ reproductions, as well as 
accounts produced after Kartosuwiryo’s capture, report that in the 1950s 
Kartosuwiryo’s intention was to first consolidate his authority on the archipelago, and 
then to build relations on the international level with Malaysia, Pakistan and Egypt. 
Once linked with movements like the Muslim Brotherhood, the Indonesian Islamic 
state would have been able to establish a pan-Islamic dewan Khalifatullah fil’ardi 
(Council of God’s Caliphate on Earth), which would assume a federal structure with a 
rotating leadership of two-year terms.” 186 
The Darul Islam came about in response to the first call to Jihad in Indonesia in 
August 1949 by S. M. Kartosuwirjo when he had declared West Java an independent 
Islamic State.
187
 The Negara Islam Indonesia (NII) as a movement began its first 
phase when Kartosuwirjo aspired for an Islamic State in West Java and his 
announcement that West Java was Darul Islam or land of Islam.  
 
The second phase of the establishment of NII arose out of the rejection of Indonesian 
nationalists to entrench shari’a law as a law of the land in the 1970s. It was in the 
1970s that the earlier and nascent struggle for what was envisioned as an Islamic State 
was at its embryonic stage. Influence by global developments  - Muslim Brotherhood 
in Egypt arose fervour for change. The second phase of the NII movement was based 
on the precedent of the earlier DI movement. Coupled with global developments, the 
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initial faith of channeling their grievance through the Masyumi Party remained 
unsatisfactory. As such, there was a revival within NII to alleviate dissatisfaction with 
governance under Suharto and for the instating of Shari’a in Indonesia. The rule of 
law and especially that of the Shari’a continues to be a point of contention through 
the years. The etymological meaning of the word Shari’a is track or road.   
  
“Islamic law is based, as we shall see, on unqualified submission to the will of God. 
This is a fundamental tenet of the Islamic religion, and since Islamic law is based 
upon Islamic religion, it proceeds on the same fundamental assumption. The will of 
God embraces all aspects of life and the law hence covered them all. It is a path or 
way guiding the Muslim and the revealed law governing all these matters is known as 
the Shari’a”188 
 
In Islam the notion of the social contract is contrary to that which was initially 
espoused by Western philosophers such as Thomas Hobbes and then expounded upon 
in greater detail by Jean Jacques Rousseau and John Locke. Central to the Western 
concept of a social contract is in essence the notion of a contract between men. In 
Islam every person is “in individual contract, reflecting the Covenant his soul has 
sealed with God; for the Covenant is in reality made for each and every individual 
soul”189 This forms the foundations of what is envisioned to be the utopian ideal of a 
nation under God’s law. “Shari’a is not strictly speaking, a legal system for it reaches 
much deeper into thought, life and conduct than a purely legal system can aspire to 
do.”190  
 
Global Developments and the Call to Jihad 
 
The Iranian revolution and later the Soviet-Afghan War provided necessary 
inspiration and acted as a catalyst. They showcased the possible merits of rule under 
the laws of Islam, and were icons of both a new liberating force as well as a symbol of 
resistance
191
 against the West.  
 
In the early 1970s and 1980s, there were two key personalities in NII Abdullah 
Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir. They were arrested in 1978 for their role in the 
propagation of violence and radical extremist ideology and later escaped to Malaysia 
in 1985. While fleeing from Suharto’s measures in Indonesia they sought refuge in 
Malaysia where on 1 January 1993; they co-founded and formed a new group, Jemaah 
Islamiyah (JI). They remained in Malaysia until 1998 building an intricate network of 
resources and personnel, several of whom after being recruited were later sent to 
Afghanistan for training during the Soviet Afghan War between 1979-1989. When the 
Suharto regime had collapse, Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir then moved 
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the JI headquarters back to Indonesia in 1998. To a large extent, through the use of “a 
combination of radical religious ideology, clandestine recruitment, extensive 
networking and professional transnational operations, JI has created a formidable 
challenge for any security or intelligence authority.”192 It was the effect of global 
influences that were exacerbated by already weak governance that further enable JI to 
flourish from its beginning in Malaysia and later in Indonesia. 
 
“While for many Muslims, radicalism was learned from the textbooks of scholars 
such as al-Banna, Maududi, and Qutb, many Southeast Asian radicals personally saw 
and heard what modern radicals such as Faraj, Sayyaf, and Azzam had to say.”193 The 
initial wave of extremists that fought in the Soviet Afghan War from 1979-1989 were 
not only influenced by their ideas but several had even met these key ideologues 
inspiring the global jihadist narrative whilst they were in Afghanistan. These global 
developments presented the necessary inspiration and key ideologues provided the 
religious justification for violent extremism. 
 
Inter-religious and Communal Tensions and the Call to Jihad 
 
In the late 1990s, there were tensions and perceived fear of Christianisation of 
Indonesia.  The Conflict in Ambon resulted in more than 2000 deaths. According to 
United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), more than 700,000 people were displaced 
by violence in Ambon and Maluku from 1999-2002, and some 30,000 had yet to be 
resettled by early 2011. The effects of which were staggering. 
 
In 2000 the Forum Komunikasi Ahlus Sunnah Wal Jamaah (FKASWJ) issued a call 
for jihad to assist the ikhwan (brothers) in Maluku (Moluccas). FKASWJ formed a 
paramilitary wing known as LJ, led by Ustaz Jafaar Umar Thalib. Justification for the 
call for jihad came not from within Indonesia but instead from “six muftis in the 
Middle East: ‘Abd al-Razzāq ibn ‘Abd al-Muhsin al ‘Abbād, Muqbil ibn Hādi al-
Wādiī, Rabī ibn Hādi al- adkhalī, Sālih al-Suhaymī, Ahmad Yahyā ibn Muhammad 
al-Najm, and Wāhid al- ābirī.”194 Framed within a construct of a Muslim-Christian 
conflict, the fatwas provided moral and religious justification and legitimacy to what 
was intrinsically a domestic nationalist struggle. At its peak, LJ had a growing 
membership that was estimated to be approximately 10,000-13,000 members with 
approximately between 4000-6000 volunteer in Maluku.
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In the late 1980s after the post-Suharto era and the rise of extremist groups within the 
Indonesia.  Between 1985-2000, toward the end of the Suharto era and the political 
uncertainty that followed with three Presidents in the span of two years, the “jihadi 
movement was free to expand with relative impunity.”196 Groups such as Jemaah 
Islamiyah (JI) was founded in Malaysia on 1 January 1993 and moved its 
headquarters to Indonesia in 1998. In addition to the flourishing of groups that were 
entrenched in radical thought with the aim of subverting the government in power, 
there were also independent paramilitary and vigilante groups that had begun to form. 
Extremist paramilitary organisations such as the Front Pembela Islam (FPI) and 
vigilante groups such as Lashkar Jihad (LJ) that were formed in response to the on-
going conflict in Poso and Maluku in 2000.  
 
L ’s call to jihad ended in February 2002 with the signing of the Malino II 
Declaration. LJ posed “an internal threat to the mainstream interpretation of Islam in 
Indonesia and, crucially the Indonesian state’s monopoly of force.”197 Jafaar Umar 
Thalib “gave a number of reasons for disbanding the organization, including Laskar 
 ihad’s failure consistently to follow the doctrinal positions outlines on the fatwas of 
the Middle East ‘ulamā’.”198 
 
Throughout the course of Indonesia’s contemporary history, the aspiration for religion 
to play a more dominant role can be seen in the call to jihad as a result of nationalism, 
global developments and even religious and communal tensions. This almost guttural 
call for jihad that began in 1945 by Kartosuwirjo, gained traction with global events 
especially the Iranian revolution and the Soviet-Afghan War and thereafter thrust 
forward with ensuing tensions nationally has resulted in a growing momentum. 
Unique to Indonesia is the bourgeoning number of terrorist and extremist groups. 
 
Despite the increased number of terrorist and extremist groups, each group has 
articulated its own means to achieve almost the same end. Each group varies in their 
capability and targets, the general intention of these terrorist and extremist groups fall 
into two streams either the establishment of an Islamic State in Indonesia or the 
establishment of a regional caliphate in Southeast Asia, the formation of what is 
known as Daulah Islamiyah Nusantara which would encompass Indonesia and the 
neighbouring countries including Singapore, Brunei and Australia. 199  It was the 
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aspiration for a state governed by Shari’a, that would present a panacea to national 
problems could not be solved through the establishment of a new order. To achieve 
this end, any means would be justified, even violence.  
 
BOURGEONING TERRORIST GROUPS IN INDONESIA  
 
Whilst they do not comprise all the groups in Indonesia, the list shown in the table 
below highlights the sheer number of terrorist and extremist groups that have gained 
considerable prominence in Indonesia over the past seven decades. 
 
Table 3: Terrorist Groups in Indonesia 
NO. GROUP FORMATION 
1 Darul Islam (DI) 
House of Islam 
1945 
2 Negara Islam Indonesia (NII) 1945 
(revival 1970s) 
3 Organisasi Papua Merdeka (OPM) 
Free Papua Movement 
1960s 
4 Dewan Daakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (DDII) 
[Indonesian representative of Rabitat al-Alam 
al-Islami, The Muslim World League, RAI] 
1967 
5 Gerakan Aceh Movement (GAM) 
Free Aceh Movement 
1977 
6 Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HT) 1982 
7 Komite Aksi Penanggulanan Akibat Krisis 
(KOMPAK) (Crisis Prevention Committee) 
1988 
8 Wahdah Islamiyah (WI) aka Fathul Muin 
Foundation 
1989 
9 Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) 
Islamic Community 
1993 
10 Negara Islam Indonesia Komandmen Wilayah 
9 (NII KW9) 
1996 
11 Khilafatul Muslimin (KM) 1997 
12 Front Pembela Islam (FPI) 
Islamic Defenders Front 
1998 
13 Forum Antisipasi Kegiatan Pemurtadan 
(FAKTA)  
Anti-Apostasy Movement Forum 
 
 
1998 
14 Rabitatul Mujahideen (RM) 
Cross SEA Organisation Network 
Late 1990s 
15 Laskhar Jihad (LJ) 
Warriors of Jihad 
2000 
16 Majelis Mujahideen Indonesia (MMI) 
Indonesian Mujahideen Congress 
2000 
17 Laskhar Jundullah (LJ), security arm of 
KPPSI until 2005 
God’s Militia 
2000 
as part of KPPSI 
18 Forum Kommunikasi Ahllus Sunna Wal 
Jamaah (FKAWJ, Forum of the Followers of 
2000 
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The groups listed above gained considerable prominence in the aftermath of major 
terrorist attacks in Indonesia. Unique to the developments in Indonesia is the vestiges 
of the history that have underpinned their rise and the unique permissive environment 
that groups are able to thrive. During the course of this study the most prominent of 
the groups responsible for conducting attacks the majority of the attacks will be 
explored.  
 
The ten groups that will be explored further in this study as noted earlier will be, 
Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), Lashkar Jihad (LJ), Darul Islam (DI), Front Pembela Islam 
(FPI), Negara Islam Indonesia (NII), Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HT), Majelis 
Mujahideen Indonesia (MMI), Jamaah Anshorut Tauhid (JAT), Al Qaeda Indonesia 
(AI) and Mujahideen Indonesia Timur (MIT). These have been the groups that have 
been involved in the conducting of major attacks throughout Indonesia, and attacks on 
government, security and law enforcement officers.  
 
GRAVITY OF THE THREAT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 
 
The reasons behind the sustenance of the movement in Indonesia is not merely 
because of jingoistic nationalism but it entails a complex vignette of multifarious 
reasons which are unique to the interests of groups and (individuals) hence the 
continued popularity of the movement for Daulah Islamiyah Nusantara and the 
aspiration to from an Islamic State. Amongst the reasons given for supporting the 
the Sunna and Community of the Prophet) 
19 Komite persiapan Penegakan Syariat Islam 
(Preparatory Committee for Upholding 
Islamic Law, KPPSI) 
2000 
20 Jamaah As Sunnah (JAS) 
Community on the Teaching of Prophet 
Mohammed 
2000, 
 
21 Lashkar Hisbah (LH) formerly Tim Hisbah  2000, 
renamed 2008 
22 Jamaah Tauhid Wal Jihad (JTWJ) 2004 
23 Angkatan Mujahideen Darul Islam (AMDI) 
Mujahideen Armed Forces of the House of 
Islam 
2005 
24 Lintas Tanzim (LT)   
Jihadi Coalition: JI, JAT, KOMPAK, Ring 
Banten-DI, DI-Akram, FPI-Aceh and former 
GAM. 
2007 
25 Jamaah Anshorut Tauhid (JAT) 
Defenders of the Oneness of God 
2008 
26 Al Qaeda in Indonesia (AQI) 2012 
27 Mujahideen Indonesia Barat (MIB) 
Mujahideen of Western Indonesia 
2012 
28 Mujahideen Indonesia Timur (MIT) 
Mujahideen of Eastern Indonesia 
2012 
29 Jamaah Ansharu Shari’ah (JAS) 2014 
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Caliphate - is the need to ensure that their civil rights and liberties will be kept, a 
country that is built on moral legitimacy under the banner of Islam. 
 
Based on findings from their study of forty JI and Komite Penanggulangan Krisis 
(Crisis Prevention Committee, KOMPAK) members, Idhamsyah Eka Putra and Zora 
A. Sukabdi, posit that terrorism in Indonesia is could be explained by three social 
conditions, first the ensuing conflict between Muslims and non-Muslims globally, the 
perception that systems that are in place at present have not brought economic 
prosperity and perhaps enacting the Law of God would bring prosperity and finally 
also the perceived notion that the government is taking the side of non-Muslims and 
the West especially on matters of economic and political importance.
200
 
 
Asia as the New Front of Terrorism  
 
Ajai Sahni warns that the notion of the locus of terrorism is amongst the “conceptual 
barriers to an effective understanding of, and response to, the unstructured threat of 
contemporary terrorism”201 which ultimately will “distort the character and direction 
of the global war on terrorism.”202 It is not so much that Southeast Asia has become 
the second front or that the threat has moved from the Afghan-Pakistan areas to 
Southeast for the notion of a “shift is contrafactual.”203 This gives the idea that the 
threat moved but contrary to that violent extremism has been a steady feature within 
the Southeast Asian region.  
 
The groups highlighted in this study come from across the historical spectrum of the 
last seven decades. They span nearly two to three generations of fighters who have 
grown up amidst separate historical backdrop of Indonesia. The understandings 
gleaned could provide insights of the future with the new call for jihad issued by the 
Islamic State (IS) as it calls for fighters in Asia to join them in Iraq and Syria. Several 
key ideologues in Asia and in particular Indonesia have already pledged their 
allegiance to IS. They implications of this to reinvigorate the journey of some groups 
towards violent extremism would have implications not only to Indonesia but have 
significant ripple effects both regionally and globally. 
 
In recent times, the ubiquity of the Internet, the presence of extremist publishing 
houses and extremist websites has created an environment that is not only permissive, 
but one that ensures the sustenance of both extremist and terrorist groups. The 
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inability of the state to proscribe terrorist groups due to political pressure and 
limitations in the Association of Southeast Asian’s (ASEAN) efforts to effectively 
counter terrorism has aided in the creation of a permissive environment. 
 
In exploring ways to improve on counter terrorism efforts in Indonesia thus far, 
Norhaidi Hasan argues that that ‘enemy‐centric’ strategy that Indonesia has 
emphasised thus far resonates with the historical dominance of the military in 
Indonesia. Noting that the best strategy in the long run was for a population-centric 
strategy that would amalgamate both hard and soft approaches in dealing with the 
threat of terrorism in Indonesia.
204
  These soft approaches of engagement and building 
an integrated, cohesive and well-coordinated security framework within ASEAN 
would increase effectiveness in the long term. 
Contrary to the realist analogy of states as billiard balls acting independently of each 
other, the growing threat of terrorism presents a cogent security threat to the 
Southeast Asian region. This as such has created a traditionally uncomfortable yet 
necessary contemporary marriage of joint security frameworks between the Southeast 
Asian nations as a collective. 
 
Indonesia as the heart of the terrorist and extremist movements in Southeast Asia 
presents an interesting case study. Over the course of the next few Chapters, the role 
of ideology, leadership and group dynamics will be explored in greater detail. These 
multifarious groups have flourished in an environment with tightened security 
measures and yet they have managed to regenerate and thrive with considerable 
success and with an increasingly better avatar over time. It is this unenviable 
continuous cycle of violence that lays the groundwork for this study. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
 
“ Let every man be his own methodologist;  
let every man be his own theorist;  
let theory and method again be part of the practice of a craft” 
C. Wright Mills
205
 
 
The field of terrorism studies is no longer a domain of esoteric debates amongst select 
scholars of the security studies community alone. As expounded in Chapter 1, the 
widening ambit of security and the confluence of ideas from multiple disciplines 
provide a nuanced understanding of the threat of terrorism. The influence of multiple-
disciplines is especially reflected in the variety of discourses that this study will draw 
lessons from in the process of exploring the factors that influence the behaviour of 
groups as they embark on a path of violent extremism. Central to the hypothesis is the 
latent understanding that both terrorist and extremist groups continually aspire for and 
attempt to enact a political change within society. 
 
This Chapter will detail the research design and methods chosen to unpack the 
complex vignette of terrorist and extremist groups in Indonesia. The study will 
explore the forces of influence that push a group from extremism to terrorism. These 
forces include the strain from an extreme political ideology, presence of influential 
leadership and group dynamics. As a whole, the research design and methodology 
undertaken in this study will build on previous scholarly research on radicalisation, 
some of which was highlighted and expounded upon in the earlier chapters. In the 
absence of easy explanations to the research questions and to avoid methodological 
reductionism,
206
 this research design comprises a three-tier data collection process 
followed by a three-phase data analyses process.  
 
MIXED METHODS RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
There are three research paradigms that are ontologically and epistemologically 
different. Each of these paradigms - the positivist paradigm, constructivist paradigm 
and the pragmatist paradigm, are based on very different research philosophies. In 
Thomas Kuhn’s seminal work on paradigms, he defines paradigms as "universally 
recognised scientific achievements that, for a time, provide model problems and 
solutions for a community of researchers.”207 This held true for a large volume of 
research that surfaced prior to the early 1990s that were dominated by both the 
quantitative and qualitative research paradigm. The quantitative research method, it 
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assumes that in the process of conducting analyses, researchers “eliminate their 
biases, remain emotionally detached and uninvolved with the objects of study and test 
or empirically justify their stated hypotheses”208 On the other hand, proponents of the 
qualitative research method “contend that multiple-constructed realities abound, that 
time- and context- free generalisations are neither desirable nor possible, that research 
is value-bound, that it is impossible to differentiate fully causes and effects, that logic 
flows from specific to general and that knower and known cannot be separated 
because the subjective knower is not the only source of reality.”209  
 
In comparison, the pragmatist paradigm that was borne out of a search for a middle 
ground amidst the two contesting paradigms of quantitative and qualitative research 
methods in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Kuhn notes that in general, “paradigms 
gain their status because they are more successful than their competitors in solving a 
few problems that the group of practitioners has come to recognise as acute.”210 The 
pragmatist paradigm was born out of what researchers have begun to see as distinct 
challenges that were posed by the qualitative and quantitative research paradigms.  
 
The pragmatist paradigm “rejects the either/or choices associated with the paradigm 
wars, advocates for the use of mixed methods in research, and acknowledges that the 
values of the researcher play a large role in the interpretation of results.”211 The mixed 
methods approach combines both deductive and inductive means of questioning and 
seeking knowledge. Mixed methods research is defined as a mixture of “elements of 
qualitative and quantitative research approaches (e.g. use of qualitative and 
quantitative viewpoints, data collection, analysis and inference techniques) for the 
purposes of breadth and depth of understanding and corroboration.”212 Johnson and 
Turner iterate that “methods should be mixed in a way that has complementary 
strengths and non-overlapping weaknesses.” 213  They add that “The fundamental 
principle is followed for at least three reasons: (a) to obtain convergence or 
corroboration of findings, (b) to eliminate or minimize key plausible alternative 
explanations for conclusions drawn from the research data, and (c) to elucidate the 
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divergent aspects of a phenomenon. The fundamental principle can be applied to all 
stages or components of the research process.”214 
 
The mixed methods research design chosen for this study is congruent with the 
eclectic multi-disciplinary approach that is conducted through an examination of three 
key areas of ideology, leadership and group dynamics. Using the nested or embedded 
mixed methods framework, this study will draw it research philosophy from the 
pragmatist paradigm and will mesh together both qualitative and quantitative 
approaches at various phases of the process of unpacking this complex vignette of 
themes and ideas.
215
 As a whole the study will aim to amalgamate both discursive 
strategies of Foucault’s top-down approach through the exploration of data in report 
and court documents and Goffman’s bottom-up approach through the face-to-face 
interviews and through the questionnaires conducted.  
 
Introduced by Wertheimer in 1923, the Gestalt principle has its roots in visual design. 
It is based on the notion that that the whole is bigger than the sum of its parts. The 
mixed methods research design draws inspiration from this very principle. In this 
instance, the “combine quantitative and qualitative research tools can support stronger 
scientific inferences than when either is employed in isolation.”216 The strength in the 
mixed methods approach as such lies in the collective strength of the design that goes 
beyond the individualised strengths of both the quantitative and qualitative research 
methods alone. The amalgamation of both research paradigms provides for 
complementarity
217
 and completeness
218
 of the research design. 
 
DATA COLLECTION: A THREE - PRONGED STRATEGY  
 
A constant critique within terrorism studies has been the lack of original data that is 
gleaned from the field by researchers and analysts working on areas within the 
terrorism studies domain. This study aims to gently steer away from predominant 
research methods of social science research on terrorism wherein “there is a 
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continuous lack of individual-level, data driven evident to test hypotheses, build case 
studies, and support the emergence of new theories about the psychological process in 
the development of the terrorist.”219 To ensure an overall rigour in research design 
this study will explore a variety of means to obtain both qualitative and quantitative 
data. A three-prong approach is used in the process of data collection from the field 
namely – Interviews, Questionnaires, Court Documents and Extremist Literature. 
Harris and Brown iterate the need to “collect the two types of data with a minimal 
time gap.”220 Furthermore they add that “researchers must create tightly aligned and 
structured instruments; present the construct in a simple, concrete, and highly 
contextualised manner; collect the two types of data with a minimal time gap; and 
estimate agreement between methods.”221  
 
While “mixed methods researchers deny that the paradigmatic differences between 
the ways of viewing the world make qualitative and quantitative method 
incompatible,”222 Harris and Brown’s work on compatibility between questionnaires 
and semi-structured interviews, raised several factors that the authors suggest are 
needed to mitigate potential differences that may arise in attempting to align data 
between these two methods in particular.  Their suggestions include, ensuring that the 
both the questionnaire and the interview questions are similar, the importance of 
reducing the time lag between data collection, presentation of findings in a specific 
way, ensuring that the responses have a common context, encouraging simplicity in 
psychological objects explored and having an estimate of agreement between methods 
given varied data distributions.
223
  
 
The sampling strategy undertaken in this study was to gather a sample size that would 
scalable and would provide balanced insight. Other factors that influenced the sample 
size were the necessity for the respondents to agree to participate in the study (given 
that they all either presently belonged to a terrorist or extremist group or we doing 
time for terrorism related activities), time constraints for the study as a whole and the 
security parameters and permissions needed in order to conduct these interviews. 
Glaser and Strauss’ concept of theoretical saturation refers to the point wherein “no 
additional data are being found.”224  In principle, although the idea of theoretical 
saturation is attractive and definitive at a conceptual level, “it provides little practical 
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guidance for estimating sample sizes, prior to data collection, necessary for 
conducting quality research.”225 On the criterion of theoretical saturation, there is not 
a published guideline across the social sciences discipline that indicates that the point 
of theoretical saturation has been reached. Often enough these are dependent on the 
discretion of the researchers based on the findings gleaned in the process of the study. 
At a conceptual level, the sample size in his study meets the criterion of theoretical 
saturation within the parameters set.  
 
At the start of this study 10 groups were selected from a broad cross section of 
terrorist and extremist groups in Indonesia. These groups were chosen because of 
their prominence and pertinence in the threat landscape in Indonesia. They range from 
groups that have existed in the past and are presently in existence and fall on the 
spectrum from extremist to terrorist. The unique dynamics in Indonesia and the 10 
groups selected - Lashkar Jihad (LJ), Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), Darul Islam (DI), Front 
Pembela Islam (FPI), Negara Islam Indonesia (NII), Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HT), 
Majelis Mujahideen Indonesia (MMI), Jamaah Anshorut Tauhid (JAT), Al Qaeda 
Indonesia (AI) and Mujahideen Indonesia Timur (MIT) were explored in Chapter 3 of 
this study. 
 
Based on the research methodology drafted, permission was thereafter sought from 
Indonesian government agencies to conduct both the semi-structured interviews and 
questionnaires for this study. Both the interviews and questionnaires were conducted 
in Indonesia in the Indonesian language over the course of approximately 2 and a half 
months. In total there were 124 respondents from both terrorist and extremist groups. 
Of the 124 respondents, one-on-one semi-structured interviews were conducted with a 
select group of 30 respondents or approximately 24% of the total sample size, who 
formed the upper echelons and were in positions of leadership within their respective 
terrorist and extremist organisations in Indonesia. These included prominent emirs, 
co-founders, ideologues, trainers, bomb makers and individuals who had trained in 
Afghanistan and were responsible for the initial waves of terrorist and extremist 
activities in Indonesia.  
 
In addition to permission that was sought from the authourities to conduct interviews 
and questionaires within the corrections facility, additional permission was sought 
from the detainees prior to the semi-strcutured interviews that were conducted with 
them. Each interview lasted approximately two hours on average. The interviews 
were conducted in rooms within the prison and custodial setting. The rooms that the 
interviews were conducted in were relatively casual over tea and soft drinks. The 
interviewees were informed of the purpose of the research prior to the start of the 
interview and were at liberty to stop the interview at any time. The interview 
questions mirrored the questions that were asked in the questionnaires in order to 
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enable effective analysis across the three themes of ideology, leadership and group 
dynamics. 
 
The remaining 94 respondents responded to the survey questions. Of the 94 
respondents for the questionnaires, 16 respondents were from extremist groups; they 
comprised approximately 17% of total number of questionnaires conducted. 83% of 
the questionnaire respondents were either from terrorist groups or arrested on 
terrorism related charges. Despite the varied data distribution, the similarity in focus 
of the questions asked anchors the data collection via both these methods. Both the 
interviews and the questionnaires were conducted with the aim of understanding 
pathways of radicalisation of the selected groups.  
 
As with the semi-structured interviews, after permission was sought, the 
questionnaires were distributed to those who volunteered to do the questionnaire. 
They were advised of the purpose of the questionnaire and to answer them in 
candidly. The questionnaires were anonymous with the exception of respondents 
annotating the (terrorist or extremist) organisation they were part of. I was present to 
answer queries that the respondents might have had throught he duration. As with the 
semi-structured interviews, the respondents were free to leave at any point of time. 
 
To minimise the time gap in the collection of data for the interviews of terrorist and 
extremist group leaders (within prison and those that were released), the interviews 
with law enforcement and security personnel were conducted within the same span of 
approximately three months. This was done while taking into consideration the time 
frame required need to visit several category one/high value detention facilities in 
Indonesia after permission was granted. The interviews were conducted in Jakarta, 
Medan, Palu, Semarang, Cilacap and Yogyakarta. The interviews were conducted in 
the following facilities over the duration of approximately 2 and a half months – Class 
1 Penitentiary in Cipinang; Class 1 Penitentiary in Tangerang; Class 1 Penitentiary in 
Nusa Kambangan;
226
 Jakarta Provincial Police Prison where terrorists and criminals 
are held as they await trial; Jakarta Police Mobile Brigade Prison in Depok where 
Indonesia’s elite police unit is located and prisons that are under the auspices of the 
District Police around the country.  
 
The use of a three phase analytical framework based on Alexander George’s notion of 
structured focused comparison between the groups, couple with the special attention 
paid to the primary themes of political ideology, presence of influential leadership and 
a sense of collective consciousness will help ensure that the data will be presented in a 
directed and succinct manner. The findings from both the Interviews and 
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Questionnaires were triangulated against the court documents, extremist literature, 
and additional interviews with experts and scholarly work in the field. 
 
Data Collection (1) - Interviews with Leadership  
 
The first prong of data collection in this study comprised four types of one-on-one 
interviews that were conducted with leadership. The first was with terrorist suspects 
and convicted terrorists held in detention centers and prisons who have held or still 
hold positions of leadership within the terrorist organsation so as to understand what 
the impact of group dynamics on their path to terrorism. Second, interviews were 
conducted with former members of terrorist organisations who have held positions of 
leadership in their organisations and have since been released after serving time in 
Indonesia. Third, leaders of (Non-Violent) Extremist groups who are currently leading 
the two main extremist groups in Indonesia. Last but not least, individuals from the 
Indonesian government and academia who are not only thought leaders within the 
field in Indonesia but they are additionally able to offer unique insights into the 
unique threat landscape in Indonesia.  
 
Of the interviews conducted, the 30 interviews with the terrorist detainees, former 
terrorist and leaders of extremist groups in Indonesia form an integral part of the 
primary research data that has been collected as part of this study. Their unique 
insight into the nature of group dynamics as well as their impressions on that held the 
reins of power in their respective organisations proved to be candid yet poignant 
reminders that pathways of radicalisation. The insights gleaned provided insight into 
the reasons behind the movement of groups to heightened trajectories of violence.  
 
The choice of interview subjects were based on their positions of seniority and 
leadership with their respective organisations and ultimately their availability and 
willingness to participate in this interview. As noted earlier, in the instance that the 
leadership were imprisoned, permission was sought from Indonesian agencies to 
interview the leadership of the 10 groups that were selected as part of this study. 
Please refer to the list below for terrorist/extremist leaders that were interviewed.  
 
LIST OF INTERVIEWS WITH LEADERSHIP 
Table 4: List of Interviews with Terrorist Leadership 
NO. NAME TERRORIST/EXTREMIST ORGANISATION 
1 Ustadz Jaffar Umar Thalib Head, Laskhar Jihad  
2 Ismail Yusanto Spokesperson, Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia 
3 Ustadz Kiyahin Co-Chairperson, Front Pembela Islam 
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4 Badri Hartono Head, Al Qaeda in Indonesia 
5 Umar Patek Instructor, linked with Moro Islamic Liberation 
Front, Bali Bombing and arrested in Abbotabad 
Pakistan, Ring Banten, Jemaah Islamiyah 
6 Nassir Abbas Head of Mantiqi 3 and military training division, 
Jemaah Islamiyah 
7 Zarkasih Caretaker Head, Jemaah Islamiyah, 2004 – 2007 
8 Abu Dujana Head of Askari Sariyah, Military Wing, Jemaah 
Islamiyah 
9 Sapto Arrested for involvement in the Aceh Training 
Facility 
10 Ustaz Ambrori Radical Cleric, Jamaah Anshorut Tauhid  
11 Mubarok Involvement in the Bali Bombing 2002, Jemaah 
Islamiyah Few survivors from the original group 
involved. Most have been executed. 
12 Ali Imron Bomb Maker for Bali Bombings 2002, Military 
Training in Afghanistan 6th Batch, Jemaah 
Islamiyah 
13 Jibril Military Training in Afghanistan, 2
nd
 Batch , 
Darul Islam 
14 Ustadz Kohar Military Training in Afghanistan, 3
rd
 Batch, 
Darul Islam 
15 Hidayat Military Training in Afghanistan, 
3
rd
 Batch,  Darul Islam 
16 Suhairi Military Training in Afghanistan, 7
th
 Batch, 
Negara Islam Indonesia and Jemaah Islamiyah 
17 Jubair Military Training in Afghanistan, 
7
th
  Batch, Negara Islam Indonesia and Jemaah 
Islamiyah 
18 Ghozali Ideologue, involved in CIMB Bank Robberies 
 Tanzim Al Qaeda Serambi Mekkah and Jemaah 
Anshorut Tauhid  
19 Abu Tholud Head of  I’s antiqi III, a member of  I’s central 
command and Special Forces 
Jemaah Islamiyah, Tandzim Al Qaeda Serambi 
Mekkah, Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid 
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20 Sawad Recruitment, Jemaah Islamiyah 
21 Ghoni Jemaah Islamiyah operative who played a central 
role in the Bali Bombings 
22 Abu Bakar Basyir Emir, Jemaah Islamiyah, Rabitatul Mujahiddin, 
Majelis Mujahiddin Indonesia, Jamaah Anshorut 
Tauhid, 
23 Abu Husna Education Division of the Central Board in 
Jemaah Islamiyah, Senior member of the Jemaah 
Islamiyah Command. 
24 Tony Togar Bombmaker, Christmas Eve Bombing in 2000 in 
Medan and the JW Marriott Bombing in Jakarta 
on 5 August 2003, Jemaah Islamiyah, worked 
alongside Hambali (Al Qaeda - Jemaah 
Islamiyah) 
25 Fajar Taslim Member of the special operations team of 
Jemaah Islamiyah. First foreigner to be charged 
and convicted under Indonesia's anti-terrorism 
law 
26 Abu Umar Head Abu Umar Group; Head, Darul Islam – 
Akram; Head, Abu Bakar Battalion, 
27 Arifin Lone Wolf Operative caught facilitating weapons 
28 Abdullah Sonata Head of KOMPAK (Action Committee for Crisis 
Response) in Ambon – Maluku, Planning 
Military Training Facility in Aceh, Recruitment 
29    Abdurrahman Ayub Head of JI Mantiqi 4, Australia 
Jamaah Islamiyah 
30 Ahmad Sajuli  ember of  I’s Armed Forces Division 
Jamaah Islamiyah, 
 
 
As a female analyst conducting the interviews, the paradoxical power asymmetry of 
interviews needs to be taken into consideration, “due to the interpersonal nature of the 
interview context, participants may be more likely to respond in ways they deem 
socially desirable.”227 Any “successful field research depends on the investigator’s 
trained abilities to look at people, listen to them, think and feel with them, talk with 
them rather than at them.” 228  The ability to build rapport with the subject was 
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pertinent towards the success of each interview. Managing social expectations, 
religious and gender difference meant that special effort was taken to ensure that the 
respondents were at ease. In order to ensure that the subjects were as comfortable in 
the social setting as possible, the interviews were conducted in Indonesian and 
minimally a hijab worn throughout the interviews with the first three categories of 
interviews conducted.  
 
The questions during the semi-structured interviews did not focus on operations that 
they conducted but instead focussed on what inspired them as individuals and as a 
group fighting for a cause. The interview sought to understand their sentiments, 
experience and role within the organisation and at the core, what inspired them to start 
and continue into with their journey as an individual and thereafter within a group. A 
factor that constantly stood out from the face-to-face interviews was that each one of 
them had acted with clear intent and with an aspiration for change as part of their 
respective groups. 
 
Data Collection (2) – Questionnaires  
 
The questionnaire draws inspiration and is modified from an earlier work conducted 
by the two esteemed psychologists in the field, Arie Kruglanski and Michelle 
Gelfand.
229
 Their creation of the index by Kruglanski and Gelfand was initially aimed 
to understand the process and the indicators that can identify factor that would lead to 
a successful rehabilitation programme. Their pioneering work focuses on factors 
“such as personal history, organisational embeddedness, current conditions, family 
situation, and personality variables (such as need for social dominance or tolerance 
for ambiguity) may all affect resilience to change.”230  
 
The questions from their earlier work were reframed to suit the core themes explored 
at the heart of this study - the correlation between violence in terrorist and extremist 
groups through the exploration of the role of ideology, leadership and group dynamics 
in the 10 selected groups. The questionnaires aimed to explore and understand the 
unique ways through which ideology, leadership and group dynamics played a role in 
terrorist groups in Indonesia. For scalability, a five-point Lickert Scale was used. The 
Likert scale is a psychometric scale will enable a quantitative assessment of the 
opinions provided by the respondents. The questionnaires were conducted in 
Indonesian. These structured questionnaires provided reliability between the 
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qualitative and quantitative methods used in this study and were translated into 
Indonesian and thereafter back-translated in order to ensure accuracy in the 
translations.  
 
Within the prison system in Indonesia, there are a mixture of detainees who are 
indicted and those awaiting trial within the prison facility. In the process to 
conducting the interviews and questionnaires, it was important to be cognizant of the 
subtle difference in the outcome and the manner in which detainees would choose to 
approach the questions with regards to their group affiliation and activities in 
Indonesia. The questionnaires that were distributed in the prison facilities were 
distributed with the understanding of anonymity, given that several respondents were 
still undergoing trial.  
 
As opposed to the one-on-one interviews with the leadership that the respondents and 
their organisations are named, these questionnaires were classified according to 
groups that the individual noted they belonged to. Respondents to the questionnaires 
were members from Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), Majelis Mujahideen Indonesia (MMI), 
Darul Islam (DI), Negara Islam Indonesia (NII), Splinter groups and cells in Aceh and 
Poso, Hizbut-Tahrir (HT) and Front Pembela Islam (FPI). The questionnaires have 
been coded accordingly. Some respondents had claimed that they did not respond to 
any group and omitted answering a few sections of the questionnaire.  
 
The questionnaire respondents were informed that they would be asked a series of 
questions on the role that they have played in their respective organisations. The 
questions raised were divided into the following themes, (a) what they were doing 
prior to joining the organization, (b) sentiments that they had felt when they had 
joined the organization, (c) personal experiences within the organization, (d) attitudes 
towards the Indonesian government, (e) the sense of belonging to the organisation, (f) 
the level of fundamentalism and last but not least (g) what the respondents aimed to 
change in Indonesia if they were given an opportunity. The questionnaire aimed to 
understand the level of group ‘embeddedness’ and belonging, level of extremist 
thought and their unique journeys into the terrorist or extremist organisation. Please 
refer to Annex 1 for the list of questions that were asked.  
 
Throughout the course of the survey, the word ‘terrorist group’ or ‘extremist group’ 
was not used given the pejorative nature of the term and the subsequent impact that it 
would have on the results. The value-neutral terminology of ‘organisation’ was used 
in questionnaire. The respondents were not provided full disclosure on what the 
constructs that the questions were aimed at assessing. The aim was to prevent 
instances wherein the respondents chose to play up or play down the role that they 
have had with their respective organisations. The respondents were told that this 
survey was aimed at understanding their personal journeys, struggles and what 
essentially inspiration to the cause.  
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Data Collection (3) – Court Documents and Extremist Literature 
 
A third-prong of data collection was to source for court documents and extremist 
literature from Indonesia. These additional insights will be triangulated and 
amalgamated with the insights gleaned from both the semi-structured qualitative 
interviews and quantitative questionnaires. Extremist literature in this instance would 
include literature that was authored by the terrorist leadership and court documents 
and records of the activities of the detainees within the correctional facilities. 
 
Analyses of the court documents and indictments would provide insight on the nature 
of the network and in-group dynamics between members of the groups. It would help 
to corroborate data and identify narratives and the level towards which the strength of 
ideology acts as a socially binding mechanism that can not only transcend territorial 
boundaries through narratives but also additionally strengthen the in-group dynamics 
and its impact on the ideological resolve of individuals within the groups. 
Due diligence was taken to ensure safety and security during the course of the 
interviews. All data collected including original questionnaires, notes from the 
interviews, court documents and extremist listerature are kept securely. 
 
DATA ANALYSES: THREE PHASES OF SYNTHESIS 
 
Mixed methods design used in this study is known as the embedded or concurrent 
nested strategy. This would embed both the quantitative as well as the qualitative 
element at the data acquisition stage as well as the data interpretation stage. This 
would help to enhance the findings while working off the strengths from both the 
quantitative and qualitative approaches. This study will utilise three phases of data 
synthesis – the influencers, the sustenance of terrorist groups and the threat matrix. 
These are illustrated in the diagram below.
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Phase One: The Influencers  
 
The first phase will analyse 10 terrorist and extremist groups across the three key 
factors that are hypothesised to influence the movement of groups from radical 
extremist thought to violent action. These key factors are ideology, leadership and 
group dynamics. For each key factor, data collection using both the quantitative and 
qualitative methods would be included.  
 
The diagram shown below will form the conceptual framework within which the six 
variables of the group’s escalation to violence will be explored vis-à-vis the role that 
ideology, leadership and group dynamics may play in the group’s shift towards 
violence. The additional variables will be the intent of the group, the opportunities 
and the capabilities of the group to conduct an act of terrorism. 
 
The analysis using the Alexander George’s method of inquiry in Phase Two will bring 
together this unique confluence of theories and assess the pathways of groups as they 
make the shift from ideological extremism to terrorism in a methodical manner that 
will rigorously draw from three varied disciplines of International Relations, 
Organisation theory and Collaborative Networks. 
 
Figure 2: Confluence of Disciplines 
 
CONFLUENCE OF DISCIPLINES 
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International Relations: 
Political Ideology 
Organisational Studies: 
Leadership 
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Collaborative Networks: 
Group Dynamics  
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Phase Two: The Sustenance of Terrorist Groups 
 
The framework used to analyse each of the 10 case studies of terrorist and extremists 
groups in Indonesia will be done using a method developed by Alexander George to 
conduct structured and focused comparison of each of the case studies. George’s 
method is aimed at developing typological theories. “In contrast to earlier discussions 
that focus on coarse comparisons, we emphasise that qualitative research usually 
involves a combination of cross-case comparisons and within-case analysis using 
methods of congruence testing and process-tracing. Within-case methods of analysis 
can greatly reduce the well-known risks of inferential errors that can arise from using 
comparative methods alone.”231  
 
A typology helps to partition events through the use of a specified combination of 
factors.232 “Typological theories treat cases as a configuration of variables that may 
involve complex interactions among all the variable values in the case.”233 In this 
instance, the assumption would be that “typological theories involving several 
variables can better capture the complexity of social life than the two-variable 
typological theories that are common in the social sciences.”234 This would add to the 
rigour of the research design and thereby provide a better understanding of the threat.  
 
The method’s openness to equifinality is especially attractive in recognition of the 
fluid interaction between variables in the process of radicalisation.  There are five 
steps within this framework, (1) identifying the nature and class of problems to be 
studied; (2) to define the independent, dependent and intervening variables; (3) to 
select cases to be studies and compared; (4) decide the characterisation of 
independent and dependent variable and lastly; (5) to formulate a detailed set of 
questions to be applied to each case. The use of one country – Indonesia thereby 
provides a contextualised comparison, thereby achieving a “high level of construct 
validity.”235 
 
The formulation of the detailed set of questions to analyse each case study will draw 
on the earlier work by Jones and Libincki. They identified five factors that contribute 
towards in the demise of terrorist groups. In analysing the factors that propelled a 
group to their demise they argued that the key factors were policing, military force, 
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the splintering of the group, politics, or (the eventual) victory of a terrorist group.
236
 
Separately, they had identified five variables that influenced the sustenance of a 
terrorist organisation. These five variables were ideological motivation, economic 
conditions, regime type, the size of groups, and the breadth of terrorist goals. This 
study will build on the work by Jones and Libincki and will posit that in addition to 
the five variables identified, the role of group dynamics is an integral variable that 
continues to sustain groups.  
 
Phase Three: The Threat Matrix 
 
The threat matrix as reflected above draws its influence from criminology. A 
successful act of terrorism arises from the convergence of three factors namely, the 
individual or groups intention or motive for attack, the capability of individuals and 
groups to carry out attacks and lastly, the opportunity for attack.237 The factors that 
push groups on the path of violence and terrorism are caused by a convergence of - 
Intention, Capability and Opportunity for attack. This third and last phase in the 
analyses adds to the earlier hypothesis wherein the external push factors or strains of 
influence are necessary but not sufficient. The factors that influence a group’s future 
tell only one side of the story. It is ultimately a group’s ability to successfully carry 
out an act of terrorism or threaten to carry out at attack would point to the precise 
moment that the shift from extremism to terrorism takes place.  
 
This third and last phase in the analyses will conclude the study and provide a 
summation of the underlying threat of the group’s progressive thrust towards violence 
in Indonesia. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
INFLUENCER A:  
IDEOLOGY AND THE IMPACT ON  
RADICAL GROUPS IN INDONESIA  
 
“A belief is not merely an idea the mind possesses.  
It is an idea that possesses the mind” 
Robert Oxton Bolt 
 
Long wars are won or lost on the battlefield of ideas. In Indonesia, despite the relative 
successes that have been achieved in the kinetic efforts against terrorism, the 
ideological scaffoldings that form the very foundation of terrorist and extremist 
movements has not been dismantled. “In the widest possible sense an ideology thus 
offers answers to the question of what type of society should be desirable.”238 The 
vast ineffectiveness at countering the radical ideologies that incite violence that are 
promulgated by terrorist and extremists has created a permissive environment for the 
sustenance of these groups.  
 
Over the course of the past three decades, several prominent models and conceptual 
frameworks on radicalisation have placed substantial emphasis on the role of ideology 
in radicalisation. These radicalisation models and conceptual frameworks included 
amongst others, The Al-Muhajiroun Model by Quintan Wictorowitz, Phases of 
Islamic Radicalisation by Micheal Taarnby, the Continuum of Salafi-Jihadi 
Radicalisation by Jeffery Cozzens, the NYPD model, FBI model, 6-Stage 
Radicalisation Model by Savage and Liht, NCTC Model and Velhuis and Staun’s 
Root Cause Model. These models and conceptual frameworks were explored in 
greater detail in Chapter 2 of this study.  
 
This Chapter will examine the role of ideology as one of three key influencers in 
sustaining and pushing the groups in Indonesia on a pathway of violence. The other 
key influencers, the role of leadership and group psychology will be dealt with in 
greater detail in the next two Chapters of this study. This chapter will explore the 
factors within the group’s ideology that (1) incites violence, (2) sustains the terrorist 
and extremist movement in Indonesia.  
 
The Chapter will not embark on the refutation of these extremist narratives as 
expounded by terrorist and extremist groups. What is pertinent for this study is not 
how true or false these ideological statements are but instead the type of meaning 
these beliefs have acquired vis-à-vis society over time and ultimately its relation to 
power. In particular, its hold over the group and thereby the impact on the operational 
injunctions of the group. Power can be accrued when thoughts and ideas are 
politicised through the language of religion and channelled in order to have an impact 
on the escalation of violence within groups.  
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IDEOLOGY: DIFFERENTIATING FORM AND SUBSTANCE 
 
The word ideology is more often than not, one of the most controversial terms used 
within the social sciences discipline. Just like terrorism, the term when used loosely 
can be looked upon as pejorative. Much of the discourse on terrorism (thus far) has 
placed the role of ideology at the heart of the causes of terrorism. In short, ideology is 
seen to provide a motive and framework for action, provide a justification for acts of 
violence, provide a language for mass mobilisation through the call for jihad, 
generates public support and radicalises communities through a culture of violence 
and a radical interpretation of Islam.
239
 The danger lies in the often tenuous and 
flawed correlation between Islam the religion and violence.  
 
In form, ideology merely refers to the collation of ideas or very loosely put a ‘belief 
system’ per se. A collection of ideas without the process of politicisation of the very 
ideas in question will remain but an aggregation of ways of thinking about the world 
and proving a loose explanation for ensuing world events. This functionalist approach 
of broad categorisation of the terms has resulted in the problem where the term 
ideology has been used loosely within the discourse. In this instance, “nearly every 
ideological system or set of practices can be a religion, then calling something 
religious does not distinguish it from anything else.”240 As such, merely stating that 
ideology has justified violent action or resulted in mobilisation or caused conflict 
negates a quintessential factor that links thought (a belief system) and activism (an 
action).  
 
In substance, what most scholars often failed to highlight is the crucial and missing 
link in the puzzle. It is the means and the methods used to politicise the idea. The 
substance lies in the politicisation of the idea(s) that both accelerates and charts the 
course for action and potentially violent action. The securitization of the ‘belief 
system’ has rendered it a key factor in influencing the increased level of violence.  
The missing link between the idea and the means undertaken to politicise a belief 
system and can be moved a step further, to explore the transference of the now 
politicised belief system to a community of people.  
 
The term ideology as used by scholars has amalgamated both these aspects over time. 
As such, it is not only ‘what’ the ideas are but perhaps more importantly, ‘how’ these 
ideas have been politicised that has created a lasting impact.  Ideology as the term is 
originally meant – as a system of beliefs as such, is a necessary but insufficient means 
of explaining the pathways of violence of groups in Indonesia. This Chapter will 
explore the role and subsequent impact of manifestos of JI and JAT on the ideology of 
the group. In addition to the formal means of influence through manifestos, this 
Chapter will also explore the use of books, music and chants to reach out to the 
masses. These varied means undertaken by the groups aim to reiterate the core 
message propagated by these groups on the necessity and viability for the 
establishment of an Islamic State – a seemingly incorruptible ideal that they all share. 
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This study will argue, that the role of particular individuals or a group in providing a 
permissive environment needs to be highlighted in order to provide the necessary 
depth and understanding on the traditional assumptions of the role of ideology. It is 
important to note that ultimately “belonging to a group and remaining isolated from 
society at large reinforces the terrorists’ ideology and strengthens their 
motivations”241 through the constant politicisation of these ideas through the lens of 
religion. The repetitive reinforcement of ideas and group-pressures as explored further 
in Chapter 7 are pertinent in sustaining interest of the members and cadres of terrorist 
and extremist groups. 
 
Religion is a familiar and potent force when harnessed effectively. It channels an 
almost primordial reaction amongst believers to enact change for the sake of what is 
perceived to be the greater good. A set of ideas and values in it of itself is not 
political. It is ultimately the politicisation of these ideas and values that renders the 
ideology political. The group becomes the catalyst through which ideas are 
politicised, sustained and put into a course of action, thereby rendering the ideology 
problematic to contend with thereafter. 
 
Ideology Creates a Framework for Interaction 
 
Stuart Hall defines ideology as “mental frameworks – the languages, the concepts, 
categories, imagery of thought, and systems of representation – which different 
classes and social groups deploy in order to make sense of, figure out and render 
intelligible the way society works.”242 The role of ideology is to facilitate making 
sense of governing realities amongst communities. Ideology is often widely seen in 
the literature as a “set of consensually shared beliefs and doctrines that provide the 
moral and intellectual basis for a political, economic, or social system, imbues human 
existence with meaning and inspiration, but it also fosters illusion and threatens 
individual freedom.”243 
 
Teun A Van Djik’s work on ideology aptly notes “that discourse and ideology are 
social phenomena and as long as one embeds cognition in social contexts and 
society.” 244  The social context of ideology and the manner in which meaning is 
created will inadvertently act as the means through which societies and groups are 
formed, informed and ultimately transformed over time. The ideology is both the 
message and the indentity marker of the group. The leadership a potent messenger 
and the collective aggregation of individuals through group dynamics reinforce this 
message. The social context through which an ideology is propagated and reinforced 
cannot be dismissed.  
 
Political Islam has been rendered to an uncomfortable position since Indonesia’s 
Independence. This has been explored in greater detail in Chapter 3. It has directly 
influenced the manner in which radical thought has taken root in society over time. 
The social role of ideologies to impact the norms and mores of groups and society 
would have implications on not only the identity of members within the group, it 
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would additionally have implications on the identity of the group vis-à-vis the 
community at large. It is pertinent to understand that, 
 
“ideologies are also socially shared and related to societal structures, an obvious 
insight which, however needs a different theoretical analysis. Similarly, beliefs are not 
only personal, nor do they always spontaneously ‘emerge’ as products of the 
individual mind. Rather, many of them are socially acquired, constructed and changed  
- for example, through social practices and interaction in general, and through 
discourse and communication in particular. This means that besides their mental 
dimensions, they have social dimension, neither of which should be reduced to the 
other.”
245
 
 
The ideology in this case forms the framework for interaction both within and outside 
of a given group. “As ideological animals, humans suffuse the world with socially 
constructed meaning.”246 An ideology that is rooted in any given religion has the 
ability to influence existing social and political structures, impact groups and their 
respective interests, and inspire power and create a sense of dominance through the 
acquisition and reproduction of divine inspiration. 
 
Ideology Defines the Parameters and Sets the Future Direction of Group   
 
An aggregation of individuals who possess the same idea has the propensity to 
facilitate the process through which these ideas are mutually reinforce over the course 
of time. The function of “(t)he group, as selector and interpreter of ideology, is 
central.”247 In JI for instance, the Qoidah Sholbah (Core Group) comprised selected 
members such as Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, Abdullah Sungkar, Abu Jibriel and Hambali 
whose task was to identify others that had potential to carry forth the ideology of JI.   
As the arbiter of knowledge the parameters of action and the activities that the group 
eventually engage in were defined. As such, 
 
“group ideology plays an important role in supporting this conformity-inducing 
group environment. When questions are raised the absolutist ideology becomes the 
intellectual justification. Indeed the ideology becomes, in effect, the scripture for 
the groups morality.”
248
  
 
Ideology as such is seen to “break the bonds of the existing social order”249  An 
important aspect is the presence of an in-group and out-group. While not conforming 
to one group – the mainstream, the terrorist or extremist group thereby creates and 
defines the parameters for its own existence through its ideology. Setting the tone of 
the debate, the politicisation of the terrorist ideology has not only outlined the 
activities undertaken within the group, but it would define how members of the group 
interact in the public domain and see themselves in relation to society. The parameters 
of the group as dictated by its ideology vis-à-vis the use of violence to achieve their 
aims will have a considerable impact on the trajectory of security of the state. 
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Setting the group on the course of action to achieve their objections, Qutb felt that 
only religion could rid “humanity from the barbarity of technocratic culture” 250 
Ideology thereby imbues in the group not only a common identity and a cause to 
identify with, but also a goal to move towards. This creates a group identity with 
strength harnessed through the narrative of religion. This transformational character 
of ideology sets out the rules of engagement. It sets the group on a course of action.  It 
presents a ‘cognitive map’ for future action that can then be undertaken by the group. 
 
When religious texts are used to politicise, the effects can be devastating. Religion 
weaves into the picture and underscores the notion that if God is with you, then Man 
would not be able to stand in the path of a Divine Plan. It bolsters the movement as a 
collective both terrorist and extremist groups alike with the aspiration to move 
towards a utopian ideal.  
 
RELIGIOUSLY MOTIVATED TERRORISTS:  
CREATE, DEFINE AND TRANSFORM 
 
The challenge of dealing with the threat of religiously inspired terrorism has and in 
many ways still continues to be a daunting enterprise. Ensconced in a 
misinterpretation of religious texts, while holding the cards for a zero sum game, the 
current wave of religiously motivated terrorism bears the hallmarks of all the dangers 
raised by scholars that will be evident in this complex discourse. Hoffman notes that 
two challenges are prevalent in religiously inspired terrorism. The first would be the 
inability to identify the adversary, and thereby reduce the opportunity to conduct any 
predictive analysis to assess their capabilities accurately. Second, the unpredictability 
of religiously inspired terrorists
251
 in their pursuit of violence as means to an end. 
Ultimately “the intention to kill and maim for political purpose is chosen, and the 
choice itself is strongly informed by moral arguments and reasons, however 
misconceived or hallucinatory.”252 The dominant discourse in terrorist and extremist 
literature “speak of one another as evil.”253 They ascribe notions of evil and the idea 
that the enemy that they are facing albeit a secular state is equivalent to the warring 
factions in the dichotomy of good and evil. David Rapoport emphasises that the 
“special justification and precedents”254  differentiate the religious and the secular 
terrorists. 
 
Central to the role of religion is Durkheim’s work on the distinction between the 
sacred and the profane.
255
 As such religion “functions to promote social unity and to 
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create moral and intellectual consensus.”256 Stark and Bainbridge take the idea of 
further and see religion through the lens of deductive reasoning as one that provides 
believers with things that they desire and have not yet received in life thus far.
257
 The 
allure of the divine sanction and aspiration of a better future remains a central theme 
for religiously motivated terrorists. Broadly, “religion focuses on maximizing 
individual benefit through group participation, while ideology is intent on maximizing 
group benefit through individual participation.”258 
 
Salafi-Jihadi 
 
Jihad can be defined as striving in the path of God with the aim of defending Islam 
against any attack.
259
 In particular, it would be to defend Islam against the non-
believers who are seen to be the “very epitome of evil.”260 Radical leader and Bali 
Bomber Imam Samudra for instance, was of the opinion that there is a “jihad di’fai 
(defence)”261 and “jihad hujumi (offence)”262 The Bali bombings of 2002 was looked 
upon as a conflation of both a defensive and offensive attack against the perceived 
enemy. Explaining that jihad is a continuous process until the aspiration of an Islamic 
State is achieved, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir identified the various weapons that can be used 
in the path of Jihad,  
 
“there are three types of weapons: (1) weapons made of iron (guns) 
(2) weapon of written word (dakwah) (3) weapon of prayer. Now that 
I am in jail, I utilise the weapon of the written word.”263 
 
 He emphasized that one’s call to jihad should continue as it is a divine calling and a 
gift to strive for the establishment of God’s rule on earth. 
 
The term salafi-jihadi has been used in much of the discourse to describe the 
underlying religious doctrine that underscored much of terrorist ideology today. 
Wiktorowicz identified an apt manner of understanding the Salafi Movement. He 
divides the Salafi movement into three categories, namely, purists, politicos and 
jihadists. The common denominator within the Salafi movement is the religious creed 
or aqida based on the Qu’ran and Sunnah. The creed is based on Islamic principles 
such as the belief in the, tauhid or the oneness of God, the supremacy of divine 
governance. The division amongst the three categories arise from the manner in which 
the aqida is applied to contemporary issues and the hold that they have on religious 
authority.  The purists implement the aqida by using politically neutral and peaceful 
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means through dakwah, tazkiyya and tarbiya. They see themselves as protectors of the 
tauhid and the purity of Islam. The politicos claim to have a better understanding of 
contemporary issues, and undertake a more activist approach short of a rebellion 
against the current order to uphold the aqida.  
 
The jihadists emerged during the Soviet-Afghan War and unlike the politicos they 
would not hesitate to use violence to uphold the aqida.
264
 The necessity to take up 
arms in this instance was seen to be a necessary progression due to the perceived 
dereliction of duty of the religious leadership of both the purists and the politicos who 
were seen to have not performed their duty to uphold the aqida to the fullest of their 
abilities. 
 
Over time the salafi-jihadists gained considerable clout amongst radical teachers, 
preachers and scholars in scholars even in Indonesian Islamic boarding schools or 
pesantrens. In a recent report exploring the evolution of Al Qaeda and the persistent 
threat of the salafi-jihadist, Seth Jones, notes that there is a “58-percent increase in the 
number of Salafi-jihadist groups from 2010 to 2013.” 265   In addition to that the 
“number of Salafi-jihadists more than doubled from 2010 to 2013.” 266  It is the 
prevalence of the salafi-jihadi discourse that continued to alarm governments and 
exacts pressure in order to find new ways of dealing with this threat. Salafi-jihadi 
ideology confers “the believer with a strong sense of identity and existential certainty; 
it also, more importantly, enables them to rationalize personal failings and justify 
violent retaliation against those who are perceived to be responsible for them.”267  
 
In a now infamous interview in 1998, Osama bin Laden even after his death, 
continues to be a prominent icon of the salafi-jihadi movement even after his death. 
He iterated then that violence was the only way in which to achieve an ideal state. 
Violence through acts of terrorism would act as justified punishment and would be a 
warning and bring about order and justice. Osama bin Laden emphasised that,  
 
“Every state and every civilization and culture has to resort to terrorism under 
certain circumstances for the purpose of abolishing tyranny and corruption. Every 
country in the world has its own security system and its own security forces, its 
own police and its own army. They are all designed to terrorise whoever even 
contemplates to attack that country or its citizens. The terrorism we practice is of 
the commendable kind for it is directed at the tyrants and the aggressors and the 
enemies of Allah, tyrants and the traitors who commit acts of treason against their 
own countries and their own faith and their own prophet and their own nation. 
Terrorising those and punishing them are necessary measures to straighten things 
and to make them right.”
268
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It was indeed a strong statement of justifying violence in order to achieve a political 
end, for like Clausewitz, who saw “war as politics by other means.” For Osama bin 
Laden, terrorism was a natural progression of force in order to purge evil – an 
extension of other methods that have been used in order to make things right. The 
bold use of force is thus seen as a necessary means to an end. “Clausewitzian war, in 
short, is rational and instrumental. It is the attempt to bring about a new state of 
affairs through the artful combination of violence and the promise to cease violence if 
certain political objectives are met.”269 This was similar to what the salafi-jihadists 
proposed, as means in order to achieve their desired objective that of a state governed 
by Islamic Law.  
 
“Salafis are totalist, in that they believe that Islam is a complete code of life, and 
envisage no sphere of human activity independent from this scope. They are 
fundamentalist, in that they believe that Islam is the literal word of God and cannot 
therefore be questioned or revised in any way.”
270
 
 
It is this quest to return to fundamentals of Islam that stands as the core of their 
activities. In Indonesia, as much as their actions could be undeniably defined as salafi-
jihadi by many scholars, several of the leaders interviewed attempted to steer clear of 
the term when using to describe themselves or the work of their organisation. When 
asked if he considered his group ‘radical’, spokesperson of HTI, Ismail Yusanto noted 
that it would depend on whose definition of radical. For HTI,  
 
“if it is about going back to the roots, it means going back to the 
Quran and the Sunnah, then its alright.”271  
 
Ismail Yusanto went on to highlight that the term  
 
“radical has a political bias especially since radical is a pejorative 
term.”272  
 
Ustaz Jaafar Umar Thalib the former leader of LJ noted that the  
 
“salafi-jihadi is a label, I am salafi.”273  
 
The discomfort with the terminology might just stem from the entrenched association 
of salafi-jihadism with acts of terrorism. Semantics aside, most would wear the badge 
of salafism proudly and see violent jihad as a means to establishing Islamic Law in 
Indonesia.  
 
Explaining the foundations of Islamic Law, Dr. Irfan Idris, Director of Indonesia’s 
Deradicalisation Programme a scholar in Islamic Law noted that most of the terrorists 
and extremists have missed the 5 factors that were the reasons behind why Islamic 
Law of Shari’ah was created in the first instance. These factors were, to look after 
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life, to look after the religion, to look after the intellect, to look after the family and 
last but not least to look after one’s possessions. He noted that all the above would be 
important in order to establish Islamic law, and not merely a misguided understanding 
on establishing Islam in Indonesia.
274
 Salafi-Jihadi or radical, the groups as a 
collective aimed to return back to the core teachings of Islam with a the objective of 
establishing Islamic Law however, it is done in a selective and misguided manner, 
that does not embrace the true spirit of the law.  
 
Survey Findings – Fundamentalism 
 
As part of this study a survey was conducted exploring the notion of fundamentalism 
in terrorist and extremist groups. The 94 respondents comprised members of both 
terrorist and extremist groups in Indonesia. The notion of fundamentalism was 
examined with the aim of identifying the importance placed on the role of religion 
namely Islam and the perception of members after they had joined the group.  
 
 Of the 94 respondents, the results reiterated the entrenched notion of religion 
amongst members of the groups. 77% believed that God has given humanity a 
complete, unfailing guide to happiness and salvation, which must be totally followed. 
66% believed that the basic cause of evil in this world is Satan, who is still constantly 
and ferociously fighting against God, in this instance this would include governments 
and agencies who impede the establishment of an Islamic State. 56% believed that 
there are basically only two kinds of people in the world: the Righteous, who will be 
rewarded by God, and the rest who will not. 66% felt that to lead the best, most 
meaningful life, one must belong to the one, fundamentally true religion. True to the 
salafi teachings underpinning terrorist and extremists groups in Indonesia, 70% 
agreed that the fundamentals of God’s religion should never be tampered with, or 
compromised with others’ beliefs. For abandoning the true religion, 68% agreed that 
God would punish those who walked away from the faith.  
 
The centrality of religion amongst the respondents was especially strong with the 
survey results that showed an overwhelming majority of those who reiterated the role 
of religion. 80% of the respondents agreed that Islam is the only acceptable religion. 
78% agreed that Islam teaches without error God’s truth. 76% believed that only 
Muslims would be allowed to go to heaven regardless if the individual was good. And 
finally, 67% believed that non-Muslims had a lot of pagan ways. The construct of 
fundamentalism to some extent showcased the inherent in-group and out-group 
dynamics that were rooted in their belief system.  
 
Differentiating the Nuanced Impact of Ideology on:  
Individual vs Group  
 
In exploring the influence of ideology in radicalisation, Jonathan Githens-Mazer and 
Robert Lambert’s work on conventional wisdom, adeptly warns about the fallacy 
sorrounding the often focused upon convential wisdom of the assuming that solely 
ideology caused the radicalisation of individuals. Their work based on case studies of 
brothers involved in Operation Crevice and the Brixon Salafi Community’s work 
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highlighted that even if the ideology is “one of ‘Islam under threat’ or more 
specifically as a ‘Salafi-jihadi’ orientation, is present in a variety of cases where 
individuals don’t become terrorists. It is therefore illogical and dangerous to assume 
that identity issues and/or ideology in and of themselves are causing terrorism.”275  
 
A nuance understanding of the role of ideology is pertinent to provide an accurate and 
balanced understanding of the role of ideology in both indivdual and group 
radicalisation respectively. This study explores factors that could lead to increased 
levels of violence within groups. Ideology in this instance, is seen from the vantage 
point of the collective. Ideology is seen as an outward manifestation that reinforces 
the identity of what the collective unit stands for. It is  taken to be one of  three key 
influencers that will shape the group’s course of action.  
 
The survey conducted of terrorist and extremist group members on the construct of 
the individual’s purpose of joining the organisation was examined. Of the 94 
respondents, 60% respondents noted that they felt it was their religious duty to join 
the organisation. 75% felt that they were doing something for the good of the 
community. 69% felt that joining the organisation would bring honour to themselves 
and finally, 67% felt that that joining the organisation would bring honour to their 
families.  
 
Figure 3: Purpose of Joining 
 
 
Hence while at an individual level, there may be instances where ideology plays a 
limited role in radicalisation, the role of ideology for the group provides a varied 
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function on the path towards violence. For the group, ideology acts as an identity 
marker, a binding mechanism for group solidarity and even as a framework for action. 
At an individual level, where ideology does not play a pertinent role, the individual 
may perhaps be attracted to other aspects within a group that would pull them on a 
path of radicalisation. The individual can either be drawn by the role of leadership or 
intra-group relations that would facilitate the individual’s pathway of radicalisation. 
In the case of Indonesia, the pre-existing perception of religious duty, greater good 
and concept of honour were reflected in the responses in the survey. In an extension 
of the work by Mark Juergensmeyer on religious violence, the case study of the threat 
landscape in Indonesia is influenced by “religious language and ideas.”276 Even in the 
event that ideology were not the initial influence, it is an enduring facet that has 
entrenched itself within the terrorist and extremist groups in Indonesia for it is the 
image of a “cosmic war, which adds further complications to a conflict that has 
become baptized with religious authority”277 spiraling it into a vortex and a continues 
cycle that is sometime hard to break out of.  
 
MANY GROUPS… ONE MOVEMENT 
 
Former Chief of Indonesia’s Intelligence Agency, General Hendropriyono, explained 
the proliferation of many groups in Indonesia using the analogy of a fruit tree. He 
opined that the terrorist threat in in Indonesia was analogous to a tree with radical 
ideology as its roots and the fertilisers are the on-going conflicts especially the Israeli-
Palestinian issues. The sunrays were akin to the poverty and economic strife in 
Indonesia, shining its warmth on all but just like sunshine, not everyone gets burnt 
and just as poverty would not necessarily result in an increased vulnerability of 
individuals to be radicalised. The strong trunk of the tree was the steady growth of the 
terrorist and movement in Indonesia and its many fruit the terrorist organisations.
278
 
The numerous terrorist organisations were borne from the same tree – many groups 
one movement. He added that while a majority of the terrorist groups were 
problematic to Indonesia, a considerable number such as JI, MMI and JAT had one 
person in common, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir.279  
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Figure 4: Attitude of Countries 
 
 
 
 
The strong disdain for Israel and the US was evident where of the 94 respondents, 
63% held both negative and very negative views of Israel and 67% held both negative 
and very negative views of the US. 
 
The table below highlights the core aims of the ten groups that are being examined in 
this study. With the exception of FPI, all the groups call for the establishment of an 
Islamic State as its ultimate political end game. FPI calls for the establishment of 
Islamic Law within the parameters of the state – while maintaining the state’s doctrine 
of Pancasila.  Ghozali explained that in his opinion, there were two types of 
ideologies as seen in behaviour of the terrorist movement in Indonesia, (1) The first 
what he referred to as the ‘Radical’ comprised groups that wanted to change the laws 
in Indonesia and wanted to change what is known as Negara Kesatuan Republik 
Indonesia (NKRI), the Republic of Indonesia. These groups are JI, JAT, MMI, HTI, 
NII, DI and several of the more radical smaller splinter groups. (2) The second was 
what he referred to as the ‘Moderates’ these comprised groups that did not want to 
change status quo too much, however they wanted to see implemented Islamic Law. 
These groups include groups such as FPI who were comfortable with Indonesia’s use 
of Pancasila however saw the necessity to include the implementation of Islamic 
Law. 
280
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Table 3: Ideology in Action - Beliefs and Aims of the Groups281 
NO. GROUP AIMS 
1 Darul Islam 
(DI)* 
Established in 1948 with the aim of challenging Dutch rule 
through independence and the establishment of an Islamic 
State.  
2 Negara Islam* 
Indonesia (NII) 
NII was established by Kartosuwiryo with the proclamation 
of Independence in West Java in 1949, the area that was 
controlled by NII was called DI. The movement in general 
aims to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia. Both DI that 
was formed in 1948 and the NII are intrinsically linked and 
often referred to as the DI/NII movement. 
3 Lashkar Jihad 
(LJ) 
As the paramilitary wing of FKAWJ, LJ has a primarily local 
agenda. Targeting Christians in conflict areas of Maluku and 
Poso. LJ deployed fighters to Ambon. FKAWJ, its parent 
organisation was formed as part of Salafi movement in 
Indonesia that had aimed to spread the Salafi teachings in 
Indonesia namely the Sunnah of the Prophet, to be a positive 
example to society and accept and believe in tauhid (the 
oneness of God).  
4 Majelis 
Mujahideen 
Indonesia (MMI) 
Aimed to establish Islamic law in Indonesia and the world. 
This would be done through dakwah (outreach), educating 
Muslim community, gain consensus for the establishment of 
Islamic Law, create positive environment for non-Muslims 
and to mobilise the masses towards the creation of Islamic 
Law. 
5 Jemaah Islamiyah 
(JI) 
They aimed to establish an Islamic Archipelago (Daulah 
Islamiyah Nusantara) that includes Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
southern Philippines, Singapore and Brunei. 
6 Jamaah Anshorut 
Tauhid (JAT) 
JAT ultimately aims to establish a true Islamic state/khilafah 
based on the teachings of the Quran and Prophet - Khilafah 
rasydah ala minhajin Nubuwwah.  The state will be achieved 
through outreach (dakwah) and jihad, through encouraging 
people to do good deeds and fight evil deeds (amar ma'ruf 
and nahi mungkar). 
7 Al Qaeda 
Indonesia (AI) 
The group's objective is to establish a pan-Islamic state, or an 
Islamic state in Indonesia. 
8 Mujahideen 
Indonesia Timur 
(MIT) 
Its short-term objective is to establish an Islamic state in Poso. Its 
long-term goal for the establishment of an Islamic state. 
9 Front Pembela 
Islam (FPI) 
FPI's goal is the implementation of Shariah law in Indonesia. 
Unlike other groups, (on paper) FPI does not call for an 
Islamic state. Instead, it demands the change in Indonesia's 
constitution to include adherence to Islamic law. FPI's 
primary objective objective is to implement the amar ma'ruf 
nahi munkar (to do good deeds and avoid the evil deeds) 
principles in all aspects of life.  
10 Hizbut Tahrir 
Indonesia (HTI) 
Hizbut Tahrir’s goal is to establish a global Islamic state or 
Daulah Khilafah Islamiyah. HTI calls for the Indonesian 
nation-state (NKRI) to be abolished and replaced by an 
Islamic Caliphate.  
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The terrorist and extremist movements in Indonesia were not without its internal 
schism and fissures. When asked in the survey the aspects that they would like to 
see changed in Indonesia the highest recurrent theme was that of wanting to see a 
change instituted in Indonesia, Islamic state and governance at 24% and the to 
change the laws and legislation at 16%. Approximately one quarter of the 
respondents or 28% have aspects that they wanted changed that were not reflected 
in the dominant themes shown below. 
 
 
Figure 5: Things to Change in Indonesia 
 
 
 
To a large extent, what remains unique with the Indonesia case study is the fact that 
numerous groups have surfaced under a multitude of banners, but almost always 
with the same aim. This chapter will highlight two of the major splits that had taken 
place in Indonesia vis-à-vis belief systems. 
 
Split from DI/NII to JI 
 
Although there were distinct similarities in the aims articulated by the groups, the 
terrorist movement in Indonesia was prone to schisms and fissures from within. These 
schisms occurred at the level of ideology and as a result of leadership. The split 
between DI and JI for instance occurred “over the conduct of the struggle with the 
kaffir unbelievers and the scope of the fundamentalist vision.”282 At one level, some 
assume that Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir,283 senior leaders of NII had a 
more global vision for NII, by sending mujahideen to participate in the Soviet Afghan 
War. Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba’syir were tasked to expand NII’s networks 
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while in exile in Malaysia,
284
 capitalised on the opportunity accorded by Abdullah 
Azzam through the Makhtab al-Khadamat al-Arab.  It is likely that their sending of 
mujahideen to Afghanistan “was less to wage jihad against the Soviet in Afghanistan 
than to take advantage of the military training that was made available on the 
Pakistan-Afghanistan Border.
285
 Hence, the concerted effort by Abdullah Sungkar to 
send batches of fighters to Afghanistan was as a result of his aspiration to steer JI may 
have not entirely be because of a totally global aspiration but a viable space to train in 
order to conduct activities in Southeast Asia. There were reports that Adjegan 
Masduki a senior and rival NII member opposed the regional and global stance that he 
felt Abdullah Sungkar was shaping the group towards.
286
 However if this was the 
case, Hambali’s plan to initiate a change in targets from domestic to a western targets 
might not have been met by opposition by Abdullah Sungkar as described by several 
individuals that were interviewed including Nassir Abbas.  
 
Muhammad Tito Karnavian, identified two distinct narratives for the split. At one 
level there was the ideological split as noted by those that were pro-JI. According to 
this narrative, Abdullah Sungkar accused senior NII member, Adjegan Masduki “of 
having Shi’ite and sufi tendencies and therefore of having strayed from salafi 
teaching.”287 DI and later NII were founded on the basis of salafi doctrine where as 
Ghozali pointed out, they desired to change the laws in Indonesia through the 
establishment of Islamic Law.  
 
At a second level was the narrative that was predominant from pro-NII forces and 
supporters of Adjegan Masduki who indicated that there was a dispute over funding 
and the control of funds that Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir had accrued 
while they were in Indonesia. “Adjegan Masduki suspected that (Abdullah Sungkar 
and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir) were getting funds from the International Network that was 
sending the Mujahideen to Pakistan and Afghanistan.”288 This was in addition to the 
funds that they were already collecting from the communities in Malaysia and 
Singapore. The dispute arose over the autonomy of the use of funds by NII through 
Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir. 
 
Either because of the split over funding or ideology or perhaps owing to both these 
reasons, the DI/NII group split with the formation of JI in 1993. The ideology of JI 
was enshrined in the document Pedoman Umum Perjuangan al Jemaah al 
Islamiyah (General Guide for the Struggle of Al-Jamaah Al-Islamiyah) (PUPJI) a 
document that they had consolidated in May 1996.  Since its establishment in 1993, 
JI had over the course of a few years, “evolved into an ideological hybrid deriving 
its political ideology and strategy in part from Qutb and the Egyptian Islamic jihadi 
groups Gamaa al Islamiyah al Masri (Al Masri Islamic Group) and al Islamiyah al 
Jihad al Masri (Al Masri Islamic Jihad), as well as from its own indigenous 
                                                 
284
 Ken Conboy, The Second Front: Inside Asia’s Most Dangerous Terrorist Network, (Jakarta: 
Equinox Publishing, 2006) p.36 
285
 Muhammad Tito Karnavian, Explaining Islamist Insurgencies: The Case of Al-Jamaah al-Islamiyah 
and the radicalisation of the Poso Conflict, 2000-2007, (London: Imperial College Press, 2015) p. 44 
286
 Rohaizah, RSIS Commentary 
287
 Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia: Damaged but Still Dangerous ICG Asia Report N°63, 26 
August 2003, p.6 
288
 Muhammad Tito Karnavian, Explaining Islamist Insurgencies: The Case of Al-Jamaah al-Islamiyah 
and the radicalisation of the Poso Conflict, 2000-2007, (London: Imperial College Press, 2015) p. 46 
95 
 
resources.”289 JI aimed to mirror the work of its namesake the Gamaa al Islamiyah 
al Masri and to some extent saw itself as an extension to the group in its aim to 
establish an Islamic state and caliphate. This time as opposed to DI/NII,  I’s aim 
was not merely the establishment of an Islamic state in Indonesia but the aspiration 
of Daulah Islamiyah Nusantara – a Caliphate in the Southeast Asian Archipelago.  
 
 
Defection from MMI to JAT  
 
The Majelis Muhjahideen Indonesia  (MMI) was formed in 2000 with the aim of 
bringing various terrorist and extremist groups together under the umbrella of one 
council. As a collective, the aim of MMI was the establishment of an Islamic 
Caliphate.
290
 Tensions between MMI and Ba’asyir escalated in 2006 after Ba’asyir’s 
release from prison and over the question of who should be in charge of facilitating 
the return of Ba’asyir return to Ngruki. Ba’asyir’s sons Abdul Rochim and Rashid 
Ridho were of the opinion that MMI was misusing their father’s popularity for the 
benefit of MMI decided to manage Ba’asyir return after his release from prison. His 
dakwah or outreach activities were later managed by Abdul Rochim under the newly 
form Abu Bakar Ba’asyir Centre in 2008.  
 
At the core the split was a result of the dispute over the dogma on the manner through 
which leadership was selected in MMI. Ba’asyir noted that while “The amir could 
consult with others in an executive council, or majelis syuro, but ultimately, he made 
the decisions, popular or not, and every member of the organisation had to fall in 
line.”291 Ba’asyir felt that in MMI the leader possessed “only a symbolic role.”292 Abu 
Bakar Ba’asyir refused to condone the selection of the leader of MMI through 
election as he deemed choice of leader by democratic elections as un-Islamic. The 
split result in the more radical sections of MMI joining JAT, several of whom later 
were part of the JAT Executive Council.  
 
On more than one occasion, Ba’asyir continued to make attempts to unite terrorist 
groups under one common banner. The formation of JAT almost mirrored the idea of 
a multitude of groups operating under one banner. 10 days after Ba’asyir’s resignation 
from MMI on 28 July 2008, Ba’asyir founded a new organisation – JAT.  JAT was 
inaugurated on 17 September 2008 on “the (Islamic Calendar’s) anniversary of the 
Battle of Badr in 624, Islam’s first major victory, when the Prophet’s outnumbered 
forces in Medina (and) defeated attackers from Mecca”293 with Ba’asyir as its Emir.  
 
JAT possessed members from a variety of backgrounds as a majority used to be 
members of terrorist and extremist groups in Indonesia. Within its ranks, JAT 
comprised members who were from various terrorist and extremist groups. An 
enduring problem that JAT faced was that “JAT has never really had an identity apart 
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from Ba’asyir, and he is too weak for many JI members, too political for the 
(orthodox) salafis, and too compromising for the takfiris.”294  AT’s formation was as 
a direct result of Ba’asyir’s almost cult leadership status. JAT later proved to have 
enduring rift with several groups. With  I’s Abu Rusydan there were tensions on dual 
membership.  Abu Rusydan who held tight reigns on membership and insisted the 
individuals could not be a member of both JI and JAT at the same time. With DI’s 
Tahmid Rahmat Basuki who felt that Ba’asyir was capitalising on internal dissention 
within DI to poach its members.   
 
Continued Proliferation of Groups in Indonesia 
  
After 2010 with the founding of a military training capability in Aceh, many of the 
key leadership from JI and JAT were either neutralised or apprehended. It was within 
this vacuum and in the absence of hierarchical leadership that several smaller splinter 
groups began to surface in Indonesia. While engaging in violence as a means to an 
end and aspiring for the inclusion of Islamic law and the establishment of an Islamic 
State, these groups did not have the technical skillsets that were prevalent amongst 
terrorist leadership in the past. These skillset included experiences of training in 
Afghanistan or within regional training facilities for instance in the Philippines. 
Despite the lack of training as compared to the operatives of the past, the intention 
and aspiration has not wavered altogether that much. Groups such as MIT and AQI 
aimed to target the near enemy and as Imam Samudra, highlighted the establishment 
religion needs to be continually worked until such a time when the “abode of sin 
becomes the abode of Islam.”295 This was in reference in to Indonesian state that was 
still governed under secular law.  
 
IMPACT OF IDEOLOGY ON A GROUP’S IDENTITY 
 
In Indonesia, the ideology of the terrorist or extremist group had an enduring impact 
on the group’s identity not only vis-à-vis the inter-group interactions but it 
additionally has an enduring impact on intra-group relations, amongst its members.  
Most of the group leadership when asked what their ideology was, almost always 
responded ‘My ideology is Islam.’ Religion was a strong identifying marker of both 
the individual within the group and the group as a collective. Even the few that went 
into details about establishing an Islamic state, they unfailingly reference their 
believes directly with Islam. While in no way was it in reference to the fact that Islam 
was violent, what it did emphasise was the deep-rooted association that was placed 
connecting faith and ideology. By and large, despite the subtle differences on how the 
groups were run, they almost always saw group as an extension of the requirements of 
Islam and the necessity to be take on the uphill task to sow the seeds and establish an 
Islamic State.  
 
Impact 1: Building Solidarity Using Religious Ideology as a Collective Identity 
 
The religious narrative has provided the necessary justification and has facilitated the 
politicisation of the ideologies that underpin the non-violent and violent extremist 
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groups in Indonesia. The strength of the religious narrative is compounded by several 
factors (1) religion in the public domain has always held a contested position in 
Indonesia that has a predominantly Muslim population, (2) religion remains a strong 
marker of identity in Indonesia and (3) religion as an entity on its own already 
provides a natural sense of solidarity. An ideology politicise by religious doctrine 
capitalises on a strong under current of primordial sentiments associated with tenuous 
religious sentiments amongst the majority of the population. 
 
According to the PUPJI, which embodies  I’s ideology, it was crucial not to separate 
life and worldly affairs from worship (ibadah) and the quest for Allah’s pleasure. 
Separating religion from governance of the country would prove detrimental to all.  
 
“Firstly, man lives only to worship and obey Him. Consequently, all worldly 
possessions, time, energy, and thoughts must be dedicated for the purpose of ibadah to 
Allah. Secondly, man is the vicegerent of Allah in this world. His duty is to administer 
and prosper the earth according to the syariah, prevent, destroy and overcome evil 
practices that destroy the earth as a result of not complying the syariah. Thirdly, life 
on earth for man is like a test to sieve out whom, amongst men has the best deeds. 
Those who have the best deeds are those who fulfil two conditions; sincere to Allah 
and to follow the Sunnah (the way of the Prophet). Fourth, the Prophets were sent to 
uphold the religion. According to the ulama, the religion is Islam in a comprehensive 
meaning.”
296
 
 
As a whole, the ideology and work of JI was seen as a continuation of efforts 
entrenched in history since the fall of the Ottoman Empire in 1972, and as such 
numerous groups had since emerged throughout the course of history.
297
 “The Al-
 ama’ah Al-Islamiyah, which is a Jemaah (group) among Muslims, was born and 
established for dakwah and jihad fi sabillah together with other Jamaah in order to 
preserve the righteous path based on Islamic principles.”298 
 
This echoed a message by Ayman Al-Zawahiri, that was translated into Indonesian 
and published in an extremist website, arrahmah.com. In his Special Instructions for 
the Conducting of Jihad, Ayman Al-Zawahiri, emphasised that jihad comprised two 
aspects – military and proselytization.  The global impact of messages by terrorist and 
extremist leadership outside of Indonesia continue to have a considerable impact on 
the terrorist and extremist groups in Southeast Asia writ large and Indonesia in 
particular, through an active network of extremist materials. These principles are 
reiterated once again in Chapter 2, Article 4 and Article 5, of the JI Constitution that 
highlights the foundation, targets and the method of the struggle. The JI Constitution 
explicitly states in Article 4, that: 
 
 “(1) This jamaah is based on the Holy Quran and Sunnah in accordance to the 
understanding of the Salaf. (2) The aim of the struggle is to establish the daulah as a 
step towards the restoration of the Caliphate”
299
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As extension, it goes further to note in Article 5 of the JI Constitution, as it moves 
one step further to craft a general way forward identifying the religious tenets that 
can be used to support their work. Hence,  
 
“In order to achieve the aim, the jamaah will take the path of dakwah tarbiyah 
(education), amar ma’ruf nahi munkar (enjoining good and forbidding evil), hijrah 
(emigration) and jihad.”300  
As stipulated in the PUPJI, the main aim is for the establishment of the “caliphate in 
accordance to the way of the Prophet, free people from the enslavement to people to 
the enslavement to Allah alone.”301 
 
 AT’s ideology as embodied in its own ideological document that was inaugurated 
during the official inauguration of JAT in September was known as Manhaj dan 
Aqidah, the Identity and Agreement of JAT, called for a move to target the ‘near 
enemy.’ It emphasised,  “We distance ourselves, bear hatred against, are hostile to and 
will combat the thoghut (those who profess that they are Muslim but are resisting the 
laws of God) We oppose those between us and they will remain enemies until they 
abide by and serve only one God forever.”302  AT’s notion of the importance of 
Islamic law is entrenched and extends to the fact that even if the ruler of the state is 
Muslim and Islamic Law is not the law of the land, then the country would be 
regarded as pagan and as such the necessity to continue to struggle until Islamic law is 
achieved.
303
 Once again the centrality of religion underscores  AT’s collective 
identity, aim, vision and aspiration. 
 
In a position that often plays too close to the edge between extremism and violent 
extremism, FPI on the other hand notes that their group would stand against social ills 
and cautions that “if there were an armed movement similar to that as was seen in 
Papua or Maluku or any others in the area devoted to justice and against injustice, and 
make better the Homeland, these would have to be supported and defended, as long as 
the movement is not symbiotic widened movement that would morph into terrorist or 
separatist movements.”304 
 
There are religious undertones to the statements made and despite the overt 
statements that FPI are not terrorists and do not engage in violence, however the 
statements that are issued by FPI seem to imply that violence would be a means to an 
end if the cause of justified. In this instance, if the cause is justified then by extension 
of the same argument, acts of violence would not be seen as acts of terrorism but 
violence in defence of a community of people who are unable to defend themselves. 
 
For FPI, the terms and conditions justifying acts of violence to achieve their ends 
would be dependent on attacks on the Muslim Community.  To a large extent, 
“(i)deological and structural factors – including political socialization, mass media 
influences, and the institutional control that dominant groups have over rewards and 
punishments in society – also affect system justification theories.”305 It is within this 
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convoluted and cyclical justification that sometime moves extremist groups in 
Indonesia too close to the edge. The hymn shown below was sung with much gusto at 
FPI’s Third Congress by the approximately 2000 people in attendance at its Opening 
Ceremony in Bekasi in August 2013. The words of the Hymn while initially praising 
God, have been peppered with a Call to Jihad in defence of Muslims and that the price 
of defending Muslim might be death  - a sacrifice that they would be willing to 
undertake for the cause of God.  
 
FPI Hymn:  
Come Let us Conduct Jihad
306
  
 
Allah is Great, Allah is Great, Allah is Great, Allah is Great! (x2) 
Allah is our God, 
He is our purpose 
Muhammad is the Prophet, 
He our Exemplary 
Al-Quran is our guide 
The way of Jihad is our fight 
Martyrdom is our desire 
 
Allah is Great, Allah is Great, Allah is Great, Allah is Great! (x2) 
Come let us do jihad, Come let us do jihad 
Defending Islam and Muslims 
Lead a noble life or die a martyr (x4) 
Allah is Great, Allah is Great, Allah is Great, Allah is Great! (x2)  
 
The fact that Indonesia is a predominantly Muslim country is constantly emphasized 
in the manifestos and ideological documents of the various groups listed above. This 
is also applicable to the ideological materials of FPI and HTI. The examples above 
provided above highlight the solidarity of purpose by JI, JAT and FPI respectively. 
Like most of the groups in this study, this sense of solidarity is built on the 
foundations of religion. This provides a cornerstone of moving thought to action. By 
using the language of religion, the solidarity of the group is almost automatically 
strengthened as a result of not only the naturally emotive power of religion but also 
the sense of morality that underpins the identity marker of religion within these 
groups. This inadvertently acts as a justification of the paths chosen by the groups in 
order to achieve their respective aims. The use of hymns as described above provide a 
strong identifying marker not only for the group as one entity, but the religious 
undertones creates a sense of solidarity with the plight of the Muslim Ummah global 
community.  It is this sense of solidarity that is capitalised on in order to achieve their 
goal.  
 
Impact 2: Aspiration of Radical Utopianism 
 
Karl annheim’s work on ideology and utopia echoes the respite that is often sought 
by terrorists and extremists as they engage in an aspiration of a future while harking 
back to the golden age of Islam. According to Mannheim “When the imagination 
finds no satisfaction in existing reality, it seeks refuge in wishfully constructed places 
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and periods.”307 Terrorist and extremist groups in Indonesia are unsatisfied with the 
current means and methods of governance of the Indonesia. The aspiration of the 
utopian ideal is assumed to be achievable. It is an aspiration, an ideal that will take 
time to achieve fruition, but nonetheless one that would ultimately reap success over 
an extended period of time.  
 
Capitalising on the doctrinal underpinning of religion, the accusation by terrorist and 
extremist groups alike is that the non-Islamic countries have deliberately targeted, 
attempted to divide and made bold and calculated attempts to control resources of the 
Islamic Countries. The only solution to the problem is the establishment of an Islamic 
State one that will adhere strongly to the laws of Islam. To achieve this end, the use of 
violence is sanctioned. Lyman Sargent notes that, “every ideology contains a utopia, 
and the problem with utopia arises when it becomes a system of beliefs rather than 
what it is in almost all cases, a critique of the actual through imagining a better 
alternative.”308 
 
In envisioning this better alternative, at no point did any of the manifestos or 
ideological documents provide a blue print of the manner through which the country 
will be governed thereafter. For FPI, the perceived deficits of the democratic system 
lies the notion that “in a democratic system, there is one person, one vote and majority 
vote is decisive, so much so that the voice of the scholar is given the same importance 
as the voice of a prostitute, the voice of the intellectual is given the same importance 
as the voice of the fool, and the voice of a fighter is treated the same as that of the 
voice of the loser.” 309  In qualifying the necessity of Islamic Law, Habib Rizieq 
highlights that the sense of equality accorded to all through a democratic system of 
governance, surpasses the base moral inequality that underlies each person. As such 
Islamic law is seen to provide a better sense of justice.  
 
The ideological documents written by Abu Bakar Ba’asyir for instance as noted in the 
PUPJI, aims “to adhere to a collection of honourable steps, support and develop 
strength for the glory of Islam and Muslims, to restore the Islamic Caliphate, and the 
sovereignty of the syariah all over the world.”310 In this quest for a utopian ideal, Abu 
Bakar Ba’asyir, authored 6 part series of books311 titled Tadzikiroh while in prison. 
These books were a collection of letters, documents and Islamic religious rulings 
(fatwas) by clerics in Saudi Arabia. These books provide a compilation of articles of 
faith and a call to action for different sectors of the community to rise and achieve this 
ideal.  
 
In a brazen call for change, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir wrote,  
 
“I urge Muslims to preach and let us rise up Daulah Islamiyah jihad enforce with 
determination to win or die by the help of God's way of Allah, do not bow and 
surrender to the taghout. Daulah Islamiyah / Khilafah is the demands of 
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monotheism and faith should not be negotiable. Sacrificing your lives in the fight 
far better than surrendering to the apostates while living prosperous lives.”
312
 
 
The 6-part series were written for his followers with a specific group that he reached 
out to in several of the editions. They were as follows: 
 
(1) Tadzikiroh 1: Dedicated to the People in Power and Presently Ruling Indonesia, a 
Country with a Predominantly Muslim Population 
(2) Tadzikiroh 2: Dedicated to All who Claim to be Muslim and the Officials in the 
Legal, Justice and Corrections Facility in Indonesia 
(3) Tadzikiroh 3: An Explanation of the Concept of Monotheism and Worship 
(4) Tadzikiroh 4: Treatise on Monotheism and Faith 
(5) Tadzikiroh 5: Democracy is the Devil’s Whisper and is Instrumental in Destroying 
Monotheism and Faith 
(6) Tadzikiroh 6: How to Practice and Fight for Islam Under the Guidance of Qur'an 
and Sunnah 
 
Written in a mixture of Indonesian and Arabic, each book justifies the quest for an 
Islamic State. It identifies government bodies that need to ammend their ways and 
espoused the core concepts often identified by Salafis namely, the role of faith (iman), 
Monotheism (Tauhid) and the necessity to reject democracy and to surrender to the 
demands of the Quran and Sunnah.  
 
On the other hand, FPI’s leader Habib Rizieq notes the presence of what he refers to 
as the “Khilafah Phobia.”313 This refers to a phobia by the International community of 
what a Caliphate would entail due to lack of understanding of the workings of a 
Caliphate. The manner through which FPI envisions the Caliphate differs from the 
Caliphate as envisioned by HTI. HTI calls for the establishment of a Caliphate 
through abolishing the present system of government, FPI on the contrary seeks the 
implementation of Islamic Law with the confines of an Islamic Republic. Albeit 
seemingly more palatable in nature, their forays into vigilantism in support of their 
objectives, places them in a problematic contest of aspiration towards the idea of a 
utopia.  
 
Impact 3: Envisioning a Cognitive Map for Future Action 
 
The Call to Action: On the International Stage 
The fatwa issued by the World Islamic Front Against the Jews and the Crusaders was 
faxed to Al-Quds al-‘Arabi on 23 February 1998 and signed by Osama Bin Laden, 
Ayman al-Zawahiri, Abu-Yasir Rifa’i Ahrnad Taha, Shaykh Mir Hamzah, secretary 
of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Pakistan; and Fazlul Rahrnan, Amir of the Jihad Movement 
in Bangladesh. The fatwa underscored the highlighted three areas that were deemed to 
be  “crimes and sins committed by the Americans.”314  Justifying the fatwa were the 
occupation of Muslim lands, oppression of the Iraqi People and economic and 
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religious incentive of  the Americans to support Israel and destry the Arab world. As 
such their actions are tantamount “a clear declaration of war on God, his messenger, 
and  uslims.”315  As such in response to this declaration of war,“Nothing is more 
sacred than belief except repulsing an enemy who is attacking religion and life.”316  
“On that basis, and in compliance with God’s order, we issue the following fatwa 
to all Muslims: The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies -- civilians and 
military -- is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in 
which it is possible to do it, in order to liberate the al-Aqsa Mosque and the holy 
mosque [Mecca] from their grip, and in order for their armies to move out of all 
the lands of Islam, defeated and unable to threaten any Muslim. This is in 
accordance with the words of Almighty God, “and fight the pagans all together as 
they fight you all together, ” and “fight them until there is no more tumult or 
oppression, and there prevail justice and faith in God. ”
317
 [Emphasis author’s 
own] 
Osama Bin Laden’s message, to groups all over the world was to embark on a 
collective effort to fulfil their obligation as Muslims and to engage in is jihad liberate 
the Arab world from the grip of the enemy of God, namely the United States and its 
allies.
318
 The language was strong and framed the message in a rigid dialectic of good 
versus evil.  
 
In Southeast Asia and in particular in Indonesia, Osama Bin Laden's message 
provided the cognitive map for future action. Hence in addition to the articulated goal 
of wanting to establish Islamic Law in Indonesia, for (some factions within) the 
leadership of JI there was a move to push for jihad on a global stage, beyond the 
principal aspiration of JI that was initially domestic and regional in nature – Daulah 
Islamiyah Nusantara (Land of Islam in the Archipelago). At the global level this 
meant a shift in the trajectory of violence to include and to focus on attack on the 
Westerners and Western Target with a more concerted effort.   
 
As much as Osama Bin Laden remained generally widely respected amongst the 
Southeast Asian Afghan alumni, there might have been a more deep-seated reason 
behind the resonance of Osama Bin Laden’s Call for war against the Crusaders and 
the Jews with the Indonesian violent extremists. By the time Osama Bin Laden had 
issued his fatwa in 1998, several batches of Indonesians and Southeast Asian 
members of DI/NII and JI had already gone and returned from fighting the Soviet 
Afghan War in Afghanistan. The influence of the Afghan alumni provided a 
significant thrust to the movement. The research team at the Ministry of Religious 
Affairs highlighted the role of the alumni from conflicts in Afghanistan, Poso, Ambon 
and Moro (in the Philippines) as bringing to Indonesia a predominantly Wahabi-Salafi 
influence coupled with increased levels of intolerance.
319
 The religious zeal coupled 
with the perception that by coming together the Mujahideen could be victorious. 
Riding on the successes of their time in Afghanistan, it increased their confidence in a 
clear and present victory over the enemies of Allah. The call to action against the far 
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enemy thereafter led to a string of high profile bombings that had killed and injured 
many in Indonesia. 
 
The Call to Action: On the Regional Stage 
 
On the regional stage, the more prominent group associated with a large number of 
high profiled attacks in Indonesia was JI. The general guide for JI comprises four 
distinct sections, (1) the principles for the methodology to establish the religion, 
[ideology] (2) the methodology to establish the religion [group] (3) the operational 
methodology [group] and (4) the constitution. [ which delved into the leadership 
structure of the group]
320
 The first of which, entailed ten principles for the 
‘establishment of the religion’ form the foundation upon which would become  I’s 
general ideological guide for the role of the group and the constitution and by 
extension the role of the leader and that of the members of JI. The section of  I’s 
guide will be explored in this Chapter. The remaining three will be discussed in the 
Chapters ahead.  
 
The ten principles as listed in the PUPJI were are follows: 
 
“(1) Our aim is only to seek Allah’s pleasure through the means that has been 
determined by Allah and His Prophet. (2) Our faith is based on the faith of the 
Sunni according to the way of the Salaf. (3) Our understanding about Islam is 
comprehensive and follow the understanding of the Salaf. (4) Our aim in the 
struggle is to guide mankind to submission to Allah only by the restoration of the 
caliphate on earth. (5) Our way is faith, hijrah (emigration) and jihad in the way of 
Allah. (6) Our provisions are: Knowledge and the Taqwa (Consciousness of God), 
Yaqin (Confidence) and tawakkal (reliance to Allah) and syukur (gratefulness) and 
patience, Zuhud and making eternity (eternal things) your priority and the Love for 
jihad in the path of Allah and matrydom. (7) Our loyalty to Allah, the Prophet and 
the believers (8) Our enemy is the unseen Satan and human Satan. (9) Our jamaah 
ties are based on the shared aims, beliefs and understanding of the religion and 
(10) Our Islamic practices are pure and comprehensive with the jamaah system, 
then the state, then the Caliphate.”
321
  
 
The 10 principles as listed by JI in the PUPJI to a large extent became the “normative 
template from which the institutional entity of Jemaah Islamiyah emerged and 
subsequently developed.”322 As much as the PUPJI identified a future call for action, 
many of the attacks that were conducted by JI there after were a result of a handful of 
members from the organisation who either through the power of influence or personal 
ambition defected from this core document in order to achieve its objective. The role 
of leadership and influence will be explored in greater detail in the Chapter 6.  
 
Impact 4: Centrality of Violence 
 
At the heart of the exploring the poignant role of ideology as an influencer is the 
means through which ideology translates to an increased level of violence within the 
group. As Hoffman notes “The religious imperative for terrorism is the most 
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important defining characteristic of terrorist activity today.”323 He further added that 
the increased number of deaths rests in “the radically different value systems, 
mechanisms of legitimisation and justification, concepts of morality, and world-view 
embraced by the religious terrorist, compared with his secular counterpart.”324  
 
The modern day construct of the Mujahideen, gained momentum during the Soviet-
Afghan war (1979-1989). It was a battle of resistance that brought together fighters 
from all over the world. Individuals who were came together, to fight under a 
common banner, a common ideology, a common faith, for a common community of 
believers and a common cause. In an almost (seemingly) selfless sacrifice in defense 
of religious belief and ideals, the underscoring drive was that only victory would 
prevail even in death. As such, there would be victory for the cause and victory for 
themselves, as they would be guaranteed a place in paradise. The often referred to and 
romanticised benefits from Jihad that were “awaiting them in paradise are rivers of 
milk and honey, and beautiful young women. Those entering paradise are eventually 
reunited with their families and as martyrs stand in front of God as innocent as a 
newborn baby.”325 
 
The increased levels of violence seen in religiously motivated terrorists in part lies in 
the varied perception that they have of themselves. 
 
“Where secular terrorists regard violence either as a way of instigating correction 
of a flaw in the system that is basically good or as a means to foment the creation 
of a new system, religious terrorists see themselves not as components of a system 
worth preserving but as ‘outsiders’, seeking fundamental changes in the existing 
world order. This sense of alienation also enables the religious terrorists to 
contemplate far more destructive and deadly types of terrorist operations than 
secular terrorists, and indeed a far more open ended category of enemies for 
attack.”
326
 
 
For FPI, its slogan “Reformation, Yes! Terrorism No! Revolution Yes! Separation 
No! God is Great!”327 perhaps to some extent emphasizes the fact that the group 
abhors terrorism. However this tension between the justification of the use of 
violence, with their tendency for vigilantism has created doubts on their ability to 
pursue a path of non-violence while aspiring to achieve its agenda. While the FPI 
calls for an the establishment of a state under Islamic Law, their tendency for clamp 
down on what it sees as non-Islamic values and ideals through violence remain a 
cause for concern.  
 
Survey Findings 
 
In exploring the centrality of violence in the group three measures were used in the 
survey to explore the impact after an individual joins the organisation. These were 
namely the level of approval of violence of US and Israeli civilians and troop, the 
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perception of armed jihad and the level towards which there was identification with 
other Muslims.  
 
On the approval of violence as show in the table below, of the 94 respondents, 40% 
approve of the attacks on US military troops in Muslim countries and 13% approve of 
the attacks on US civilians in Muslim countries. 17% approve of attacks of US 
civilians on US soil. By contrast the approval of attacks on Israeli civilians were 
almost double at 31% and 61% approved the attack on Israeli military troops.  
 
Figure 6: Approval of Violence 
 
  
On the perception of armed jihad as shown in the table below, of the 94 respondents, 
27% agreed that the concept of jihad in Islam approves the killing of civilians in some 
circumstances. 37% agreed that armed jihad is a personal obligation of Muslims today 
and while only 19% agreed that suicide bombers would be rewarded by God for their 
deeds, a relatively high proportion of respondents - 38%, chose to remain on the 
fence.  
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Figure 7: Perception of Armed Jihad 
 
 
 
 
On identifying with other Muslims shown below, of the 94 respondents 73% of 
Muslims of Indonesia should help their oppressed brothers. 67% identified closely 
with other Muslims and 51% think of themselves largely in terms of religious beliefs. 
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Figure 8: Muslim Identification 
 
 
 
Tore Bjorgo notes that extremist ideologies in general can be looked upon as an 
intermediate cause of terrorism even if the individual adopts the ideology for reasons 
other than religion. Ultimately when the “worldviews are adopted and applied in order 
to interpret situations and guide action, they tend to take on a dynamic of their own, 
and may serve to dehumanize the enemy and justify atrocities.”328  The construct 
exploring the centrality of violence amongst members of terrorist and extremist 
groups showed relatively mixed results on approval of violence. While the approval 
of violence against Israeli troops and civilians factored highly, the muted response 
with the high number of respondents on the fence on perception of armed jihad may 
have been a result of the majority of respondents being incarcerated at the time they 
responded in the survey. While perhaps it was a result of a renewed perspective while 
incarcerated or perhaps being wary the survey result would highlight their true 
opinion albeit the surveys were done anonymously. The differentiated response by the 
members who were incarcerated with the opinions of the terrorist leadership who 
were interviewed separately showed the hardened ideological stand of the leadership.  
 
CONCLUSION  
 
This Chapter examined the role of ideology as one of three key influencers. Just as 
terrorism is a by-product of ideological extremism, there have also been instances 
where even in the face of ideological extremism, there have been a limited pursuit of 
violent extremism by members of terrorist groups.  As such the need to be weary of 
sweeping generations and the presence of a multiplicity of paths towards 
radicalisation.  
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This Chapter addressed the role that religious ideology plays in both maintaining the 
ideological cohesion of the group and propelling the shift from non-violent extremism 
to terrorism. The Chapter highlighted the manner through which thoughts and ideas 
are politicised through the language of religion and channelled in order to have an 
impact on the escalation of violence within groups. 
 
To a large extent the “transcendental dimension”329 of religiously motivated terrorist 
not only reinforces the ideology but to a large extent additionally presents the 
aspiration for and Islamic State through the lens of a dichotomy between a group of 
people that are either for or against an Islamic state and in the process demonising the 
other. Lee Harris explores the notion that, “political and ideological symbols and 
tropes used not for political purposes, but entirely for the benefit of furthering a 
specific personal or collective fantasy.”330 In this instant, the other is dehumanised 
into the role of an object and not a subject with innate views and aspirations.  Echoing 
 annheim’s work on utopian and ideology Harris also asserts that the need for the 
fantasy, “comes from a conflict between a set of collective aspirations and desires, on 
one hand and the stern dictates of brutality, on the other – a conflict in which a lack of 
realism is gradually transformed into a penchant for fantasy.”331 It is this complex 
dialectic of using ideology to channel aspiration into that plays a critical role in 
understanding the impact of religiously motivated ideology on the group. The next 
Chapter will explore the second key influencer, namely the unique role of leadership 
and its impact on group influence. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
INFLUENCER B:  
LEADERSHIP AND IMPACT ON GROUP INFLUENCE 
 
“Leadership is influence. Nothing more, nothing less.   
The true measure of leadership is influence.” 
John Maxwell 
 
 
Leadership has been heralded as the boon and bane of organisations globally. From 
the international conglomerates, government sectors, security services to the infamous 
gangs and terrorist groups, leadership has unmistakably in many ways chartered the 
path for the success or decline of a multitude of organisations. Broadly, leadership can 
be taken to be a process, personal quality, behavior, a trait, cognitive or emotional 
orientation, self or collective interest and even a role in a group.
332
Underscoring the 
notion of leadership is the unspoken assumption that given the presence of a leader, 
there are either followers or there exists an entity to be led.  
 
The importance of leadership in terrorist and extremist organisations has been one of 
great debate within the literature. These discussions on leadership often centre around 
(a) the importance of dismantling terrorist leadership and thereafter its impact on the 
demise of terrorist organisations (b) the sustained presence of charismatic leadership 
as seen in the radicalization models and conceptual frameworks and (c) the existence 
of a top-down hierarchical organization versus that of the grassroots organisation as 
terrorism moves into a new phase with the continuous use of the Internet and in 
particular social networking sites to reach out and connect with possible recruits.  
 
Foremost in the agenda of security agencies is the task to clamp down on terrorist 
groups. As such, the role of a leader and its impact on the sustainability of a group is 
pertinent. These concerns are based on the assumption that stems from a primarily 
kinetic vantage point whereby the death of the leadership would herald the demise if 
not, mitigate the threat emanating from the given terrorist or extremist group. The 
killing of terrorist leadership would cause not only chaos but could result in a possible 
dissension in the ranks of the members through schisms from within. Perhaps more 
importantly the demise of terrorist leadership provide for a strategic window to allow 
security and law enforcement to enact a targeted approach at dismantling the group. 
Within the parameters of the discussion of the demise of a terrorist group were the 
initial work of scholars such as Martha Crenshaw, Seth Jones and Martin Libicki and 
later Audrey Cronin. Of particular interest was their explorative work on factors that 
would lead to the demise of a terrorist group. This would be explored later in Chapter 
8.  
 
The impact of charismatic leadership has often been cited as potent force for the 
recruitment and radicalization of terrorist and extremists. The role of charismatic 
leadership was prevalent in the radicalization models and conceptual frameworks that 
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were present in what this study has referred to as Phase 2: The Struggle to 
Understand (2001-2006) and in Phase 3: The Proliferation of Models of 
Radicalisation (2007-2009). The presence of an authority figure who was able to 
translate vision into action was in essence what Silber and Bhatt in the NYPD 
radicalization Model referred to as individuals who were catalysts in specificity, they 
called them the operational leader or an spiritual sanctioner.  The other models 
implicitly refer to them in passing as ideologues, in essence individuals that are able 
to inspire with a certain je ne sais quoi that motivates groups and thrusts them into 
action.  
 
The most prominent of these debates that arose in 2008 were between terrorism 
scholars Marc Sageman and Bruce Hoffman. Essentially was ‘new terrorism’ 
terrorism bottom-up or top-down? The Sageman-Hoffman debate, as with the earlier 
RAND report by Seth Jones and Martin Libicki, the discussion predominantly 
surrounded the work of Al Qaeda – a group that posed a more dominant threat 
internationally at that point in time.  In Sageman’s first book, Understanding 
Terrorist Networks and later expounded on in greater detail in his second book 
‘Leaderless Jihad’ he argued that the predominant threat of the future would not be 
from hierarchical organizations. Hoffman on the other hand, abhorred Sageman’s 
notion of the bunch of guys concept and was steadfast with his emphasis that 
organizations still do matter. Hoffman notes that in order to defeat a group like Al 
Qaeda “destroying the organization's leadership and disrupting the continued 
resonance of its radical message”333 that seduce individuals from the grassroots.  
 
In a hierarchical organization undoubtedly the role of leadership is key. Most of the 
groups operating in Indonesia are predominantly hierarchical. Leaders articulate the 
vision, mobilise the group to action whilst working towards the ideal of the group. In 
a nutshell, they provide the strategic direction, motivate and coach, enforce and 
interpret the organisation’s policies and last but not least obtain the necessary 
resources for the group.
334
 Leaders help to provide and sustain a visceral impact on an 
individual’s sense of belonging by harnessing the power of a politicised ideology 
while emphasising group identity in the process of achieving their aspired objectives. 
It is this unique power of leadership in terrorist groups and its impact on group 
influence will be explored in this chapter.  
 
LEADERSHIP AND POWER 
 
Leadership as a core concept is inextricably connected with the concept of power. In 
short, this intimate correlation between leadership and power is best described by the 
impact that effective leadership has in engineering change.  
 
“Leadership over (a) human being is exercised when persons with certain motives 
and purposes mobilize, in competition or conflict with others, institutional, political, 
psychological, and other resources so as to arouse, engage, and satisfy the motives 
of followers.” 
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To some extent, it can be argued that the leadership of terrorist and extremist 
organisations can be seen to be a type of revolutionary leadership, wherein a non-state 
actor, wanting to alter the manner through which the state is governed ultimately 
harnesses the power of religion to create change. This intricate notion of power is 
central to the role of leadership for “an individual may exert power without being a 
leader, an individual cannot be a leader without having power.”335 While assuming 
the presence of a hierarchy in this instance, the position of an individual in an 
organisation would determine the level of power (in most instances).  
 
Niccolò Machiavelli in The Prince, his classic 16th-century treatise advocates 
manipulation and occasional cruelty as the best means to power emphasises that - It is 
much safer to be feared than loved. The wielding of power through by position and 
the wielding power through coercion is just one of a few means through which 
leadership can exercise their strength within the organisation. However this is not the 
predominant means through which leadership in terrorist and extremist groups in 
Indonesia have exercised their power.  
 
A Position of Power versus A Position of Influence 
 
An important distinction that needs to be made is the fact that an individual’s position 
of power within an organisation need not directly translate to their level of influence. 
In Indonesia, while leaders at the apex of terrorist and extremist organisations wield 
substantial power and are undoubtedly influential, there are a few select individuals 
whose level of influence far exceeded their position within the organisation. 
Organizational psychologists sometimes refer to this as the ability to lead without 
possessing a title. As such, influence is derived not from position within organizations 
but from qualities relationship and personal excellence and effectiveness. Later in this 
Chapter, this study will explore several individuals who led without a title. Ambitious 
and well-connected, they climbed through the ranks, gained prominence, and 
additionally, thrust their group onto a path of increased violence.  
 
Alan Bryman identifies three components in leadership namely group, influence, and 
goal. Leadership is taken to be the social influence by the leader over the group.
336
 
Gary Yukl and Van Fleet defined leadership as “a process that includes influencing 
task objectives and strategies, influencing commitment and compliance in task 
behavior to achieve these objectives, influencing group maintenance and 
identification and influencing the culture of an organization”337 Yukl and Van Fleet’s 
emphasis on the role of influence is a pertinent facet that will be explored in greater 
detail in this Chapter – “influencing others to behave in a ways that is consistent with 
the goals of the organization.”338  
 
John French and Bertam Raven identified bases of social power. These were namely 
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reward power, coercive power, legitimate power, referent power, and expert power.
339
 
Reward as a basis of social power refers to power that is derived from the 
transactional ability reward or pay the other person. Coercive stance as a basis of 
social power, refers to the ability of the leader to manipulate the subordinate party, in 
this instance, the degree of threat and punishment would influence the degree of 
power. Legitimacy as a basis of social power refers to individuals who wield power as 
a result of social norms and mores, and they are in positions that are socially 
acceptable whilst at the same time enabling the person in postion to garner respect 
through traditional means. As a referent and basis of social power it is a little more 
ambiguous. In this instance, “the individual seeks some sort of "social reality" and 
may adopt the cognitive structure of the individual or group with which he 
identifies.” 340  As such, “the lack of clear structure may be threatening to the 
individual and the agreement of his beliefs with those of a reference group will both 
satisfy his need for structure and give him added security through increased 
identification with his group.”341 Expertise as a basis of social power would refer to 
power that is wielded by the strength of the individual’s expertise. The assumption 
here would be that the individual’s strength in expertise over a particular domain 
provides an indisputable edge over the other members of the group, rendering the 
leader as the individual who would set the parameters for debate and control. 
HARNESSING THE POWER OF INFLUENCE 
 
(1) The Influence of Moral Authority  
 
A predominant and powerful factor that has considerable influence over the activities 
of terrorist and extremist groups in Indonesia is the sword of moral authority that is 
wielded by leadership within these groups. The sword of moral authority slices both 
ways. It has the power to influence the activities within the group by reinforcing the 
role of the individual leader as preeminent holder of moral authority. It additionally 
becomes intertwined with the identity of the group as a collective whereby they are 
seen as soldiers upholding the faith through their association with both the leader as 
the figure of moral authority and hence by extension the group.   
 
 oral authority is “seen as being rooted in fundamental moral truths that are not a 
subject to human interpretation of revision.”342 In this case, it is through the lens of 
religion that the moral authority of the leader in derived and sustained for the 
followers. A leader of an organisation based on an (albeit misguided version of) Islam 
through radical and extremist ideology would nonetheless retain this very sense of 
moral authority while in his position of leadership. The moral authority that is 
exercised by the terrorist and extremist groups in Indonesia are far reaching. The 
impact could be felt not only for activities within the group but also vis-à-vis the 
group’s activities when it interacts with the public. As seen in the case of hard-line 
extremist group FPI, whose behavior as the sheriff of moral values in Indonesia had 
                                                 
339
  ohn French and Bertam Raven, “The Bases of Social Power,” Studies in Social Power, D. 
Cartwright (Ed.), Ann Arbor, Mich.: Institute for Social Research, 1959, pp.262-268 
340
 Ibid; p.266 
341
 Ibid  
342
Aaron C. Kay and Richard P. Eibach, “The Ideological Toolbox: Ideologies as Tools of Motivated 
Social Cognition,” in (Eds.) Susan T Fiske and C Neil Macrae, The SAGE Handbook of Social 
Cognition, (London: SAGE, 2012), p.497 
113 
 
resulted in them being labeled as thugs and vigilantes in Indonesia. They “are known 
to vocally oppose and target “immoral” businesses, such as those associated with 
drugs, prostitution, gambling and bars.”343 
 
The centrality of Islam in daily living coupled with the aspiration to create an Islamic 
state is especially prevalent in the ideology of the terrorist and extremist groups 
explored in this study. As an ideal to be aspired towards, all ten groups would be able 
to agree on the aspiration of state under the Laws of Islam. This is in part tied to the 
dominant position of Islam within daily life in Indonesia despite Indonesia being a 
secular state. At the core, Islamic leadership is premised on the role of religion. “For 
Muslims, the first and original leader is God and all are bound by their faith to obey 
God’s law. Thus any leader of any organization – business, political or religious – is 
also first and foremost a follower of God.”344 Hence, the responsibility of leading 
people of the faith, by the faith could only be done through the faith.  
 
As explored in greater detail in Chapter 4, the contested role of political Islam had 
resulted in the relegation of Islam to the peripheries of society, where religion and 
religious leadership flourished over the years. With the aspiration of many terrorist 
and extremist groups to establish Islamic Law, religion is a nodal factor in order to 
not only glean support but would be at the foundation of its establishment. The 
already entrenched, role of religious leadership in Indonesian history is reiterated 
further by the authority that religious leadership had amongst the Indonesian masses 
through the course of history. Their ability to function within the villages away from 
institutions that were run by government administration meant that over time, 
religious leadership shielded albeit unwilling and untouched by administrative powers 
and duties of running Indonesia, grew from strength to strength within the villages in 
Indonesia. Villages act as arterial veins connecting communities. The presence of 
numerous madrasahs within the community reinforce the moral authority of religious 
leadership is sacrosanct.  
 
The influence of moral authority will be expounded upon through highlighting the 
varied means through which the leadership terrorist and extremist groups’ exercise 
their moral authority.  
 
Capitalising on Carrying the Mantle of the Prophet  
 
While it is certainly not the case that most religious leadership by and large 
participate in acts of terrorism. The leaders in terrorist and extremist organisations in 
Indonesia, continue to see themselves as carrying the mantle of religious leadership. 
They do so in order to fulfil a gap that they have continued to emphasise exists. Abu 
Bakar Ba’asyir former Emir of JI, MMI and JAT candidly shared how he saw himself 
vis-à-vis the on-going threats that he has faced even in light the current sentence he is 
serving for participation in formation of a military training camp in Aceh. With 
fervour and pride in his voice he brushed off the fact that he was placed on the Most 
Wanted Lists noting that the  
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“US and Australia said that they wanted to kill me, but I am like the 
Prophet Mohamed, I aim to spread the truth about Islam.”345  
 
The sense of pride that brimmed in his voice and the air of conviction that he was 
carrying the mantle of God could be seen in the paternal yet commanding demeanour 
he possessed. 
 
It is this very mantle of leadership that continuously resonates, even with the 
leadership of FPI. Head of hard-line extremist group FPI, Ustaz Habib Rizieq’s aura 
of spirituality and use of religious parlance during the conduct of its Third National 
Deliberation from 22-25 August 2013 was testament to that. The inauguration on 22 
August was conducted in an officious and orderly nature of the annual event brought 
together more than 5,000 people including participants from all over Indonesia and 
even the Middle East. The arrival of chief guests, a majority of whom were extremist 
leadership including MMI amongst others was with an air of dignity and calm as 
Ustaz Habib Rizieq in a white turban, white traditional clothes and a walking stick 
mirroring the attire of the Prophet Mohamed entered with close to 10 paramilitary 
dressed in white. Carrying the mantle through trying to emulate the Prophet through 
both thought and action. The colour white is the colour traditionally worn by all the 
members of FPI. For a group aiming to rid society of what they perceive to be social 
ills and sin, the colour white become a symbol of the purity that they are fighting for.  
 
Moral authority in this instance is seen through the actions of the leadership, either 
through both thought and action. The outward manifestation of which can be seen to 
in dressing like Prophet Mohamed and the association that they are doing the work of 
the Prophet – the establishment of Islamic Law.  
 
Capitalising on the Use of Fatwa 
 
The use of fatwa or legal pronouncements by religious scholars has often been used a 
means through which leadership has shown and maintained their moral authority. 
Present at the inauguration ceremony of FPI were leaders from Majelis Ulama Islam 
(MUI) The Organisation of Islamic Clerics. MUI is a conglomeration of 
approximately 40 Islamic organisations that aim to come together with the hope of 
providing a unified front for religious affairs. MUI in a show of support by publicly 
backed Ustaz Habib Rizieq the leader of FPI for the upcoming presidential election in 
2014. FPI and MUI have always had a long-standing connection. FPI provided MUI 
with a political platform for them to exert pressure on government.  
 
“Through a fatwa issued in 2005 condemning everything from liberalism, 
secularism and pluralism to pornography and mixed marriage, MUI provided an 
external source of theological legitimisation for FPI’s nahi mungkar campaign; 
through its financial backing, it provided the access to funds to make the campaign 
happen.”
346
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In additional to the financial backing, the FPI also uses the fatwas issued in 2005 to 
“legitimise violent vigilantism,”347 and in a strange cyclical dynamic MUI used the 
increased violence as a resulting from the vigilantism as a justification that the  fatwas 
issued in 2005 should stand. The role of religious leadership in this instance has had 
influence both within the terrorist and extremist groups as well as within society writ 
large through the enactment of the fatwas in 2005 by MUI. This seemingly 
discomforting aggregation of strange bedfellows was made perhaps even stranger 
when “Indonesia’s then-religious affairs minister, Suryadharma Ali, opted to make 
the keynote speech at the FPI’s annual congress in Jakarta at which he praised the 
group as a national asset.” 348  During the course of his speech at the event, he 
commented on the atmosphere adding with gusto “I am one of you!”349 
 
The moral authority of religious leadership in this instance has become one of that is 
driven in a calculated manner that would benefit the religious leadership from within 
terrorist or extremist groups, the religious leadership outside these groups through the 
aggregation of the association of groups such as MUI and by the then rather 
controversial Minister of Religious Affairs. The extensive nature of influence by a 
moral authority under the umbrella of religion was especially prevalent. The closing 
address was delivered by Mr. Salim Segaf Al Jufri, Minister of Social Affairs,  
Indonesia. The presence of political leadership as guests of honour highlights the 
influence that FPI has not only in terms of strength of position within Indonesia but is 
reinforced by the presence of religious leadership in Indonesia adding credence to the 
FPI and the influence of FPI’s leadership. 
 
Capitalising on Divine Sanction  
 
In addition to the convoluted relationship between the various groups involved as 
highlighted above, there is a sense of divine sanction that underscores most of the 
activities undertaken. In the case of Abu Bakar Ba’asyir the overt candour with which 
he compared himself to the Prophet, sheds light on the idea and the ideal that he as a 
leader aspires towards. Hoffman notes that in religious motivated terrorist groups, the 
role of divine approval for acts of terrorism conducted is an important facet.   
 
“Religion- conveyed by sacred text and imparted via clerical authorities claiming 
to speak for the divine – therefore serves as a legitimising force. This explains why 
clerical sanction is so important to religious terrorists and why religious figures are 
often required to ‘bless’ (i.e. approve or sanction) terrorist operations before they 
are executed.”
350
 
 
Much of this notion of divine sanction is sometimes rooted in subtlety. Ustaz Abu 
Bakar Ba’asyir’s sense of duty and obligation to create and enact change in his 
position of leadership is one that needs to be revisited. He emphasised,  
 
“I have never killed people, but it is my responsibility to change 
Indonesia so that it comes under Islamic Law.”  
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As an extension of the sense of responsibility and obligation, the leader feels that he 
has been given divine sanction.  
 
A strong manifestation of this is divine sanction is seen in the use of the bai’ah or 
oath of allegiance between the leadership and members of the group. A case in point 
was when members of NII/JI were asked to take their oath of allegiance to the 
leadership. The oath of allegiance is a concept that is intrinsically tied to religion. 
According to the Quran, 
 
“Verily those who pledge their loyalty (bai`ah) to you, do no less than pledge their 
loyalty to Allah: the Hand of Allah is over their hands: then anyone who violates 
his oath does so to the harm of his soul, and anyone who fulfils what he has 
covenanted with Allah, Allah will soon grant him a great Reward.” (The Quran, 
48:10) 
 
This lays the foundation for the unique relationship between the leader and the group 
members. Certainly, the member of the group had a different memory of how they 
had pledged their allegiance. Nassir Abbas, former Head of Mantiqi 3 and military 
training division, JI who has been released and is assisting law enforcement with 
investigations noted that the bai’ah was quick it was more like a handshake. Prior to 
leaving for Afghanistan, the small group gathered in a room before they left for 
Afghanistan and after a prayer and the bai’ah, they left the next day on their journey 
to Afghanistan.
351
 Fajar Taslim, from  I’s overseas cell in Singapore noted that his 
bai’ah was taken in a sea. They entered the waters and when they had come out of the 
waters bai’ah was taken.352 Certainly while the method of taking the bai’ah differed 
from even within the same terrorist group  I, the act of pledging one’s allegiance and 
obedience to a leader through vehicle prayer reinforces the influence and authority of 
the leadership through the veil of religion and the moral authority conferred upon an 
individual seen to be a figure of authority of the faith. 
 
Capitalising on the Role of the Vicegerent 
The idea of a vicegerent of often thought to be a papal concept whereby the Pope is 
seen to be the representative of Christ on Earth. Although not often spoken about, a 
vicegerent is a concept that is quite often used in Islam in as well. The word khalifa or  
Caliph a term that is often used synonymously at times and taken to mean vicegerent. 
Jaafar Idris examines the Qur'anic verses and Prophetic traditions against the 
scholarly work of classical scholar of Islamic texts such as al-Tabarl, al-Zamakhsharl, 
al-RazT, al- Qurtubl, and Ibn Kathlr vis-à-vis more modern scholarship. The more 
modern views of Sayyid Abu Ala' al-Mawdudl and Sayyid Qutb, greatly influenced 
the terrorist and extremist ideological landscape not only in movement in the Middle 
East but in Southeast Asia as well.  
The concept of vicegerent refers to the presence of a leader as the representative of 
God on earth. The task of the vicegerent would be ensure that the will of God 
flourishes on earth. In this instance, it is assumed that with the formation of the 
theocracy of the Islamic state, the “de jure sovereignty” would belong to Allah and 
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“de facto sovereignty” would be at the hands of the vicegerent who would need to 
ultimately be subservient to the will of Allah. In his writings, Qutb emphasizes that 
the role of man would always be subservient to that of God despite the presence of a 
vicegenerent that has been appointed by God.  
According to Qutb,  
“The supreme will intending to give to this new being the reins of the earth, and a 
free hand in it; and entrusting him with the task of revealing the will of the Creator 
in innovation and formation, in analysis and synthesis, in alteration and 
transformation; and of discovering the powers and potentialities, and treasures and 
resources of this earth, and make all this—God willing—subservient to the great 
task with which God entrusted him. This new being has thus been given latent 
powers and potentialities commensurate with the powers and potentialities and 
treasures and resources of this earth. He has also been given enough of the latent 
powers which enable him to realize the Divine will.”
353
  
Mawdudi on the other hand underscores almost a similar message. Where the sole 
task of the vicegerent would be to work towards the fulfillment of God’s Law.  
“Khalifa, vicegerent, is one who exercises the delegated powers on behalf of the 
supreme authority. Man is thus, not the master; he is only His deputy and does not 
possess any powers of his own except those which are delegated to him by the real 
Master. He therefore has no moral right to have his own will but his duty is to 
fulfill the will of the delegating Authority.”
354
  
The ideological document of JI, the PUPJI follows from a similar thread of how Qutb 
and Mawdudi had explained the role of the vicegerent. 
“man is the vicegerent of Allah in this world. His duty is to administer and prosper 
the earth according to the syariah, prevent, destroy and overcome evil practices 
that destroy the earth as a result of not complying with the syariah.”
355
 
The aim as outlined by the PUPJI was the establishment of an Islamic State. The role 
of the leader would be “to lead the community towards understanding the obligation 
of being the vicegerent of Allah on earth.”356 A core function of the Vicegerent as 
spelled out in the PUPJI was the development of personnel. The development of 
personnel would prepare and lay the foundations and systems necessary to establish 
and sustain the Islamic State. The individuals will be selected, they would be instilled 
with Islamic leadership methods and will work towards the creation of the the Core 
Group – Qo’idah Sholabah. The PUPJI adds that the Core Group can be identified by 
their fervour, solidarity and sense of responsibility towards the establishment of the 
Islamic Law.The Core Group would be made of individuals who are selected to not 
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only be leaders, they will act as the vanguard for the community, they would be set 
the benchmark and would be a model of other member and finally the core group 
would be guard and carryout the mission of JI until its fruition.  
While still conceptually vague, “One cannot but conclude that the concept of man as 
khallfatu Allah is a very vague and inconsistent one. Any attempt to make it clearer 
and more consistent renders it either banal or un-Islamic.”357 In the attempts to make 
sense of numerous religious sanctions and fatwas issued and the role of leadership, 
Tariq Ramadan highlights that generally even in diversity that is at times hard to 
explain the aspect that remain central is that “Islam is one, the fatawa, with all their 
diversity, and sometimes contradictions, still remain Islamic and authoritative.”358  
 The Caliphate is to be “formed from the consolidation or federation of a number of 
united Islamic States that are in agreement under one leader.” 359  Neither Qutb, 
Mawdudi or the PUPJI assists in identifying the process through which the one leader 
of Khalifa would be chosen. What is noted however is that the state would be a 
political entity that would be ruled under the laws of Allah and that the leader will be 
impeccable models of religiosity, possess leadership qualities and will have to be 
Muslim. 
Capitalising on the Role of Enforcer of Religious Norms and Mores 
The role of an enforcer of religious norms and mores implicitly assumes the fact that 
the leader in the position to enforce these values is not only superior in hierarchy but 
additionally morally as well.  
In JI, the Emir is the highest leader and would be assisted by four councils. The first 
Majlis Shura or the Executive Council that is established in the office of the Emir and 
assist to evaluate  I’s management globally. The Fatwa Council to ensure that 
decisions made are aligned to the Quran and Sunnah. The Hisbah Council, a 
disciplinary committee for members of the group that have committed violations. Last 
but not least the Qiyadah Markaziyah Council, the centre of management for all 
activities of the group. 
360
 In JI, the role of the Emir as the sole decision maker and 
arbiter is key. Of particular interest is the role of the Hisbah or the disciplinary 
committee whose role was to enforce on the basis of religious norms and mores.  
The role of the Hisbah Council or the Hisbah Team is prevalent across both terrorist 
and extremist groups. The disciplinary committee in this instance acts as the judge 
and jury when it comes to crimes on the basis of morality in society. The impact in 
this case can be two fold within the group and in the case of FPI as highlighted earlier 
outside the group as well. Amongst the core aims of FPI is amar ma’ruf nahi munkar 
(commanding right, preventing ill deeds), and implementing dakwah (religious 
oureach) and hisbah. 
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“Terrorists usually show acute concern for morality, especially for sexual purity, 
and believe that they act in terms of a higher good. Justifications usually focus on 
past suffering, on the glorious future to be created, and on the regime's illegitimacy 
and violence, to which terrorism is the only available response. Shared guilt and 
anxiety increase the group's interdependence and mutual commitment and may 
also make followers more dependent on leaders and on the common ideology as 
sources of moral authority.”
361
  
 
FPI uses its paramilitary wing Laskhar Pembela Islam (LPI), Army for the Defense of 
Islam in its strategy to curtail on immoral activity. Emphasizing the strength and 
commitment of the Hisbah Committee within FPI, Ustaz Kiyahin, the Co-Chairperson 
of FPI provided an example of how a young member who had used violence 
inappropriately was disciplined, noted that the individual’s membership to the group 
was suspended. He added that disciplinary issue would be taken seriously.
362
 This is 
especially since the members are the public face of the organization. Influence is 
further cemented by the interdependence not only of leadership with the group, but 
between and amongst groups as well. The strange bedfellows of FPI and MUI through 
their 2005 fatwa provides this very notion of policing morality between and amongst 
these groups and the policing of morality in the public domain. 
 
The quest for the manifestation of a supra-morality could be tied to the quest for a 
radically utopian society as discussed in the previous chapter. The overarching sense 
of perfection is entrenched in the mental construct of many members. In the society 
that is led by God’s rules where legislation comes under the purview of religion, the 
role of moral values as stipulated by the faith is quintessential. As such the entities 
and individuals that govern the domain of morals, norms and mores form an 
influential and pertinent duty of keeping the group in line with the core vision of 
group and their collective aspirations.  
(2) The Influence of Ties of Family and Brotherhood  
While LJ in the early 2000s provided a taste of what it was like to fight on for the 
Muslim community in Ambon, DI/NII and later JI formed the cornerstone of the 
sustenance of many groups that were to surface after 2009. In a carefully crafted 
strategy by the core members in the upper echelons of leadership in JI, the effects of 
their leadership cemented several of the key influencers that are still felt in many of 
groups that have since metastasized from these larger terrorist groups that had 
dominated the scene up until the mid-2000s. Many of these groups capitalized not 
only on the familial networks but the intricate ties of family that sometime blind 
members into participation and reinforce their loyalties to both the leader and to the 
organisation. 
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Marriage, kinship, brotherhood and family ties are especially entrenched in cultures in 
Asia. The close knit family ties within the group translate to not only a sense of 
belonging to the group, but it helps with mitigating the possibility of defection from 
the Tandzhim Sirri or secret organisation. Sidney Jones aptly highlights the important 
and to a large extent probably strategic decision that that senior members of JI often 
makes within the group. "Oftentimes senior members of the organisation will offer 
their sisters or sisters-in-law to new and promising recruits, so that not only is 
someone drawn into the organisation, but they're drawn into the family at the same 
time.”363  
Marriage is thus not only a tie that binds however the extent towards which it was 
prevalent, could underscore a wider strategy within the group. This would ensure that 
the group would maintain it ties from within. Strategic effort to recruit from family 
could be an out of the extremely selective criteria for recruitment that comprised three 
phases.  Zachary Abuza notes that Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, Abdullah Sungkar, Abu 
Jibriel and Hambali carried out an active recruitment strategy in Indonesia, Malaysia 
and Singapore. In part due to the high levels of anxiety and fearing for the safety of 
their children in light of their own activities to attempt to overthrow the state, senior 
JI members sent their children to Karachi, Pakistan. In Karachi they formed a group 
known as the al-Ghuraba Cell. The al-Ghuraba cell had a dual strategy, the first to 
ensure safety of the children of senior members and the second, to further the 
regeneration of the group.
364
  
The safety and security of self, was tied to the safety and security of the family unit 
and by extension ultimately the safety and security of the group. Even “quasi-kinship 
ties include bonds between extremist religious teachers and their students, which 
should not be underestimated because they are not unlike a familial bond.”365 
Capitalise on the Bonds of Family and Brotherhood 
 
In one of the most prominent attacks of terrorism in Southeast Asia the Bali 
Bombings in 2002, three brothers, Mukhlas also known as Ali Gufron, Ambrozi and 
Ali Imron were implicated.  The attacks were conducted by JI. Inspired by their Emir 
Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, funded by Hambali (through US30,000 funding received from 
Al Qaeda) and conducted by the three brothers in addition to Dulmatin, Umar Patek, 
Abdul Ghoni, Imam Samudra – the smiling bomber, the Bali Bombings shook the 
Southeast Asia into awareness of the threat of terrorism in the region. While “all three 
(brothers) have admitted their roles in the attack; none have shown any remorse, 
indeed all have shown a stoic face of defiance in the face of the death penalty”366 Ali 
Imron noted that he did not have much of a say in the bombings as the decisions were 
made by senior JI leadership and saying no was difficult.
367
 This was although 
amongst those in senior leadership included his brother. Umar Patek the Indonesian 
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who was arrested in Abottabad in the same area the Osama Bin Laden was staying 
just before Operation Geronimo killed the Al Qaeda leader acknowledged that he was 
not really privy to the discussion and that he was just asked to mix the bombs 
together.
368
 In this case, senior leadership could possibly have refrained from sharing 
details of the attacks even amongst family members.  
 
The role of brothers involved in terrorist attacks was prevalent also with the Nasir 
Abas, Mantiqi 3 leader and Afghan veteran was involved in JI along with his brother 
Hashim Abbas. Hashim Abbas was involved in one of  I’s first large scale attacks the 
Christmas Day Bombings in 2000 alongside others prominent members such as Ali 
Imron. He was arrested for possible attacks in Singapore. His sister Paridah was 
married to Mukhlas, who was part of the Al Ghuraba cell in Pakistan and involved in 
the Bali Bombings.   
 
Ali Gufron married Farida daughter of Edy Setiono who had trained with Hambali in 
Afghanistan
369
 Hambali met his wife Noraliza at religious class. Both Noraliza and 
her sister Noral Falidah attended a madrassah that they were invited to attend in 
Malaysia. They were invited by visiting clerics in the hometown in Borneo Malaysia. 
Noral Falidah went on to marry Abu Yusuf a JI operative. Hambali in turn ran the 
religious classes that Sejahrahtul Dursina and Yazid Shufaat attended when they 
returned from the US. Yazid Shufaat who would later through Hambali be selected to 
Head Al Qaeda’s anthrax programme in Kandahar Afghanistan. Taking over from 
Pakistani Scientist Abdul Rauf.  
 
For Fajar Taslim, certainly the lessons and aspiration that he had when he had initially 
joined the group had not changed. The leaders whom he noted that he was close to 
were Ustaz Ibrahim Maideen, the Head of the JI cell in Singapore whose 
granddaughter he married. The late Dr. Azahari Hussein whom he affectionately 
called ‘bro’ whom he used to meet on weekends in Johor. Dr. Azahari Hussein was 
 I’s preeminent and lead bomb maker who had ingeniously put together the idea of 
Tupperware bombs. Bombs were kept in Tupperwares to ensure that the explosives 
remained dry amidst the humid conditions in Southeast Asia to ensure maximum 
lethality. He reminisced of the times he spent in Dr. Azahari’s sports car when he 
visited with him. Fajar Taslim was close to influential members within the JI network 
in Singapore and Indonesia. He lamented that with he had now been  
 
“separated by my family and (second) wife”370 
 
for the sake of the pathway he had chosen.  
 
Capitalise on the Strategic Imprint: Relationships that Bind 
The relationships highlighted above showcase a mere sampling of the ties by blood, 
by marriage and by history that connects many of these groups more prominent 
members. The important message would be use of ties of family to bind the 
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organization together. These ties were most commonly seen in the example of JI in 
part due to the documents and findings that surfaced over more than two decades of 
the organisation’s existence. Ties of sibling relationships, connections by marriage 
through in-laws, father and sons told a tale of brotherhood and trust.  
A strategic imprint that was to influence not JI but additionally the formation of many 
of the groups that had metastasized in light of ongoing counter terrorism operations 
against terrorist groups in Indonesia. This trend of marriage within the ‘brotherhood’ 
and ties soldered by marriage often by senior leadership should not be seen to be a 
transaction of amongst men in the hope of merely finding a spouse. Many of them 
continued to remain loyal to their spouses. That would take away from what was the 
careful building of strategic ties amongst a community that would weave familial ties 
and relationships in the creation of a social fabric that would form the cornerstone of 
the Islamic State that they had envisioned – Daulah Islamiyah Nusantara.  
In the aftermath of the large numbers of arrested including core leadership of JI, JAT, 
AQI amongst others, the ability to regroup has been limited. In a court testimony, 
Separiano who was indicted for his participation in the Myanmar Embassy bombings 
in 2013 highlighted four ways through which terrorists regroup.  These were through 
Internet forums and social networks, marriage, religious teaching sessions and visits 
to prisons to meet with incarcerated terrorists.
371
 Today in prisons, marriages take 
place between widows of those that were killed and members of terrorist groups 
across prisons in Indonesia. More than just a means of ensuring that the women are 
taken care of, the marriages lay the foundations of what could be the next generation 
of children who are brought up and weaned on a culture violence and extremism. The 
wife of one of the detainees in the Prison in Palu lamented and shared her concerns 
with the prevalence of what she termed, nikah bawah tangan or secret marriages 
between detainees and other women while the first wife had no knowledge of the 
marriage.
372
  
Capitalise on Predisposed Feelings of Resentment in Interpersonal Relations 
The next figure examines the social construct of rejection prior to joining the 
organisation: 63% of respondents acknowledge that to some degree prior to joining 
the organisation they felt angry, 40% experienced loneliness, 44% felt ashamed with 
themselves and only one third or 33% acknowledged a sense of rejection and 45% 
noted that to some extent they felt different from those around them. A staggering 
62% noted that they never felt isolated. The profile of the members in general point to 
individuals who were felt a mixed sense of social rejection but strongest was a feeling 
of anger and feeling different. Certainly while what their anger was targeted against 
was not highlighted in detail in this construct, the general state of emotions could 
translate not only to the type of group they joined eventually but the desire to enact 
change through violence and speed.        
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Figure 9: Social Rejection Prior to Joining Organisation 
 
 
The figure below highlights the high level of anger that respondents shared they felt 
prior to joining the organization. The table aims to attempt to identify the sentiments 
of anger felt. Prior to joining the organization, 63% felt personally upset with the 
Indonesian government, 80% were upset with the treatment of Muslims by non-
Muslims in Indonesia and 82% were upset with the treatment of Muslims by non-
 uslims globally. 80% were upset with the specifically the Western World’s 
treatment of Muslims. 54% felt a sense of discrimination merely because they were 
Muslim. This was strange given the fact the Indonesia albeit secular has a Muslim 
majority. 
The high levels of anger and resentment prior to joining the organisation alludes to 
the already entrenched level of dissatisfaction and anger with regards to their 
treatment as Muslims. The sense of solidarity that is felt with the greater Muslim 
community worldwide. This sense of resentment existed were not a result of 
indoctrination by the groups or by the leadership but an entrenched sense of anger that 
was already present before they embarked on their pathways into the group. It 
provides insight into the predisposition of members of the groups. 
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Figure 10: Anger and Resentment Prior to Joining Organisation 
 
The psychological well-being of the group after spending sometime in the 
organisation however showed individuals where almost half, 43.4% of the 
respondents agree that they are generally happy while in the group with only 18% 
acknowledging that they were upset while in the group and with only 20% agreeing 
that they feel lonely after being with the organization. The vast majority seemed more 
at ease in the company of likeminded individuals and in a group that worked towards 
perhaps the initial sense of collective anger felt as a result of the treatment of 
Muslims. The reduce sense of loneliness could certainly be associated with the new 
ties and relationships created with the induction into the organization. The sense of 
belonging either through familial ties or the bond of brotherhood towards a common 
objective could have inspired the general sense of well-being while in the 
organization. 
 
 
 
Before you
joined, to what
extent did you
feel personally
upset with the
Indonesian
government?
Before you
joined, to what
extent did you
feel personally
upset with the
way that
Muslims were
treated by non-
Muslims in
Indonesia?
Before you
joined, to what
extent did you
feel personally
upset with the
way that
Muslims
communities in
the world were
treated by non-
Muslims?
Before you
joined, to what
extent did you
feel personally
upset with the
Western
world's
attitudes
toward
Muslims?
Before you
joined, to what
extent did you
feel
discriminated
against
because you
were a Muslim?
26% 
11% 
9% 
10% 
38% 
27% 
20% 
18% 
20% 20% 
21% 
19% 
20% 
18% 
12% 
5% 
14% 
12% 
10% 10% 10% 
27% 
32% 32% 
12% 12% 
10% 10% 
11% 
9% 
Anger and Resentment Prior to  
Joining the Organisation 
Never Occasionally Sometimes Usually Always Not applicable
125 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11: Psychological Well-being While in the Organisation 
        
These pre-existing sentiments of anger and resentment, and a perceived sense of 
injustice could increase the speed of radicalisation of not only the individual but 
thereafter increase the level of aggression and violence of the group as a collective. 
They provide the necessary justification and rationalisation for extreme violence as 
the only way forward. The presence of like-minded individuals add to the 
In a meeting with the research team at the Ministry of Religious Affairs, Rudi 
Subianto, a member of the research team noted that Terrorism in Indonesia flourished 
not because of religion and ideology per se but in part because there was a rising 
sentiment that justice was absent a sense of injustice that religion could not bridge.
373
 
He however acknowledged that to some extent, there was a sense that the members of 
terrorist groups were “brainwashed by their leaders.” 374  Abdul Jamil yet another 
member of the research team at the Ministry of Religious Affairs emphasised the 
strong role that leadership had played through indoctrination. He opined that there 
was a conflation of factors that included “ideology, social political (stressors), 
external factors and leadership of terrorist groups.”375 From the survey conducted the 
deep-rooted sense of resentment and the perceived sense of injustice is vital.  
 
Despite the general consensus that seemed to form on the importance of leadership, 
the research team emphasised that the existing preconditions. These preconditions 
could have laid the foundations for a more permissive environment for radicalisation 
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by leadership, citing the violence Ambon in 2000, Hussein HB noted that the fighters 
generally had “low levels of education, low levels of understanding of religion and 
low economic prospects. The idea was that if they wanted to enter heaven quickly, 
then go to Ambon.” 376  The leadership would them be able to capitalises on the 
vulnerability and emotional frailty of individuals and would be able to radicalise them 
to the cause.  
 
 (3) The Influence of Hierarchical Leadership  
The notion of a clear hand of leadership directing terrorist and extremist groups in 
Indonesia is an aspiration that the groups explored in this study aspire towards. The 
clearly articulated hierarchy and structure (at least on paper) in most groups provide 
clarity in the manner through which decisions are made by the leadership of the 
groups. The presence of Manifestos and Constitutional documents underscore perhaps 
the latent aspiration of order in the creation of an Islamic State.  
The table below provides a brief outline of the type of hierarchical leadership that the 
groups in Indonesia have envisioned for themselves respectively.  
Table 6: Leadership in Groups377 
NO. GROUP LEADERSHIP HIERARCHY 
1 Darul Islam (DI) DI today is not longer a united movement. 
2 Negara Islam 
Indonesia (NII) 
NII Constitution 
1. All powers rested in the hand of the Imam 
2. The second highest function in the NII was the 
General Chairman of the Supreme Command 
(KUKT) 
3 Lashkar Jihad (LJ) No Information Available 
4 Majelis Mujahideen 
Indonesia (MMI) 
MMI Three levels of Leadership 
 
1. Mujahidin Congress (held every 3 to 5 years) 
2. Dewan Pempinan Majelis or Legislative Council 
3. Pimpinan Pelaksana Majelis or Executive Leadership 
Council 
5 Jemaah Islamiyah 
(JI) 
PUPJI  
At the apex is the Emir 
Beneath him are four councils:  
1. A governing council (majelis qiyadah)  
2. A religious council (majelis syuro)  
3. A fatwa council  
4. A disciplinary council (majelis hisbah).  
6 Jamaah Anshorut 
Tauhid (JAT) 
JAT Manifesto 
At the apex is the Emir 
(elected by ulamas and Islamic public figures/leaders)
378
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Below the Emir two councils:  
1. Majelis syuro (executive council),  
2. Tanfidziyah (administrative office).  
[The administrative office manages five 
departments, namely finance, hisbah (morality 
enforcement); religious propagation/outreach and 
media/publication, tarbiyah (education); and katib (a 
secretariat)] 
7 Al Qaeda Indonesia 
(AI) 
No Information Available 
8 Mujahideen 
Indonesia Timur 
(MIT) 
No Information Available 
9 Front Pembela Islam 
(FPI) 
FPI Organisational Structure 
 
At the apex is the Grand Imam  
The organizational structure is divided into: 
1. Majelis Syura (Consultative Committee)  
2. Majelis Tanfidzi (Executive Committee).  
 
The Consultative Committee is led by Head of Supreme 
Advisory Council of Consultative Committee and made 
up of five components:  
a. The Shariah Council  
b. The Honorary Council  
c. The Supervisory Council  
d. The Advisory Council  
e. The Monitoring Council  
10 Hizbut Tahrir 
Indonesia (HTI) 
No Information Available 
 
 
The table shown above begs yet another question. If indeed the groups have 
envisioned a structure, then where do these groups stand on the debate raised in 2008 
by Sageman and Hoffman on the possible evolution of groups towards that of a 
leaderless Jihad. Are the groups in Indonesia all hierarchical and top-down? How do 
the narratives espoused by the group and their leaders impact the groups in 
Indonesia?  
 
With the increase counter terrorism operations many of the operatives of terrorist 
groups with a clearly defined hierarchy and leadership in the past such as DI, NII, LJ, 
JI, MMI and JAT, have either been disbanded like in the case of LJ or they have 
developed a multiplicity of splinter organisations.  Smaller groups that have arisen out 
of the splintering of the predominant larger terrorist groups that had dominated 
Indonesia’s terrorism threat landscape. Although having definitive leader many of 
these splintered groups have not articulated a clear structure as seen in the past. AI 
and MIT for instance have leadership that was either apprehended or on the run 
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respectively. The groups that have splintered from groups such as DI for instance 
such as Ring Banten and DI-Akram, which evolved further to become the Abu Omar 
Group, do not articulate a clear hierarchical structure but are more violent than their 
predecessors.  
 
Even though most if not all the members in JI cell that he belonged to were caught, 
Fajar Taslim, the only foreigner currently in an Indonesian prison on terrorism 
charges still finds a sense of solidarity towards a nebulous notion of a group and a 
deep conviction for the narratives that he continues to hold dear. His operational 
injunction is based on a sense of solidarity that he perceives exists amongst others like 
himself who in his mind are fighting for a common cause – an Islamic State.  
 
Fajar Taslim challenged,  
 
“If you want me to stop, bring me a verse from the Quran and Haddith.”379 
 
He later added with much conviction, that  
 
“to get Islamic Law … we will try until we die, for matters and is important.”380 
 
Fajar Taslim was part of the JI Cell in Singapore. At the time of his joining, JI 
possessed a top down hierarchical structure with regionally based units known as 
mantiqis in operation in Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines and even 
Australia. Ustaz Abu Bakar Ba’asyir’s who was the Emir of JI iterated that  
 
“Islam needs to be at the top and this is important for Islam. It is 
important that Islam is pure and strong.”381  
 
Fajar Taslim’s commitment to what JI had stood for has not changed during his time 
in prison. In broad brushstrokes, neither has what Ustaz Abu Bakar Ba’asyir stood for 
changed through the years. In fact, when Fajar Taslim was asked of what his 
intentions were after his release, without hesitation and an almost cheerfully he 
answered with much conviction,  
 
“God-willing, I will go and fight in Syria, they can try and catch me if 
they can, I will die trying.”382  
For the members of  IT, the YouTube videos by the group’s leader Santoso even 
while he is on the run aim to provide inspiration for the members in (what is assumed 
to be) rather unstructured group. Santoso was formerly  AT’s operations field 
commander. The Terrorism Research and Analysis Consortium identified “four 
different groups acting in tandem as broader network.”383 These groups were the (1) 
The Abu Omar Group whose leader Abu Omar is currently serving time (2) MIT led 
by Santoso, who is now Indonesia’s most wanted Terrorist (3) The Abu Autat Group 
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now believed to be allied with MIT and (4) The William Maksum Network. Abu 
Omar for instance emphasised that his group aimed to  
“establish Islamic Law and if there is a need for war then there is a 
need for war.”384 
He believed that at the most basic level there are  
“two things that can be done…dakwah (religious outreach) and war.”385 
His was a group that had undergone considerable evolutions and has become the one 
of the most violent groups in operation in Indonesia today. Albeit there is no longer 
the presence of a clear and distinctive structure amongst group, what they have 
managed to sustain through the years is the deference to leaders and Emirs across 
these organisations. Looking at the table shown above, even on paper, then when the 
Manifestos and Constitutions were drawn up, the role of the Emir was central. His 
authority was untouched, as he sat at the pinnacle of power. This was tied in very 
much to the framework of leadership as was envisioned by the notion of the Kalifah 
or Vicegerent.  
Ghozali, currently serving time, was the leader of the cell that spearheaded the 
robberies in order to fund terrorist operations. He was part of Tanzim Al Qaeda 
Serambi Mekkah and JAT. He added,  
“ y cell was small, and had two suicide bombers”386 
ultimately it was the leader of the cell who would decide on the operation.  
“As a leader and an Emir of the cell, I looked for individuals who are 
loyal to me, were prayerful and conducted worship, had faith, were 
sincere in their desire for death… the job of the cell was to make them 
like that.”387 
Today, although possessing a fractured group with a multiplicity of splinters Abu 
Bakar Ba’asyir still commands the respect and authority amongst followers who visit 
with him regularly. Abu Bakar Ba’asyir’s formed  I,   I and  AT. He left   I on 
account that the role of leadership was about to be chosen democratically, a process 
that he felt was illegitimate. In founding his new group JAT, the importance of the 
Emir and the almost undefiled power that the leader should hold was emphasised and 
iterated through the JAT Manifesto which bore strong resemblance to JI’s PUPJI.  
In Indonesia, not only does the leader naturally possess a multiplicity of basis for 
accruing social power. In the perceived absence of justice, law and order and 
simmering resentment amongst group members, the manner through which the leader 
conducts himself and the issuance of guidelines provides the perception of order 
amidst chaos. Just as Santoso does while on the run from security and law 
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enforcement and just like prominent cleric and ideologue Abu Bakar Ba’asyir 
continues to do while his is in prison. The power of influence extends beyond the 
confines of a life on the run and prison wall. They have not stopped acts of violence 
from continuing.  
Indonesia as such presents a unique case in point. The power of the leader at the apex 
bolstered by the hierarchy of a group presupposes the existence of a structured group. 
In Indonesia the presence of the leader of a group with a nebulous and unstructured 
group would still garner support. In addition to the narratives used, as explored in 
Chapter 5, the overwhelming level of influence that the leaders possess will be able to 
directly influence the group as a collective. Leadership is as such inextricably linked 
to collective purpose and collective action. Power through influence is key. 
Splits and Fissures  
The multiplicity of splinter groups and fissures in the terrorist movement in Indonesia 
has proven a challenge for security and law enforcement alike. The presence of a clear 
leader seems to be the predominant means of identifying the group as a collective in 
the presence of an amoeba-like cadre. The split in this instance is a result of 
leadership and by extension the organizations that they coordinate and lead. The 
narratives that sustain the movement remain unchanged. 
Cyber-Domain and Leadership 
Perhaps an uncalculated consequence, the metastasized threat has been made possible 
by the influence of Globalisation. In this instance, “information technology, combined 
with cheaper international travel, has enabled terrorist leaderships to establish their 
bases in less developed countries with weak or near absent law enforcement or 
judicial structures.”388 The ability to leadership to reach out directly to members and 
inspire a following of possible new recruits through social networking sites, videos 
and forums have presented a new means or recruitment, radicalization and sustenance 
of an orthodox concept of an organization. In addition to the role of terrorist 
leadership is an organization whose foundations are piled in using a strong layer of 
middlemen who could manage the day to day running of the organisation. The cyber 
sphere had reduced the dependence of the middleman, albeit to assume that they have 
been cut out all together, would be myopic.  
The current calls for assistance with in the ingoing war in Iraq and Syria for instance 
showcased a range of methods used. They were conducted using both by a flurry of 
videos calling for assistance, updates provided by social network site and roadshows 
conducted all over Indonesia in order to glean the necessary support through funding 
and assistance rendered to head to Syria to fight. 
Terrorist Leaders - Making Sense of a Multiplicity of Groups 
Abu Bakar Ba’asyir tried to make sense of the current fissures of groups and 
multiplicity of small groups that have surfaced on the lack of leadership. It is due to a 
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“lacking of a strong leadership, if there was these splits won’t happen”389 
 where under a strong leader all groups would come under one umbrella. In fact JAT 
when it first was established saw itself as an umbrella group that brought together 
former members of JI, NII, MMI amongst others. Perhaps JAT envisioned itself an 
umbrella organization that could lead and streamline efforts.  
Abu Tholud, JI Mantiqi 3 Commander suggested that perhaps the  
“aspiration of the members were not achieved”390 
hence the constant search and creation of new groups. He posits that individuals are 
unsatisfied by the lack of progress made by existing groups and attempt to create new 
groups in the hope of achieving the goal of establishing Islamic Law. Badri Hartono 
Head of Al Qaeda in Indonesia noted,  
“we were being attacked so all I did was to start one.”391 
Nassir Abbas on the other hand was of the opinion that it is not that the groups are 
leaderless,  
“sometimes it is just because of the size of the group.”392 
The really small splinter groups could well operate on consensus and the larger 
groups try to create a typical leadership hierarchy with the Emir or Leader at the apex. 
In this case to each group it own method and means to further their cause.  
Certainly, the increased pressure by security and law enforcement could have 
mitigated the rise of large of strong terrorists groups like that of the DI/NII movement 
and JI of the past. Ghozali notes that for him, these splits and fissures, were analogous 
to  
“one body with many changes of clothes.”393 
Ustaz Jaafar concurred when he shared his opinion of JI and JAT adding that,  
“ideology is the same, the concept is the same and the leader is the same.”394 
As such although there were numerous groups at the core the narratives espoused by 
the groups as a collective were very similar. They represent a common aspiration for 
the establishment of an Islamic state with many paths and attempts made by a 
multiplicity of groups in order to achieve the same goal.  
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(4) The Influence of Charisma and Personal Ambition 
The final factor that propels leadership as a key influencer in radicalisation is the 
influence of charisma and personal ambition. This is perhaps one of the most 
intangible qualities of an individual. However their influence is transformational in 
more ways than one. The influence of charisma and personal ambition embodies 
transformational characteristics that could change the direction of not only the 
individual embodying these traits but its resulting effects cascade through the 
decisions undertaken by the group.  
“Charisma gets people to like you, trust you and want to be led by you. It can 
determine whether you are seen as a follower or a leader, whether your ideas can 
get adopted and how effectively your projects as implemented. Like it or not, 
charisma can make the world go round – it makes people want to do what you 
want them to do.”
395
  
At the crux, charisma embodies the fundamentals of power – unbridled 
influence. 
Nuanced Understanding of Charisma 
While most certainly leaders at the apex of terrorist and extremist organisations are 
assumed to be charismatic. It is a quality that to some extent may have enabled many 
to amass a large following. However it would be difficult to differentiate the impact 
of influence as a direct result of charisma as opposed to influence gleaned from other 
aspects explored in this study such as moral authority, familial ties and hierarchy 
within the organisation. The prevalent discourse on charisma in terrorism studies and 
in particular the study of radicalisation underscores a limited understanding and 
awareness of the ongoing research on charisma. The tautological use of the term has 
give rise to a problematic lacuna in understanding the impact of charisma within a 
terrorist and extremist groups. The fact that people listen intently when a leader 
speaks for instance does not automatically mean that the leader is charismatic. 
Charisma is not synonymous with the gift of the gab. While the influence rendered by 
charisma is important, charisma is much more nuanced. It extends beyond that of 
traditional respect for religious figures and authorities in positions of power.  
This study will not explore the gaps in the terrorism discourse in greater detail. 
However it is pertinent to be sensitised to a more nuance understanding of the term.  
Charisma and the Importance of Social Conditions 
Several radicalisation models and conceptual frameworks explored in Chapter 2 for 
instance, highlight the role of a charismatic leader as a powerful means of radicalising 
an individual. Weber defines it as individuals who are “holders of specific gifts of the 
body and spirit; and these gifts have been believed to be supernatural, not accessible 
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to everybody.”396  Behavioural psychologists have debated the notion if charisma is 
innate or if can be learned.
397
 Charisma is an emotive influencer that can function 
beyond the realm of traditional basis of influence and ignites a sense of admiration 
and awe amongst their followers. It is a characteristic that has often been spoken 
about, however seldom examined in greater detail.  
In a study exploring the social conditions that give rise to charismatic leadership, 
Douglas Barnes notes that,  
 “charisma is not an individualistic phenomena hinging only on the extraordinary 
quality of a leader's personality. Rather, charisma stems from a complex of factors 
meeting in and around the same individual. For instance, the leader is likely to live 
during a period of radical social change in which the values of the society have 
changed leaving an opening for a new formulation of religious beliefs.”
398
 
In many ways the social conditions that have given rise to charismatic leadership can 
be seen in the traditional leadership within the terrorist and extremist movement in 
Indonesia. In Chapter 3, this study explored the unique dynamics and role of political 
Islam in Indonesia. It highlighted the social conditions that led to the formation of 
terrorist and extremist groups in Indonesia and the bourgeoning number of groups 
over a few decades. The formulation of a radical narrative against a backdrop of 
change was explored in detail in Chapter 5 in the role of ideology as a key influencer 
of a group on the its pathway to radicalisation towards violence.  
Ustaz Kiyahin and Habib Rizieq developed the idea to form FPI whilst they were both 
caught in a jam, travelling by car.
399
 It was a decision that they had made in light of 
deteriorating social conditions in Indonesia. In this case, the more social and engaging 
mannerisms of Habib Rizieq contrasted with the more reserved and thoughtful 
demeanour of Ustaz Kiyahin, the co-founder of FPI.   
In the interviews conducted with the terrorist leadership of JI for instance, a common 
theme that surfaced was the sense that while Abu Bakar Ba’asyir was seen to be a 
charismatic figure, Abdullah Sungkar with whom JI was founded in 1993, was a man 
who was strict. A no-nonsense figure who prior to his death maintained a tight hold 
over the organisation.   
Ustadz Jaafar Umar Thalib another religious teacher whose was head of LJ and had 
recruited fighters for Ambon. His rational for conducting jihad was as a direct result 
of the on-going conflict between the Christians and the Muslim. After the Malindo 
Accords and the disbanding of the group, many of the former members of LJ inspired 
by conflict in Ambon, were ready recruits and joined other terrorist and extremist 
groups in Indonesia. 
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Ismail Yusanto, spokesperson of HTI, noted that he was inspired by the solution that 
HT offered to solve the social ills of society. Struck by a society that was corrupt, he 
saw a need for change. HT offered a holistic solution that focused on all aspects, 
social, political and economic.  
Each one of these leaders arose against a backdrop of social change and at the same 
time, saw religion as a solution and their respective groups as a vehicle for the 
solution. The extraordinary quality of charisma coupled with the ensuing social crises 
as they had envisioned it gave rise to a powerful transformational course in either the 
creation of a new terrorist or extremist group like in the case of JI and FPI, the 
rendering of assistance to fellow brothers in Ambon through the creation of a new 
group as with the work of LJ or coming on board an established group such as HT. 
The actual and perceived social conditions had breathed life into these groups and set 
them on a course of change.  
Personal Ambition 
Personal ambition is a theme that is somewhat seldom explored in great detail 
especially within the terrorism discourse writ large and in Indonesia in particular. The 
tendency is for leadership to play down their role at times in part due to social norms 
and second, the expectation of humility amongst leaders who are religious.  Survey 
respondent 84HTI, a HTI member noted, 
“I am not anyone great, but to carry out preaching, I am well versed and understand 
the pathways to bring my HT friends and brothers together as I am born in this area 
Because of HT, I feel very privileged, as I have come to understand about the 
ideology of Islam and hope to always start new cells that do religious studies… I am 
very central.” 
Respondent 84HTI’s perhaps was a key member in charge of recruitment in his area, 
begins by highlighting that was not very great but ended by noting that he was central 
to the organisation. Just like charisma, personal ambition of an individual in the 
position of leadership in particular can set not only themselves but the group as a 
collective on a course of either heightened violence or on a path of de-escalation of 
violence.  
Brimming with Ambition: Hambali 
A case in point is the role of Hambali. Hambali was the operational chief and military 
strategist of JI.  Not only was he part of team of four who was tasked to go and recruit 
individuals when JI was at its embryonic stage, he was additionally in control of a 
central governing council that intelligence sources assert acts as the main coordinating 
body for four operational terrorist wings, the Mantiqis, in Southeast Asia.
400
  As such 
he was seen and very much believed to be Al-Qaeda's chief operative in Southeast 
Asia. He had personal access to Mohamed Atef alias Abu Hafs, the military 
commander of Al Qaeda. In 1996, Al Qaeda's chief operational planner Khalid Sheikh 
Mohammed invited Hambali to Afghanistan. Zachary Abuza quotes Khalid Sheikh 
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 ohamad’s testimony to the CIA noting that Hambali is charismatic and had a good 
following amongst the new recruits.
401
  
Nassir Abbas noted that  
“ambition of individuals can be controlled by strong leadership.”402 
Sharing insight into the dynamics of the group vis-à-vis one of it key leaders Hambali 
Nasir Abbas noted that Hambali’s ambitions were initially curtailed to a large extent 
by the strong leadership of Abdullah Sungkar.  
Hambali: Meeting with Osama Bin Laden 
Indonesians were being sent to Afghanistan to assist in fighting against the Russians. 
The training camps were moved to two areas over the course of a decade. In 1985 -
1992, Camp Sadah was in operation and from 1992-1995 Camp Torkham was in 
operation. From November 1994 onwards Southeast Asians were moving to train in 
Southern Philippines. In 1997, Hambali was tasked to go to Afghanistan as JI 
leadership was keen to understand the developments there as it had come to the 
knowledge of JI leadership that Osama Bin Laden had set up a training camp in 
Afghanistan between 1996-1997. Hambali had brought a statement by Osama Bin 
Laden in 1999 to the JI leaders, however both Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar 
Ba’asyir did not respond to the letter. It is believed that the letter comprise a fatwa 
that was spoke of partnership and collaboration between the groups through the 
conducting of attacks. He noted that while several individuals including Noordin 
Mohamed Top was of the opinion that a more violent stance was needed, as spelled 
out by the fatwa by Osama Bin Laden. Noordin Mohamed Top later masterminded 
and launched a string of attacks in Indonesia 
In October 1999, Abdullah Sungkar passed away in Bogor Indonesia. Nassir Abbas 
added that with Abu Bakar Basyir coming into power after Abdullah Sungkar’s 
demise, Hambali was happy as he had many ideas on how to further the movement 
within the region. Hambali was head of Mantiqi 1. A mantiqi is a regionally based 
system that JI had used to divide its spheres of operations. As the head of a mantiqi 
substantial authority came under Hambali. Nassir Abbas noted that Hambali was also 
keen to move the regional conflict of Ambon to a National level.  
In 2000 Hambali financed and provided the inspiration for the Christmas Eve 
bombings, a simultaneous attacks across 24 churches in Indonesia. Nassir Abbas 
emphasized that many JI leaders were not keen proceed with the Christmas Eve 
Bombings, but this fell on deaf ears. The mantiqi system allowed for the middle 
management leaders in charge to operate with considerable autonomy. Nasir Abbas 
admitted that there were a lot of things that he did to report to Abu Bakar Ba’syir as 
well. 
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Nassir Abbas explained that the more violent means undertaken by JI was as a result 
of not a splinter cell but a difference in policy from within JI. He noted that until now, 
there are individuals who continue to follow the fatwa as written in the 1997 
document that Hambali couriered from Afghanistan.
403
  
Abu Tholud also a former mantiqi leader noted that the activities of Dr. Azahari and 
Noordin Mohamed Top in particular  
 
“their heightened violence was a result of them interpreting Jihad 
differently, a different means of applying jihad.”404  
 
Abdurrahman Ayub, leader of mantiqi 4 noted that in approximately  
 
“2000-2001 there were two leaderships in Australia, one was pro-
Hambali and operated underground and the other that was loyal to 
Abdul Rohim and I (the mantiqi 4 leadership).” 405  
 
The danger continues to be present with those who were enamored with Noordin 
 ohammad Top’s work as  
 
“Noordin’s group is still around, they were a large group”406 
 
of operatives. The strength lies in the influence of leadership that is the supported by a 
common ideology that members on their own accord find hard to refute if not for a 
cognitive awakening. The leadership reiterates and reinforces not only the ideology 
but additionally provides justification that membership within this select group 
benefits the individual.  
 
The personal ambition of Hambali, his aspiration to connect JI with international 
networks and a permissive environment that accommodated and encouraged 
autonomous leadership of, thrust JI onto the path of violence that it is has come to be 
known for today. Hambali was arrested in 2004 in Ayodha, Thailand and is presently 
serving time in Guantanomo Bay. His ambition had a marked impact on the course of 
terrorism in Southeast Asia as a whole.  
Subdued Ambition: Ustaz Jaafar Umar Thalib 
Almost as a counterfoil to Hambali who was brimming ambition is the subdued 
ambition of the Ustaz Jaafar Umar Thalib, who was head of Laskar Jihad and Head of 
The Supreme Advisory Board of FKAWJ. LJ was established in January 2000 and 
disbanded in October 2002. A strict Salafi, whose beliefs were root in dialectic of 
justice and injustice, he had felt that it was,  
“the individual duty (fardhu ain) for Indonesian Muslims and a 
collective duty (fardhu kifayah) for Muslims outside Indonesia to take 
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part in the jihad in the Maluku to assists Muslims facing their 
Christian enemies'”407 
Ustaz Jaafar Umar Thalib: Meeting with Osama Bin Laden 
Having fought in Afghan front for approximately 10 years, Ustaz Jaafar met with 
Osama Bin Laden in 1987.
408
 He noted later on that Osama Bin Laden was misguided 
as his notion of an Islamic state is imagined an utopian and a revival of the days of 
Caliph Abu Bakr, Umar, Uthman and Ali.
409
 As such although he was in contact with 
Osama Bin Laden, Ustaz Jafar rejected the idea of cooperating with Osama Bin Laden 
as  
“he was in doubt about Usama’s piety.”410 
Ustaz  afar’s success with L  was contingent on his strong religious credentials.  As 
such with his “exclusive knowledge of Salafi-Wahhabi ideas and exclusive 
experiences of being in the battlefield provides him with power in the eyes of his 
followers. With this power, he could easily disseminate and implement his ideas 
without resistance.”411 
When compared to Hambali who lacked religious clout, Ustaz  aafar’s background 
placed him in a prime position to play and influential role in the terrorism threat 
landscape in Indonesia. The moral authority from being a religious teacher, an Afghan 
alumni, access to a large number of young recruits, Arab lineage through his Hadrami 
family background provided him with considerable influence on many levels. 
In 1999 in response to the on-going violence in Ambon and Maluku, Ustaz Jaafar 
wrote an open letter to President Habibie asking him to intervene. He sent a second 
letter to President Gusdur. However as little progress was made in quelling the 
conflict, in 2000 the decision was undertaken to engage in Jihad in order to restore 
order and protect the Muslim community.
412
 Thereafter Ustaz  aafar’s sent fighters to 
assist the Muslim groups there “with the backing of several mainstream politicians, to 
battle a separatist Christian group.”413  Ustaz Jaafar noted that with the Malino I 
Accords (19-20 December 2001) and Malino II Accords (12 February 2002) signed, 
peace was restored and the task that he had set out to do had come to an end.  
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Two factors that mitigated Ustaz  aafar’s journey on a path of jihad were two men 
that he had deeply respected. They were his father and Sheikh Muqbil whom Ustaz 
Jaafar had sought guidance from when Ustaz Jaafar visited with him in Yemen.
414
  
In both instances both Hambali and Ustaz Jafaar pursued a course that set their groups 
JI and LJ respectively on a path of increased violence. The difference perhaps lies in 
the ability of Ustaz Jafaar to reign in on the levels of violence and in the case of JI the 
group continued to engage on a path of violence even after Hambali’s arrest. 
Hambali’s ability to influence others such as Noordin Mohamed Top and Dr. Azahari 
Hussein had set them on the course for heightened violence of the group.  
CONCLUSION  
Transformational leadership often chart paths through unchartered territory. 
Leadership qualities are important traits in the management of a group’s activities in 
general. When asked to identify essential qualities that they were keen to see in a 
leader, members of the terrorist leadership interviewed identified several key traits 
that they felt were essential for someone in the position of leadership. Some alluded to 
traits that they saw as essential to furthering the group’s agenda, Ghozali for instance 
noted that  
“In addition to ideology, the leadership needs to possess knowledge, 
linkages with international counterparts and strong commitment.”415  
Others saw qualities that the indivdiual possessed as being necessary. Ariffin a lone 
wolf operative who had no affiliation to a group noted that inspirational leaders he 
looked up to were individuals such as  
“Kartosuwiryo (NII) whose ideas attract followers to Islam and Ustaz 
Abu Bakar Ba’asyir for his attempts to establish Islamic Law (he 
added that he looked up to) Osama Bin Laden for his charisma and 
simplicity.”416  
Ghozali added that for all inspirational leadership, terrorist groups in his opinion 
looked up to was Dr. Ayman Al-Zawahiri as  
“he was a symbol of global jihad as he has not be imprisoned.”417 
The ability to suscessfully avoid detection is certainly seen as an asset, almost as a 
ticket to continue with their struggle.  
The notion social justice and fairness is an intrinsic part of the values of Islam. 
Annonymously coded survey respondent, 88HTI who belonged to HTI added that 
ideally the leader needs to become “a person that is devoted, become welfare centric 
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and hold on to the values of Islam and become the capital or one of the provinces in 
the caliphate.”  
The precedence of moral authority and religion was another theme that surfaced. Abu 
Umar iterated that in addition to being an example to others,  
“the best religious leaders are individuals like Ustaz Abu Bakar 
Ba’asyir and Ustaz Aman Abdurrahman for they teach about Islamic 
law to Muslims.”418  
Ustaz Kiyahin noted that courage and ownership in the face of challenges is 
important. Ustaz Kiyahin in candor highlighted the courage of FPI noting that if  
“We (FPI) set the bomb, we don't run away like other groups, we will 
stand there at the spot until the police arrives and say, this bomb… I 
did it.”419  
This would reflect the integrity of the leadership to stand by the decisions undertaken. 
Leadership acts as the glue that makes messages stick. The ideological narratives stick 
to individuals through messages that are ‘sticky.’ They need to be simple, unexpected, 
concrete, credible, emotional and story-filled.
420
 Perhaps more importantly, the need 
for these messages to be delivered by effected messengers. Leaders within groups are 
in a prime position to act as a critical influencer and bridge between two other 
pertinent influencers in a group. These are namely the Ideology that was expounded 
on in Chapter 5 and the role of Group Behaviour that will be explored in greater detail 
in the next Chapter. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
INFLUENCER C:  
COMMUNITY AFFILIATION AND IMPACT ON GROUP BEHAVIOUR 
 
We must remember that one determined person can make a 
significant difference, and that a small group of  
determined people can change the course of history. 
 
 Sonia Johnson 
 
 
The use of terrorist or extremist groups as a referent of analysis in the study of 
radicalisation processes is an under explored means through which to understand the 
puzzling process of radicalisation. Broadly, the role of the group has almost been 
relegated to a secondary tier of analysis and as such, by extention the role of group 
dynamics and community affiliation in the process of radicalisation. It is an 
endeavour that is often embarked on in a limited manner after understanding the way 
through which individuals are radicalised. It is this gap that the Chapter will aim to 
shed light on. The Chapter will especially focus on the ability of the group as a 
collective to form, inform and transform not only the individual members within 
terrorist and extremist groups but in particular the direction of the group as a 
collective entity that is often influence by the community within which it thrives. The 
intra-community affiliation through group dynamics plays a pertinent role in 
sustaining a group on a course of increased violence as seen in the case of Indonesia. 
 
Social theorists such as Emile Durkheim and later Louis Althusser and Carl Jung refer 
to the concept of collective consciousness as the process through which an individual 
person identifies with the collective or the group through a multiplicity of facets that 
dominate social structures. Carl Jung goes one step further through his coining of the 
term ‘collective unconscious’ which refers to the part of an individual which even he 
or she is unaware of but which inadvertently influences the group.  
 
Karl Marx once noted that “It is not the consciousness of men that determines their 
being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness”421 
 arx’s reference was that of the material condition that placed pressure onto the 
decisions that are thereby undertaken in order to proceed and live one’s life as they 
are or in manner that they aspire towards.  Explaining the work of Marx, Weinstein 
notes that when collective consciousness develops, “participants come to share a 
definition of themselves as members of a larger whole, to understand that this whole 
has its own interests beyond those of any particular member, and to understand that it 
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has the ability to define and achieve goals in collective action.”422 It is this facet of the 
intra-group dynamics that has proven pertinent in the sustanence of groups in 
Indonesia. 
 
As part of an international effort to identify and clamp down on terrorist and extremist 
groups, countries and international agencies have created and identified a list of 
terrorist groups that have been proscribed. The aim of these sanctions against terrorist 
groups is primarily so that it “brings legal clarity to efforts to identify and prosecute 
members of terrorist organizations and those who support them.” 423  The most 
prominent of these sanctions against terrorist groups can be seen in the lists of 
proscribed terrorist groups that have been issued by the United States, United 
Kingdom, United Nations and European Union respectively.   
 
Despite the legal clarity that sanctioning terrorist groups may have brought to the 
operational and legal measures undertaken by states, the scholarly discourse on the 
understanding of the processes of radicalisation engaged in a limited manner with 
notion of the organisation as a collective. Most of the research on the processes of 
radicalisation using the models and conceptual frameworks as highlighted in Chapter 
2 of this study, even through the years, research has focused predominantly on the 
role of individual pathways of radicalisation. Hence while belonging to an 
organisation renders it dangerous, the impact of the processes of radicalisation of the 
group and in particular the processes through which terrorist and extremist groups as a 
collective entity have escalated in their use of violence has not been explored in much 
of the literature on radicalisation.  
 
Just like the definition of terrorism and ideology explored in the earlier chapters, 
social theorists too are not of one mind on the definition of a group. A group can 
perhaps be simply defined as “two or more individuals who are connected by and 
within social relationships”424 Broadly, several factors contribute towards the intricate 
makeup of a group, namely communication between members, mutual dependence, a 
shared purpose and goal.
425
 Ideology and role of leadership as explored in Chapters 5 
and 6 have a social element, not only in the means through which ideology is 
politicised in the former but also in the manner through which leadership and 
influence of particular individuals affects the direction of the group, in the case of the 
latter. In the case study of Indonesia, this change in direction additionally involves a 
path of heightened violence undertaken by these groups in order to meet their 
stipulated objectives. Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 iterated several of these factors raised 
above as constituting the intricate make up of a group. In Chapter 5, this study 
                                                 
422
 Jay Weinstein, Social Change, ( United States of America: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 
2010)  p.122 
423
Audrey Kurth Cronin, CRS: Report for Congress: “The FTO List” and Congress Sanctioning 
Designated Foreign Terrorist Organisations, Rep. No. RL32120, Congressional Research Service, 
2003, p.7 
424
 Donelson Forsyth, Group Dynamics, (United States of America: Cengage Learning, 2009) p.3 
425
 Donelson Forsyth, Group Dynamics, (United States of America: Cengage Learning, 2009) p.2 
142 
 
explored the shared aims and objectives of the 10 groups in an attempt to understand 
the common thread of ideology that weaves through each of these groups.  Chapter 6 
subsequently highlighted the unique position of leadership and positions of influence 
within the organisation and its concomitant impact on the 10 groups were explored. 
 
It is a natural problematic that is at the heart of research within the social sciences 
domain involving a human subject and by extension human behaviour. The 
unpredictability that underscores much of the research involving human behaviour is 
natural. It is human behaviour that ultimately defines us not only who we are but will 
inadvertently chart the direction of both terrorist and extremist groups as a collective 
even in their interaction between one another. The impact on group behaviour through 
group dynamics, group influence and group motivation especially in the manner 
through which decisions that are undertaken by the group will prove to be a lacuna in 
the understanding of the processes involving the radicalisation of a group. It is very 
gap that this study aims to shed some light on.  
The role of the organisation in radicalisation processes and conceptual frameworks 
has been explored to some extent by Martha Crenshaw in the first phase and 
expanded upon in greater detail in the third phase of radicalisation models and 
conceptual frameworks as explored in this study. In particular is the work by 
McCauley and Moskalenko on the 12 Mechanisms of radicalisation where amongst 
which the role of the group has been highlighted. For McCauley and Moskalenko, 
group radicalisation influenced not only the nature of the group and thereby its 
membership, but eventually, the ability of the group to survive. Andrzej Nowak and 
Robin Vallacher emphasise that in a social group, “it is the interaction among 
individuals over time that produces change and evolution of group-level 
properties.”426 Jerold Post similarly adds that the “subordination to the cause, in turn, 
gives leaders of these terrorist groups who frame the cause a major role in creating a 
dominant terrorist psychology.”427  
Even as this study aims to look as the workings of group level factors in 
radicalisation, it would be myopic to dismiss the complex interplay between and 
amongst the individuals within the group altogether. It is a symbiotic and synergistic 
relationship where one cannot survive without the other. The individuals make up the 
group and the accrued strength of the collective aggregation of individuals charts the 
direction of the group. At times as this chapter will show, this ends up drowning out 
the voices of individual actors in favour of the assumed harmonic crescendo of the 
collective voice of the group as a cohesive entity. A unified voice then governs the 
objectives stipulated by the group to ensure its survival and the fruition of its goals.   
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PART 1 THE SURVEY FINDINGS:  
THE INDIVIDUAL PERSON WITHIN THE GROUP 
 
A group is more than merely the aggregation of individuals and as noted earlier it is 
the complex interplay between individuals that ultimately makes up the unique 
dynamics of a group. The first part of this chapter will explore the findings of the 
questionnaire that was conducted as part of this study. The 94 respondents were 
members from both terrorist and extremist groups in Indonesia. Specifically this first 
part will explore in greater detail their sentiments prior to joining the organisation and 
while in either the terrorist or extremist organisation. While several of the themes 
from this questionnaire were explored in some detail in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, this 
Chapter focuses on the role of the group, the central focus of which will be how the 
individual sees himself and his activities vis-à-vis the organisation. The figure below 
highlights the sentiments that were felt by the respondents on their life circumstances 
prior to joining the group.  
 
 
Figure 12: Life Circumstance Prior to Joining 
 
 
 
This section of the survey aimed to explore the unique pressures of everyday life on 
the individual.  Of the 94 respondents, 70% felt satisfied with the job that they held 
prior to joining the organisation. While 45% felt that joining the organisation helped 
them financially, 37% were felt exactly the opposite, wherein joining the organisation 
never helped them financially. 52% noted that their families supported their decision 
to join the organisation. On the importance of religion in their life prior to joining the 
organisation, only 4% admitted that religion was Never important. An overwhelming 
majority of 51% in comparison noted that religion was Always important in their life, 
bringing those who felt that religion played a significant role in their life to grand total 
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of 81%.  Hence in general a clear majority felt satisfied with their jobs and had the 
support of their families to join the terrorist or extremist organisation while admitted 
religion played a significant role in their lives.  
 
The findings might explain the collective identity marker of religion as it continues to 
helm a significant role in their personal journeys of radicalisation as well as a central 
role in the ideology and aims of the group. The impact on their finances was certainly 
helpful as even from the survey, it had split the respondents. For the majority of the 
respondents, joining the organisation had provided them with some financial benefit, 
in this instance, while ideology and an overwhelming sense of religiosity may have 
influenced their decision to enter if not stay within a terrorist or extremist group, the 
majority’s admittance of financial gain does cast a shadow on the subsidiary benefit 
of joining and remaining with the organisation. While money may not have an 
immediate bearing on their decision to join the organisation, the members were able 
to consciously identify the benefit that it had brought them in general.  
 
A case in point is the Gerakan Sehari Seribu (Gashibu), One Thousand Rupiah A Day 
Movement, that is run by the Infaq Dakwah Centre (Centre for Donations and 
Outreach) and the Yayasan Rumah Putih (White House Foundation) - two extremist 
organisations in Indonesia. These extremist organisations provide financial assistance 
to terrorist inmates and families of inmates.
428
 The movement however has received 
some critique for its tendency to select high-profiled inmates to render their 
assistance. Nonetheless, the fact that additional funds are availed to the family either 
through the Gashibu project or from donations from the community might influence 
the individual’s commitment to the group.  
 
Assistance rendered might have been a result of the fact that a majority of the 
respondents were from Category One detention facilities in Indonesia. As a result 
there might have been a number of high-profiled inmates who were recipients of 
financial incentives while others were not. The financial incentive provides the group 
with a dependable cadre who are willing to sacrifice for the group with the knowledge 
that their families will be taken care of by the community in the event that they are 
killed or incarcerated.  
 
Recruiting from Within the Community 
 
On their recruitment into the organisation, while 28 of the 94 respondents noted that 
they had joined the group on their own accord, 29 respondents were recruited by a 
social or familial grouping of some kind. The social and familial grouping included 
friends, family member, secular and religious teachers. The 9 respondents who were 
recruited through multiple means meant that the felt that they recruited by more than 
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one factor listed above. 17 respondents refrained from responding and 11 noted that 
they were recruited from other channels. 
 
At first glance, what seemed odd was that none were recruited by solely members of 
the organisation, however the words of Ariffin the lone wolf operative that was 
interviewed helps to provide a somewhat reasonable explanation to the findings of the 
survey. When asked why he did not join a group like JI or JAT since he looked up to 
Abu Bakar Ba’asyir as a source of his inspiration, Ariffin candidly lamented that  
 
“Groups like JI and JAT, only recruit people that they know. They 
choose us it’s not like we sign up with them.”429  
 
Hence the significant numbers that were recruited by a person that they knew were 
more likely members of the organisation as well. The role of the group in recruitment 
of others within close proximity to their inner circle would not only help to maintain 
the secrecy surrounding the group and additionally help prevent defection within the 
ranks. It is poignant to note that while teachers, religious leaders or family members 
had recruited them none had indicated that these individuals were members of the 
organisation, albeit it is a likely that they were, failing which they would not have 
recruited them in the first place. They link ascribe to them was through a relationship 
that they knew as opposed to a member of an organisation which seems distant by 
comparison. 
 
Figure 13: Recruitment into Organisation 
 
 
The close relationships explored in the Chapter 6 on the influence derived from 
brotherhood, kinship and marriage reiterate this trend of recruitment of members 
within an enclosed circuit of known individuals. Recruitment from within can be 
purely seen to be functional element within the group.  This enforces and reproduces 
the sense of security felt by not only members of the group, but also by the group 
leader as well.  
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“The group can provide the members (or the dominant leader) with the security 
and comfort they seek. These typically derive from the individuals’ knowledge 
that there is a group of trusted and liked associates who share his worldview, his 
values and concerns, and who have first have first hand understanding of the 
predicaments he is facing. Any inner doubts he may have about certain issues or 
parts of his performance can be held at bay by the confidence and approbation of 
one’s peers.”430 
 
It is the sense of security and trust that is derived from being with the likeminded that 
continues to resonate with an echo-chamber effect and bears the subtle notes of 
conformity and pressure of decisions undertaken by the collective.  
 
 
Community Connectedness and Embeddedness 
 
Building on the notion of community is the level of connectedness felt by the 
respondents to the Muslim and the Indonesian community in general. Their level of 
connectedness with the community could provide a salient factor in the manner 
towards which they view themselves and the community as a whole.  
 
 Figure 14: Community Connectedness 
 
 
Of the 94 respondents, 70% felt connected to the Muslim community prior to them 
joining the organisation. 70% also felt that they felt connected to the Indonesian 
community. Exploring the level of community connectedness aims to understand the 
sentiment felt vis-à-vis a global Muslim identity as opposed to a more nationalist 
grouping such as the Indonesian community, devoid of indication of religion and 
ethnicity. On connectedness to the Indonesian community despite the similarities in 
                                                 
430
 Paul ’t Hart, Eric K. Stern and Bengt Sundelius, “Foreign Policy-Making at the Top: Political Group 
Dynamics,” in (Eds.) Paul ’t Hart, Eric K. Stern and Bengt Sundelius, Beyond Groupthink: Political 
Group Dynamics and Foreign Policy-making, (United States of America: University of Michigan 
Press, 1997) p.18 
Before you joined, how
connected did you feel to
the Muslim community?
Before you joined, how
connected did you feel to
the general Indonesian
community?
20% 
14% 15% 
9% 
22% 
18% 
13% 13% 
20% 
30% 
10% 
17% 
Community Connectedness Prior to Joining 
Never Occasionally Sometimes Usually Always Not applicable
147 
 
general outcome, a close examination indicates that there was a 7% increase in people 
who sat in the fence and said that he question did not apply to them and a 10% 
increase of those who Always felt connected to Indonesian community. Certainly 
while the survey does not indicate what the respondent envisaged when they imagined 
the notion of an Indonesian community, it is possible that the initial sense of 
connectedness to the Indonesian community influenced the reasons behind the 
individuals joining the organisation, in order to create a better life for themselves in 
Indonesia.  
 
Embeddedness of Individual within the Organisation 
 
The figure below aimed to examine the degree towards which  
 
Figure 15: Embeddedness within Organisation 
 
 
 
the individual felt a sense of belonging and purpose within the group. 42% of the 
respondents felt that their lives served a higher purpose. 28% felt a strong sense of 
belonging to the group, 28% also felt that it would be difficult for them to leave the 
group. 32% had faith that the organisation would assist them in time of difficulty. 
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27% felt that their opinions were heard and 37% felt that the organisation cared about 
their well-being. 37% felt that the organisation cared valued their contribution and 
53% felt that they did not fear leaving the organisation. Only 20% felt that they had 
prestige within the organisation and 55% felt that their beliefs fit with the 
organisation’s goal. 
 
As an extension of the individual’s embeddedness into the organisation was the role 
of the family embeddedness vis-à-vis the organisation. This was to examine the 
degree of closeness between the organisation and the familial unit. The figure below 
showcases the results from the respondents.  
 
In the figure shown below, of the 94 respondents, 43% felt that their families would 
not be proud that they had joined the organisation and only 22% felt that their families 
would be proud. 55% disagreed that joining the group would affect their families 
reputation and 64% disagreed that the organisation would provide benefits for the 
family and 68% disagreed that their families would be harmed if they left the 
organisation. Finally 59% disagreed that the organisation spent time with their family 
members. On the provision of benefits, while the earlier construct indicated that 
joining the organisation might have provided them with financial benefit this benefit 
might not directly extend to the family.  
 
 
Embeddedness of Individual’s Familiy within the Organisation 
 
 
Figure 16: Family Embeddedness 
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The findings from this section of the questionnaire were quite stark given the strong 
delineation between the embeddedness of the individual within the group and the 
family embeddedness vis-à-vis the organisation. Hence while research thus far seems 
to indicate that the terrorist and extremist groups in Indonesia are typically recruited 
from within the familial and friendship circles of members of the group, the 
organisation in it of itself kept its distance from the family unit after the individual 
was recruited.   
 
 
 
Secret Organisation – Tandzim Sirri 
 
The earlier batches of JI recruits for instance, while recruited by family members, had 
gradually distanced themselves from their families. Sawad a member of JI whose wife 
was a student of Ali Imron, who was incarcerated for his role in the Bali Bombing 
explained that  
 
“joining JI was a process that changes one’s character.”431 
 
He added that his wife did not know that he had joined JI and in a reflective tone 
admitted that today his brothers and relatives have distanced themselves from him and 
no longer want to meet with him. He added that  
 
“this is the truth for the prisoners, not all the families are supportive.”432 
 
JI operated under the strict parameters that it was a secret organisation. Many like 
Sawad had distanced themselves from their families during the time that they were 
with JI. The ideological document of JI for instance explained the notion of it being a 
secret organisation through a section dedicated to the “Implementation of Tandzim 
Sirri”433 or secret organisation where it specifies that “it is a set of rules and organised 
(nature of the) group that is secret in nature.”434 The rationale behind the secrecy of 
the group was to ensure that both the personnel and the group were to be protected. 
 
Trust and Confidence in Organisation 
 
Within the confines of a secret organisation, the foundations of trust and confidence 
of the members while being part of the groups are assumed to be quintessential. This 
trust and confidence is built not only on the foundations of ideology and confidence in 
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the leadership of the group, but additionally the sense of dependability the individual 
had of other members of the group.  The figure below explores the construct of trust 
and confidence by members of the group.   
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Individual’s Trust and Confidence in Organisation 
 
 
Figure 17: Trust and Confidence in Organisation 
 
 
Of the 94 respondents, surprisingly only 36% were confident of the organisation’s 
ability to fulfil its goal.  31% of the respondents were neutral while 17% admitted that 
they were not confident of their organisation’s ability to achieve their goals.  35% 
admitted that they had trust other members within the organisation while once again 
almost 30% were neutral with 19% noting that they did not trust other members in the 
organisation. While trust and confidence in an organisation is key in the sustenance of 
any group, what was unique with this construct was that most of the respondents were 
muted in their responses of their levels of trust of not only of the organisation’s ability 
to succeed but additionally the other members from within the organisation.  
 
The results of this section of the questionnaire could be a result of the knowledge that 
even within the confines of a secret organisation, there might be a tendency for 
members who are caught to turn on other members within the organisation and as a 
result compromising current members within the organisation.  A second plausible 
explanation might be that the individuals while believing in the cause writ large for 
the establishment of an Islamic state, might have been comforted with the knowledge 
that organisations in it of its self is just one part of the equation, it is the movement in 
general that counts. The permissive environment in the Indonesia has resulted in the 
proliferation of a large number of groups and the ability to switch membership 
between and amongst groups might have provided a possible reasoning to muted 
levels of trust felt. As a counterfoil to examining the trust and confidence of members 
in organisations, is the construct of individualism. The figure below highlights the 
relatively strong sentiments of individualism reflected by the respondents.  
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Individual’s Trust and Confidence in Self 
 
Figure 18: Individualism 
 
 
Of the 94 respondents, 58% felt that it was important to do a better job than others. 
46% admitted that they rarely relied on others. 48% would rather depend on 
themselves than others. 46% felt that they it was important that decisions of the group 
are respected and 33% saw it as a duty to take care of group members that were ill at 
their own expense. 42% noted that the welfare of fellow group members was 
important to them and similarly 48% noted that they would be proud of the success of 
members of their group.  
 
Trust after Joining the Organisation 
 
The figure below explores the construct of trust after joining the organisation. Of the 
94 respondents, only 15% questioned the intentions of the giver when someone did 
something nice for them. Only 11% were of the opinion that no one should be trusted. 
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What was surprising was the number of individuals who chose to remain neutral. The 
notion of trust in his case was not reflective on the sentiments of the members vis-à-
vis trusting another members of the group but a heightened sense of mistrust of others 
in general arising out of an increase sense of mistrust of their surroundings while 
being part of a secret organisation.  
 
Figure 19: Trust after Joining the Organisation 
 
 
Conformity 
 
In the figure below, of the 94 respondents, only 6% agreed that they would often rely 
on and act upon the advice of others. Yet another 6% noted that their friends decided 
what they would do together. 10% admitted that they were influenced by the opinions 
of others and 32% noted that they were more independent than conforming in many 
ways. Finally 40% believed that they do not give in to other easily.  Once again with 
the examination of level of conformity they tension is seen through the sheer large 
percentage that chose to remain neutral with their answers. At a personal level, most 
individuals saw themselves as people who were non-conformists, namely as 
independent individuals who did were not influence by the opinion of others and 
possessing the grit to remain resolute in the decisions undertaken. This is also 
reflected in an earlier construct where more than 25 of the 94 respondents or close to 
30% noted that they had joined the organisation on their own accord.  
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Figure 20: Conformity 
 
 
In the attempt to see if individuals in a group conform, Alexander George additionally 
warns that individual within a group while not showing characteristics of conformity 
might show characteristics of concurrence seeking instead. This distinction between 
concurrence seeking and conformity pressure is explained by George as follows.   
 
“Concurrence-seeking is a distinctive type of group dynamics, not to be confused 
with the more familiar type of group dynamic that takes the form of conformity 
pressure on dissident or wavering members of the group to bring them into line with 
the decision that is being taken. It should be noted that the evidence of conformity 
pressure within the group is more easily obtained by researchers than evidence that 
concurrence-seeking has taken place. Concurrence-seeking is at the core of 
groupthink, but it is generally not accessible to direct observation. Whether or not it 
occurs within a group has to be inferred.”435 
 
He notes that concurrence seeking although harder to identify is at the heart of group- 
think. This might explain the findings as listed above wherein the individuals did not 
seem to exhibit characteristics that they were conformists from the survey conducted. 
Their concurrence seeking nature might hence explain the dependence on the group 
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and deference to the group’s leadership especially through the language of religion 
used in many of the group’s ideological discourses.  
 
Social Dominance  
 
In the final construct examined on social dominance, as reflected in the figure below, 
26% disagreed and noted that a single group should dominate society, 27% were of 
the opinion that not one group should dominate society. Of those who had definitively 
decided, respondents were split almost in half.  22% agreed that attempts should be 
made to equalise incomes. 39% admitted that fewer problems would arise if people 
were treated equally. 38% believed that they should do what they can to equalise the 
living condition for other groups. An overwhelming majority of 54% agree that all 
groups should be given an equal chance in life. Only 27% disagreed that sometimes 
other groups ought to be kept in their place.  39% noted that group equality should be 
the ideal.  
 
While a significant with the social dominance construct is that while majority noted 
that groups should have an equal chance in life and that equality was should be the 
ideal, there was a dissonance with the believes that the groups possessed ideologically 
in terms of the need to the dominance of one group of people over others. It might be 
this dissonance created that resulted in a large number of individuals who once again 
chose to remain neutral on general questions surrounding social construct but were 
willing to take on more pointed question on religion and the faith.  
 
28% disagreed that groups remained in their place fewer problems would surface. Yet 
another 57% disagreed that to get ahead in life, there was the need to step on other 
groups. While 21% believed that it was alright if some groups received more of a 
chance of life than other groups, by contrast 23% disagreed that some deserved more 
of a chance in life than others. Surprisingly, a majority of 48% disagreed that using 
force was necessary to get what they wanted from other groups. The majority of 23% 
felt that some groups are simply inferior to other groups. While a majority of 32% 
noted that quality between groups would be ideal. A majority of 43% disagreed that 
groups of a lower status should stay in their place and a further 33% disagreed that it 
is a good thing for some groups to remain at the top and others at the bottom.  
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Figure 21: Social Dominance 
 
 
This section on social dominance raised several lines of contention between notions 
of equality and the striving for social dominance. Most of the terrorist and extremist 
groups in Indonesia believed in the need to establish an Islamic state and Islamic rule 
of law. Hence while a majority noted that group equality was the ideal and agreed that 
it was ideal to give all groups an equal chance at life, the reality was with the 
establishment of an Islamic state through violence would be placing sections of the 
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Indonesian community at risk of being targets of violence. What was not evident in 
this case was that what the individual respondents thought of as groups were not 
expounded upon. Their notion of an in-group and an out-group could range from 
groups with differences along religious, racial lines or even stratification of grouping 
along groupings vis-à-vis levels of economic prosperity. It is this very tension that 
will be highlighted in greater detail in the second part of this Chapter. 
 
PART 2: COLLECTIVISM AND ITS IMPACT 
 
Sociologist Robert Bellah ascribes the emergence of an increased collective 
consciousness within the global Islamic community to the “resurgence of Qur’anic 
Islam in the last century.” 436  This sense of revival is especially pervasive in the 
discourse by extremists and terrorists who aspire towards the renaissance and 
resurgence of what they perceive as the golden age of Islam and Islamic civilisation.  
The case study of Indonesia is challenging on two levels. First, as described earlier in 
Chapter 1 and Chapter 3, Indonesia presents a unique threat landscape coupled with a 
permissive environment that has seen the proliferation of a large number of terrorist 
and extremist groups. The proliferation of these groups has had an impact on not only 
the threat landscape in Indonesia, but it also has had a ripple effect on the threat 
environment of the Southeast Asian region as a whole.  
The second challenge is posed by the role of cross-cultural perspectives. Marilyn 
Brewer and Wendi Gardner, posit that cross-cultural perspectives “have brought a 
renewed interest in the social aspects of the self and the extent to which individuals 
define themselves in terms of their relationships to others and to social groups.”437 It 
is this very unique cross-cultural perspective within the groups in Indonesia or lack 
thereof that inadvertently presents a second challenge. Within the groups in Indonesia, 
there is limited cultural difference between and amongst members of the terrorist and 
extremist group per se. This unique nature of the terrorist and extremist groups in 
Indonesia has meant that more than the cultural identity between and amongst 
members of the group, what tends to dominate as a common denominator in term of a 
marker of group identity is religion. In part, this closely ties in with the broad aims of 
the multiplicity of groups in Indonesia to form an Islamic State.  
Even as the groups aspire for the creation of Daulah Islamiyah Nusantara, an Islamic 
Caliphate that will span the Southeast Asian region and include Borneo and even parts 
of Australia, the identifying marker of the members of the group of religion 
transcends the traditional borders of the nation state. Transnational groups such as JI 
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for instance had spread it wings to regional countries such as Singapore and Malaysia. 
The Mantiqi System or the regionally based system that JI had meant that there were 
cells operating in neighbouring Malaysia, Singapore and as far as Australia. Fajar 
Taslim, the sole foreign national incarcerated on acts of terrorism in Indonesia when 
asked what the similarities were between members of the cell he was with noted 
rather candidly,  
“birds of a feather flock together.”438 
Despite the cultural and at times ethnic differences amongst members, religion has 
been the overarching binding identity. Religion hence acts as a socially binding 
mechanism as well as an identity marker. It has bounded the members through 
membership to a larger community or ummah. It has additionally been the cornerstone 
of the ties that have bound many of the members within the group through ties of 
kinship, marriage and even through educational institutions such madrassah and 
pesantrens. Moreover, as highlighted in the earlier chapters, the language of religion 
politicises the ideology or system of beliefs as laid out by the organisation and 
additionally tends to be used by leadership and members in positions of influence to 
further the aspiration and the stated objectives of the groups. 
Muzafer Sherif notes that “Whenever individuals belonging to one group interact, 
collectively or individually, with another group or its members in terms of their group 
identifications we have an instance of intergroup behaviour” 439  In the case of 
Indonesia, the similarities based on culture and religious values between and amongst 
the ten groups explored in this study present a unique case in point. It is not so much 
that the intergroup behaviour ceases to exist, but that the intergroup behaviours are 
demarcated along the means and methods undertaken by each group to achieve the 
collective aspiration of an Islamic State. The impact of collectivism through group 
behaviour, group dynamic and group influence can especially be seen through an 
increased trajectory of violence and a building of group cohesion.  
 
TRAJECTORY OF VIOLENCE 
 
In a recently published article, James Khalil iterated the need for the studies in 
political violence to “apply the logic of correlation and causality.”440 Khalil’s work 
highlights the notion that radical belief and violent action are not synonymous. This 
differentiation was briefly highlighted in greater detail in Chapter 1 and can be seen in 
the non-violent pathways that extremist groups had undertaken in Indonesia. In this 
instance, even though groups such as FPI push the envelope towards the edge with 
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moments of vigilantism amongst individual actors, the group as a collective 
minimally holds the position that it steers away from acts of terrorism.   
 
The motivation and beliefs of the groups were explored in greater in Chapter 5 on the 
ideology of the group. The complex position of political Islam in Indonesia as 
highlighted in Chapter 3 showcases the manner through which terrorist and extremist 
groups have positioned themselves throughout the course of Indonesia’s history.  
 
In the case study of Indonesia explored in this study, it is this very unique group and 
societal level influences that it posits that has a direct impact trajectories of violence 
undertaken by many of the groups in Indonesia. This is especially seen in the manner 
that religion plays a dominant role in what is a secular state, the politicisation of 
ideology and the role of influential leaders that move the group as a collective on the 
path of increased aggession and violence.  
 
Quest for Significance as Motivation: Escalation or Mitigation of Violence 
 
At the crux of the increased levels of violence is the role of identity and a quest for 
significance of not only the individual who aims to make a difference in the world, 
but additionally a quest for significance of the group who see their work as part of a 
larger plan to establish the rule of God in earth. Often enough the “relationships 
within the terrorist group - the interplay of commitment, risk, solidarity, loyalty, guilt, 
revenge, and isolation-discourage terrorists from changing the direction they have 
taken.”441 Kruglanski and Orehek emphasize that “a perceived loss of significance to 
the groups to which a person belongs may motivate a similar quest for significance 
restoration.”442  As such they posit that “individuals who define themselves according 
to their group memberships would be more supportive of aggression against out-
groups, including the use of terrorism.”443 
 
The perceived notion of the in-group and the out-group in this instance plays a crucial 
role in the manner through which the groups not only see themselves but also 
members of the out-group as well. In this instance,  
 
“collectivism is associated with greater support for terrorism. There does not seem to 
be any difference between the collective of a nation and the collective of a religion 
in supporting violence. Both groups represent potential sources of social identity. 
When individuals view themselves according to such group memberships, it 
increases the likelihood that they will be supportive of the use of violence, including 
when the violence is aimed at civilian targets.”444 
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The support of a ‘group tent’ as Kumar Ramakrishna notes is an essential element in 
the manner through which groups embark on a quest to defend their own through 
violence
445
 in support what he calls an existential identity anxiety. Using 
 oghaddam’s framework, Ramakrishna notes that there are three factors that 
underscore the notion of identity – the individual identity, the group identity and the 
collective identity. 
 
An almost primordial sentiment wherein,  
 
“personal goals and group identities are perceived as relatively deprived, efforts to 
restore personal significance should be enacted. When the deprivation is perceived 
to be unjust, a culprit can be identified, and violence can be justified; only then are 
we likely to see terrorism pursued as a means of restoring significance.”446 
 
It will hence restore significance to the group and explore means through which the 
significance of the group as a collective is brought to greater heights through the 
achieving its stated objectives, in particular the heralding of a new era of Islamic 
civilisation.  
 
 
Parameters of Action: Subtleties of Jihad and I’dad  
 
Throughout this discourse to a large extent the choices undertaken by terrorist and 
extremist groups revolves around the use of or potential use of violence in order to 
achieve their stated objectives. “ ost members of these organizations have revealed 
that they all agree that militant jihad means justified use of violence against the 
enemies of Islam, but there is no solid agreement among themselves over when and 
how to use it.”447 Mohamed Achwan, the head of JAT now that Ustaz Abu Bakar 
Ba’asyir in imprisoned for his role in the Aceh Training Facility in 2010, attempts to 
draw a subtle distinction between groups who engage in violent extremism through 
Jihad and those whom he notes are performing i’dad, or preparation for war. These 
parameters of action albeit subtle have had an impact on not only how the groups are 
perceived by cadre on the ground, but perhaps more importantly they chart the future 
direction of the group as a collective. 
 
“We (the community) have actually been under physical attack from the police’s 
anti-terror squad Detachment 88. Those who can fight back are permitted to use 
violence as long as they have the necessary resources and capabilities. For those 
who do not yet have the necessary resources to wage violent confrontation, they 
should wait and remain patient as their time will come. The battle still has a long 
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way to go. Islam is not demanding (that) we win immediately, but fight and act 
regardless of the result.”448 
 
Mohamed Achwan’s statement above in 2010 came at time where there was much 
discussion amongst the terrorist and extremist community on what constituted 
fighting in the way of God in order to achieve the aspiration of an Islamic State.  
These subtle distinctions have been at times the defining factor between groups. For 
terrorist groups in Indonesia, who might have decided to take a step back in the 
exercising violence in order to meet the stated objectives through i’dad or preparation 
for war are presented with a conundrum. These groups face the tension of wanting to 
be seen simultaneously as strong and decisive in the manner in which they are 
furthering the aim of their respective groups as a collective.  The use of violence in 
this instance can be seen as a proactive step undertaken by a group in order to achieve 
what they would have envision as a decisive victory at the end. Certainly while the 
use of violence in it of itself is seen to be a decisive, by comparison i’dad to members 
of other groups such as JI after 2007, in the aftermath of many of their key leadership 
being caught was seen as a milder approach that may not deliver results with the 
desired speed. It provided an avenue through which the groups could recuperate from 
their losses and re-establish themselves through recruitment and preparation for a time 
that they envisage will arise.  
 
GROUP CONNECTION: INFLUENCING THE LEVEL OF GROUP VIOLENCE  
In the earlier section to a large extent the leadership of the groups such as JI and JAT 
determined the path of Jihad or i’dad undertaken by their respective groups based on 
their assessment of whether they thought if the groups possessed the necessary 
resources to attain victory. Whether the path of Jihad or i’dad was chosen, it 
ultimately influenced the level of violence and the direction of the group as a 
collective. This section highlights individuals who held positions of influence who 
through their connections with their group inadvertently influenced the intensity of 
violence that was eventually undertaken by the group.  
Umar Patek and the Group Connection: Contribution of Skills 
Umar Patek reminisced that he was initial introduced to the movement through a 
friend from his village Dulmatin. In 1991, both Umar Patek and Dulmatin left their 
village in Indonesia in search of work in Malaysia. In Malaysia they had met with a 
friend of Dulmatin’s - Mukhlas. Mukhlas otherwise also known by his alias Ali 
Gufron was a senior member of JI and was sentenced to death on 2 October 2003 for 
his role in the Bali Bombings.  Umar Patek noted that he merely followed his friend 
Dulmatin on the journey to Afghanistan; both their tickets and visas were arranged by 
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Mukhlas.
449
 Dulmatin later would go on to become a senior member of JI. Dulmatin 
was killed on 9 March 2010 in a raid in Pamulang after his role in the organisation of 
a military training facility in Aceh. 
Umar Patek noted that when he was in Afghanistan in approximately 1991, JI had not 
even existed.
450
 Aburrahman Ayub, former Head of  I’s Mantiqi 4, which was tasked 
to oversee operations in Australia noted that while in Afghanistan, Dulmatin and 
Umar Patek specialised in chemical and biological agents under Zulkarnaen. 
Zulkarnaen who is still on the run was from the first batch of Indonesians to be sent to 
Afghanistan was known to be a linguist. Ayub noted that whilst in Afghanistan for 
Southeast Asians, Zulkarnaen was Number 2 in the hierarchy right after Osama Bin 
Laden and his skillset outweighs key operatives that have been caught including that 
of Hambali.
451
 Scott Atran credits Zulkarnaen as the individual that who shifted the 
trajectory of violence not only through his position of influence within JI but 
additionally as the person who had convened the meetings in the lead up to the Bali 
Bombings.
452
 
On his role in the Bali Bombing, Umar Patek added that he was not privy to the 
discussions that had taken place and his role in the bombings was to assist in the 
mixing of the bombs that were to be used.
453
 Ayub separately notes that with 
Dulmatin’s demise and the arrest of Umar Patek, the operational ability of  I was 
reduced drastically.
454
  Just as Umar Patek followed Dulmatin and his path converged 
with that of JI operatives, Umar Patek admitted that after his return from Afghanistan, 
he went on to join the conflict in the Philippines later in 2002. He went to assist in the 
Philippines after was invited by Filipinos whom he had met at the training camps in 
Afghanistan. His Filipino friends had told him about the dire straits of the Moros and 
asked him to assist in them in the Philippines. In Umar Patek’s opinion, the conflict in 
the Philippines was similar to that of the situation in Palestine and as such he felt an 
obligation to assist in the struggle.
455
 Umar Patek cemented his relationship with the 
movements in the Philippines through his marriage with a Filipino woman.   
Umar Patek’s unique skillsets contributed to the use and sustenance of violence by 
groups both in Indonesia and the Philippines in part because of the friendship he 
shared with Dulmatin and Filipino operatives he had met in Afghanistan. In the 
Philippines, operatives such as Umar Patek reinvigorated the threats posed by terrorist 
groups there through their ability to pass on their skills in bomb making and 
ammunition amongst others that they had acquired from their own background and 
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experiences. This had resulted in the increased the level of violence of the groups 
even in the Philippines in due course.  Back in Indonesia, there were only a select few 
who were able to put together the bombs. Even is he was not closely tied to other 
members of JI or DI/NII, his skillsets enabled the group to put together some of the 
worst attacks of terrorism in the history of Indonesia and even Southeast Asia sich as 
the Bali Bombings.  
Hambali and the Group Connection: Contribution through Networks 
The earlier Chapters explored Hambali’s considerable influence within  I and the 
manner in which Hambali capitalised on the 1998 Fatwa by Osama Bin Laden. This 
Chapter explores Hambali’s unique connection with the group. Hambali’s position in 
JI granted him unobstructed access to the networks that he needed in order to achieve 
his goal. It placed him in prime position to influence the direction of terrorist and 
extremist groups operating in Indonesia.  
In 1999, the Rabitatul Mujahideen or the League of Holy Warriors was established as 
a “focal point for coordinating activities between Al Qaida,  I/  I, and Al Qaida 
cells in  yanmar, Aceh and Thailand.”456 JI played a crucial role in setting up and 
coordinating meetings amongst the secret alliance that was made up of the senior 
most members from the various organisations.
457
 As Head of Mantiqi 1, as noted in 
the earlier Chapters, Hambali had considerable autonomy. However as secretary-
general of Rabitatul Mujahideen, Hambali was in prime position as a nodal point 
connecting networks not only in Indonesia, but the Southeast Asia region as a whole. 
Slowly but surely, Hambali began to build a reputation as a field commander that 
people began to trust and could depend on.  
McCauley and Moskalenko’s Group Radicalisation in Indonesia  
 
Clark McCauley and Sophia  oskalenko’s 12 Mechanisms Radicalisation 
specifically draw attention to the role of group radicalisation. At different levels, all 
10 groups in Indonesia have experienced each stage of McCauley and  oskalenko’s 
Group Radicalisation.  
 
Solidarity and Cohesion through Isolation 
 
The group firstly already has present a heightened sense of cohesion and solidarity 
that groups naturally build amongst its members when they come under isolation and 
threat.
458
 This sense of isolation and threat was a consistent message that was 
reinforced not only amongst members of JI but it could be seen across all the ten 
groups explored in this study in general. Groups such as JI for instance built this sense 
of cohesion through the perception that the reinforced message to the members as it 
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was stated in the PUPJI that they it was a secret organisation – Tandzim Sirri. MIT for 
instance, is presently on the run with its leader Santoso issuing calls for solidarity 
amongst members through YouTube videos. The secrecy that shrouded many of these 
groups helped promote a sense of group cohesion and emphasis of a community of 
believers who had come together to protect not only the group but also the religion. It 
was a double calling, one that was to protect the brotherhood of the group but 
simultaneously laced with a higher calling to protect the faithful believers.   
 
Same Bases of Support 
 
The competition for the same base of support
459
 meant that was prevalent on three 
levels. At the first level was the competition for support amongst members of the 
community in general. In this instance, since terrorists and extremists come from the 
same population, government agencies continue to try to win the hearts and minds of 
the masses against terrorist and extremist discourse. There is an intrinsic competition 
amongst both the non-state actor and the state as a result.  
 
At a second level is the competition amongst terrorist and extremist groups 
themselves. In Indonesia where the aims and ideologies of the groups are so similar as 
explored in Chapter 5 the tendency would be sometime the ability of members to be 
convince by leadership on reasons for staying within a group due to it entrenched 
ideology. The fluidity of membership between and amongst groups reiterated this 
challenge that the groups face in maintaining members. This tension is exacerbated by 
the fact that often enough the groups splinter to form new groups, with the sole 
difference being the manner in which the groups aim to achieve the end game.  The 
group linkages diagram below presents a table indicating the connections between and 
amongst the groups. The linkages diagramme below presents in a table the connection 
between the 10 groups explored in this study. The red dots represent strong 
connections between groups. The blue dots represent the inherent connection between 
DI and NII. The clear dots represent the connections that are void because the groups 
are compared against the same organisation. Most of the groups have members who 
have connections with the groups that were formed earlier in history of terrorist and 
extremist movements in Indonesian such as LJ, DI, NII, JI and MMI.  
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Table 7: Group Linkages Diagramme
460
 
Group LJ DI NII JI MMI JAT AQI MIT HT FPI 
LJ ☼ ● ● ●      ● 
DI  ☼ ● ● ● ● ●    
NII  ● ☼ ● ● ● ●    
JI  ● ● ☼ ● ●    ● 
MMI  ● ● ● ☼ ●   ●  
JAT  ● ● ● ● ☼     
AQI  ● ● ●  ● ☼   ● 
MIT  ● ● ●  ●  ☼   
HT     ●    ☼ ● 
FPI ● ● ● ●      ☼ 
● – Direct Linkages ● – Indirect Linkages ☼ -Same Organisation 
 
At the third level is the competition for the same base of support from within the 
group. In this case, more established groups such as JI through the autonomy granted 
to the leadership of a mantiqi, each regionally based division meant competition 
amongst them. In this instance the leader of mantiqi 1, Hambali possessed much clout 
through his linkages and position not only within the organisation but also as a nodal 
point within the region. He had the ability to draw members from the other mantiqis 
who would want to assist in the operations that he had planned.  
 
At all three levels the competition for same bases of support meant that the group 
attempted overt measures as a means to draw support from the same community. In 
this instance the increased levels of violence was a means through which the groups 
were able to showcase the difference means through which they attempted to achieve 
their stated objectives in as short a time frame as possible. While extremist groups 
such as HTI and FPI in particular pushed this envelope to the edge, the terrorist 
groups in Indonesia tended to escalate their levels of violence with the assumption 
that this would translate to their objectives being met quickly. Given that the general 
objectives of the groups were to establish Islamic law and an Islamic state, the 
objectives have not been met as of yet.  
 
Gaining Sympathy When State Uses Force  
 
As a direct response to the violence used by the terrorist and extremist groups, states 
embark on policies to use increased levels of force in their response mechanisms 
against terrorist and extremist groups. Indonesia was no different. The formation of 
the Detachment 88, Indonesia’s elite counter terrorism taskforce was formed in the 
aftermath of the Bali Bombings in 2002. McCauley and Moskalenko refer to the third 
stage of group radicalisation as condensation.
461
 In this instance, as a result of the 
increased level of force used by the state apparatus to counter terrorist groups, the 
groups thereafter capitalised on this very increased use of force to gain sympathy 
from the community.  
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In Indonesia, this is perhaps seen most evidently seen in the rational provided by the 
terrorist movement in Indonesia to shift their target spectrum. Prior to 2009, the 
terrorist groups in particular targeted what they often referred to as the far enemy. In 
this instance the target of the groups were the an extended notion of the West, iconic 
representations of the West include amongst others the attack on the Bali Bombings, 
Australian Embassy and the JW Marriott and Ritz Carlton Hotel. After the capture of 
key operatives and the strong clamp down on the groups in 2009 in the aftermath of 
last major attack of the JW Marriott and Ritz Carlton Hotel in 2009, the groups began 
to expand their targets to include what they had referred to as the near enemy namely, 
government officials in particular police and law enforcement that they refered to as 
thougut. The group began to propagate that the shift in target from the far enemy to 
that of the near enemy was as a result of the attack by law enforcement who were seen 
to be acting both in collusion and on behalf of the West in order to attack the holy 
warriors who were attempting to further the course of Islam.  
 
A group with a strong disdain for law enforcement who overtly attempted to gain 
sympathy from the masses is the MIT.  For instance in a 2013 YouTube video, the 
group issued an open challenge to Detachment 88, Indonesia’s elite counter terrorism 
taskforce. The message below was shown in the video and translated by the Terrorism 
Analysis and Research Consortium (TRAC).   
 
“Let Indonesian People know, who is the real Detachment 88 Anti-Terror...!!!  They 
are just money eater people with the Combating Terrorism reason, they themselves 
who made the Terror, to be seen of it is true there are terrorists, and that all their 
cunning sense that gets rank and position, at the expense of the Nation People who 
don’t know the issues and be fooled by them.  In fact we were the Mujahideen 
should they have to resist, but it turns out they only dare to fight unarmed. 
Therefore, we are open to CHALLENGING Detachment 88 Anti Terror to Fight. 
Don’t you capture weak people again, resist us...!!!  WE WAIT YOUR 
ARRIVAL...!!!  Challenges such letter was made in good faith.  In the Name  
Commander of  ujahedeen in Eastren Indonesia Abu  us’ab Al-Zarqawi Al-
Indunesi  ABU WARDAH aka SANTOSO aka ABU YAHYA  Allahu Akbar.”462 
 
On 22 April 2014, in a call to Muslims to defend Poso, Santoso in yet another speech 
on YouTube urged Indonesians to take to the streets and demonstrate against the 
Indonesian government. Referring to the situation in Indonesia, he noted that Muslims 
should stay away from Detachment 88 whom he deemed as enemies of the 
community.
463
 Subsequently in a message released on 30 June 2014 MIT has pledged 
allegiance to Abu Bakar Al Baghdadi and to the Islamic State. In the message, they 
pledged to,  “hear and to obey both in happy an difficult circumstances, in a state of 
likes and dislikes, in all cases except to do wrong to Allah Ta’ala.”464 The video by 
the  IT Press goes on to definitively state  IT’s support for Abu Bakar Al 
Baghdadi.  
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“O our noble Shaiykh, know that every mujahidin here with you, loves you, supports 
you, and makes you as a leader and role model in jihad fi sabiililaah in our area. And 
we all here in East Indonesia are soldiers of yours, your pivot man, and stone 
cantilever of the Daulah Islamiyah that you lead, that the Daulah full of blessings 
that it influenced into every soul, whom Allah Ta’ala opened their heart to accept al 
haq with sincerity at every place and every time.”465 
 
MIT went from disdain for the state and the overt attempts by the group to gain the 
sympathy of the masses and progressing onto a path where the group pledged 
allegiance to the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. The use of the mass media and in 
particular YouTube as a means to put forth their messages reiterates their underlying 
intention to reach out to as many people as possible. The attempts to gain sympathy 
from the masses is further reinforced by images of the leadership in MIT on the run 
and in jungles whilst delivering the messages of their aspiration for an Islamic State in 
Indonesia. It is an emotive picture that highlights the sacrifice that is allegedly made 
by the group on behalf of the larger Muslim community.  
 
Fissures Amongst Group Members 
 
The last stage in McCauley and  oskalenko’s group radicalisation refers to the 
fissures amongst group members arising from competition from within the group. The 
fissures amongst groups can be explored on three levels. At the first level is the in-
group competition that resulted in the splintering of the groups. In this instance the 
split amongst group members is seen in a more tangible fashion through the formation 
of a new group with a distinct division from the older group. This was explored in 
greater detail in Chapter 5 of this study through the (ideological) split of DI/NII and JI 
and later of the split from MMI to JAT. At this level the in-group competition and 
problems that subsequently arose from this resulted in the formation of newer groups 
that were considerably more violent than its predecessors.  
 
At a second level is fissure amongst group members without a tangible split in the 
groups in it of itself. In the case of JI for instance, this was most noticeable in the 
fissures amongst members of the various mantiqis or regionally based subdivisions as 
a result of the power imbalance between the regional subdivisions. Mantiqi 1 
possessed a disproportionate amount of power by comparison with many of its 
members opting to follow in a path of escalated violence. As noted in the Chapter 6, 
the raw ambition of several members who were in positions of power steered the 
group on a pathway of escalated violence. In this case, while JI as a group did not 
split, there was an intangible split in manner though which the various regional 
subdivisions engaged with the larger ideology of the group.  
 
At a third level, perhaps on the scale of a movement, the fissures and in-group 
competition can be seen in the formation of the newer terrorist groups over the past 
five years. These include AQI and MIT. The larger movement as a whole possess a 
similar aim to establish Islamic Law and an Islamic State in Indonesia. The newer 
groups can be see to have surfaced broadly as a result of in-group competition in the 
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movement fuelled by a desire to achieve the end game with considerable speed. The 
new groups such as AQI and MIT in particular were particularly violent in the 
methods undertaken by the group as a collective. 
 
BUILT TO LAST: THE VALUE OF GROUP COHESION 
 
Cohesion based on Group Loyalty 
 
Group loyalty is the cornerstone of any group. It is rooted in not only a sense of 
belonging to the group and renders those within the group with a sense of identity that 
they would need to support and defend as part of their agreed upon loyalty to the 
group.  This is not an exception for terrorist and extremist groups. Group loyalty is a 
treasured commodity that terrorist groups especially prize. As explored in greater 
detail in Chapter 1 of the study, terrorist groups at its crux aim to create political 
change. Group loyalty as such will not only ensure that the plan of the group 
(typically a non-state actor) to create political change (against a state-actor) is kept 
secret but it also mitigates potential defection from within the ranks of the group. The 
group’s sense of loyalty thus bolsters its future course of action as it moves towards 
its aims and objectives. Group loyalty can be a force that propels and thrusts the 
group to action without sparing any expense.  
 
“(O)ne important psychological and behavioral force contributing to group stability 
and integrity is a member’s group loyalty, the desire to forgo attractive alternatives 
for group membership. Loyalty is a complex, multifaceted construct, consisting of 
emotive, cognitive, as well as behavioral elements. For example, loyalty may be 
manifested through the experience of strong, positive emotions (happiness, joy, 
empathy) associated with group membership.”466 
Role of the Bai’ah  
In Chapter 6, the role of the Bai’ah as used by leadership as a form of divine sanction 
was explored. While the religious undertones convey a sense of the divine, the role of 
the bai’ah as a social binder of the group renders it altogether a more important facet 
when one focuses on group dynamics. It reiterates the bonds and cements the sense of 
affiliation that members have with the group. For members of JI for instance the 
group loyalty is sealed with an oath of allegiance or bai’ah to the leader of the group. 
In essence the Bai’ah is “an oath of loyalty. Whoever makes bai’ah agrees to submit 
his entire life to the leader and the ummah. He will not act against the leader in agreed 
matters, and will be loyal to him in every action, regardless of his personal likes or 
dislikes.”467 At the heart, the bai’ah would inspire loyalty amongst the group. The 
religious language of the bai’ah would to an extent affect an individual where 
defecting from the leadership brings along with it such guilt as it is looked upon as 
turning away from the individual’s affiliation to religion as well. One oath that 
envelopes a sense of belonging to both the terrorist or extremist group and the faith.  
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In JI where the oath of allegiance was very much documented, some members as 
noted in Chapter 6 embraced the oath as almost a baptism into the group’s code of 
conduct. As much as the bai’ah is steeped in a sense of religiosity, other JI members 
such as Ghoni had downplayed its importance within the realm of the group. For 
Ghoni, he noted that his joining JI,  
“was nothing formal”468 
for others they recalled it as merely being just a handshake and a promise.  
The community affiliation can be seen in the manner in which “people form groups 
and behave towards one another as members of groups which find themselves, or 
perceived to be in a great variety of relationships.”469 The oath of allegiance presently 
acts not only as a binding force and additionally as a lens through which members 
would be able to see themselves and others around them.  
Cohesion Based on Established Structures: PUPJI and the Group 
 
The sense of group loyalty and through social identification and social cohesion was 
additionally seen through the criteria of Al Qoidah Al-Sholbah – core group that 
would form the basis of the organisation as stipulated in the PUPJI. At an 
organisational level, “(1) There is solidarity and bonding among personnel (2) There 
is a high concern towards collective work (3) There is high endurance in collective 
work (4) (Members) Possess high organisational discipline (5) A prime social 
group”470  At the heart of the what JI saw as its core group was strength in the 
collective. This cohesion was cemented in the ideological and operational manual of 
JI. John Turner notes that,  
 
 “Individuals assigned to groups on a random basis probably tend to assume that 
they must have something in common or automatically invent or infer common 
group characteristics from the available information. At the very least they would 
have information about one exemplary group member, themselves, from which to 
derive inferences about the characteristics of the group as a whole.”471 
 
If one considers most of these terrorist and extremist groups in Indonesia for example, 
for most of them, there were not assigned to these groups on a random basis. However 
in the course of building ties, they have found commonalities within the group that 
has continued to inspire their activities and propelled many of them to identify with 
the collective vision of the group, to establish an Islamic State.  
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Martha Crenshaw’s early work aptly deduces the key facets that she sees is essential 
for group radicalisation when she adds, “We are not dealing with a situation in which 
certain types of personalities suddenly turn to terrorism in answer to some inner call. 
Terrorism is the result of a gradual growth of commitment and opposition, a group 
development that furthermore depends on government action.”472 It is very much a 
reaction by an in-group that sees it’s self as chosen against an out-group that it sees as 
epitomising in this instance everything that is evil. Groups present not only a sense of 
affiliation, but perhaps at a more human level it provides comfort and the company of 
other like-minded individuals who are out to change the current status quo.  
 
Cohesion Based on a Common Cause: One Identity but Many Groups 
 
Despite the groups in Indonesia having many splinter organisations in recent years, 
the flattening out of hierarchies of the older groups and the development of newer 
splinter organisations in a short span of time such at AQI and MIT for instance 
emphasises the role of group even further.  It is this very irony of the manifestation of 
one collective identity but the presence of a multiplicity of groups that Stuart Albert, 
Blake Ashforth and Jane Dutton allude to when they conclude that “as the 
environment becomes more ever more dynamic and complex, organisations become 
ever more organic.” 473  For the purposes of this study, rather than dismiss the 
importance of a group, what it does emphasize instead is that the presence of a 
multiplicity of groups has resulted in not only the sustenance of one group, but the 
movement as a collective.  Although, 
 
“collective identities can be understood as (potentially) encompassing shared 
interests, ideologies, subcultures, goals, rituals, practices, values, worldview, 
commitment, solidarity, tactics, strategies, definitions of the ‘enemy’ or the 
opposition and framing of issues, it is not synonymous with and cannot be reduced 
to any of these things.”474  
 
As a whole, “collective identity scholarship has also shed light on why groups that on 
the surface seem to be compatible in terms of goals can nevertheless have problems 
building alliances.” 475  This aptly describes the threat landscape in Indonesia, in 
Chapter 3, the presence of a litany of terrorist and extremist groups were highlighted. 
Chapter 5 drew the attention to the marked similarities in the ideologies of the 10 
groups explored in this study. A vast majority of these groups underscored the need 
for the establishment of an Islamic State.  Even then, the presence of groups working 
together was not without its tensions as seen in the creation of the new group JAT and 
the presence of a multiplicity of splinter groups that have flourished since then.  
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Cohesion Based on Common Experiences 
 
In building effective group cohesion, common experiences between members of the 
group contribute towards the creation of a cultural worldview that is then shared by 
the group. Cultural worldview “is defined as a set of beliefs about the nature of reality 
shared by groups of individuals that provides meaning, order, permanence, stability, 
and the promise of literal and/or symbolic immortality to those who live up to the 
standards of value set by the worldview.”476 
 
In attempting to build a collective experience, many of the groups in Indonesia look 
towards the Middle East to draw inspiration and wisdom. Providing an example of 
how Tandzim Al-Qaeda Serambi Mekkah attempted to so draw inspiration from the 
Middle East, Ghozali noted that the group,  
 
“aimed to have programmes all worldwide, while they were targeting 
Americans, they held in high esteem the Arab language and attempted 
to establish links with countries outside Indonesia either through visits 
or online via the Internet, they made attempts to sustain links with 
Afghanistan.”477  
 
A more tangible experience amongst many of the terrorist leadership in particular, and 
senior leadership in general were their experience in fighting in the Soviet-Afghan 
war. Their experiences in Afghanistan formed an indelible mark in the manner in 
which they would therein perceive the world. The experience they had in Afghanistan 
built a sense of solidarity and cohesion that many of them reminisce and share 
amongst themselves even until today. Today, while the members of the Afghan 
Alumni who have since completed their sentences, engage terrorist inmates and try to 
steer them away from a path of violence. Several members of the Afghan Alumni 
interviewed such as Jibril, Ustaz Kohar, Hidayat, Suahair and Jubair saw it as a 
personal undertaking due to the inherent assumption that their level of seniority in the 
organisation typically vis-à-vis their experiences in Afghanistan underscores their 
credibility.
478
 Hence while those interviewed came from different batches of those 
who were trained militarily in Afghanistan, collectively in brotherhood they almost 
fondly remember their journeys to and experiences in Afghanistan. Hence, their 
experiences in Afghanistan not only provided them with a common experience but a 
common identity under the banner of an expanded notion of a Southeast Asian 
Afghan Alumni, a network that spans beyond that of Indonesia alone.  Like many of 
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those who had been sent to Afghanistan to train, their experiences were central in the 
formative process of both their own sense of identity as a person and perhaps more 
importantly their identity as part of a group as a collective. Their experiences 
Afghanistan provided the necessary credibility through their experiences of battling 
the enemy whilst being a mujahideen – a Holy Warrior. This experience in particular 
had set them apart from members of many of the newer groups that have surfaced in 
recent years. It is a distinction that many interviews shared with pride and nostalgia 
for both the interviews that were conducted in prison and for the interviews that were 
conducted with members who had since served their time and were released. The 
Afghan experience was an indelible mark on the personal journey of the individual 
and the collective combat experience of the group.  
 
CONCLUSION  
 
This Chapter explored the community affiliation of a group and its impact on group 
behavior through exploring the role of the individual within a group and second 
through the role of collectivism and its impact within and between groups. 
Highlighting the unique dynamics within terrorist groups that can influence change 
from non-violent extremism to terrorism through cCauley and oskalenko’s factors 
in Group Radicalisation, the impact of group connections and the factors that 
facilitated the building of group cohesion amongst groups in Indonesia, the chapter 
traced the unique factors within a group that contributed to the unique pathways 
undertaken by them as they attempted to fulfill the stated objectives of the group. 
The next and final chapter in this study will explore these the three key factors of 
ideology, leadership and  group dynamics vis-à-vis community affiliation against the 
sustainability of the group in general and the impact of this study on future research in 
the field.   
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
CONCLUSION 
 
“The difficulty lies not so much in developing new ideas  
as in escaping old ones.” 
 
 John Maynard Keynes 
 
 
The field of terrorism studies is fraught with complexity. The complex study of 
radicalisation is indeed both a fascinating yet vexing area of study. At the centre of 
this complexity is the Holy Grail - the quest to understand the processes of 
radicalisation and the factors the move and sustain a radical group along this course. 
This study builds on the work of scholars in the field who had worked on identifying 
the root causes of radicalisation. The process of radicalisation has a cascading impact 
on not only the individual and the group, but also the activities of the radical groups 
whose actions would eventually and inevitably affect the community as a whole. In 
the process of examining the 10 radical groups in Indonesia, the common 
denominators of ideology, leadership and group dynamics were identified based on 
the the processes of radicalisation that have dominated the terrorism studies discourse. 
 
Within the domain of terrorism studies, the human terrain remains a fundamental 
element in the process of radicalisation both within for the radicalisation of 
individuals as well as the radical pathways of groups. The difficulty in understanding 
the process of radicalisation lies buried amidst a synergy of factors that bring together 
several disciplines that can contribute towards the understanding of an on-going and 
topical area of research that has gain much attention in recent years. The challenge 
sometimes lies in the ability to connect the dots and to shed light on the areas that 
have just assumed to be conventional wisdom. 
 
The study of radicalisation has at times been plagued with critique given that 
solutions are difficult to ascertain. As explored in Chapter 2, just as through the years, 
scholars have not been able to find a universal definition of terrorism and that has not 
prevented the field from growing in understanding of the threat of terrorism. Similarly 
this should not stop scholars from exploring and adding to the understanding of the 
process of radicalisation. All the more, there is a need to peel through the layers of a 
complex process that continues to puzzle scholars and practitioners alike. The study 
of radicalisation is entrenched in the root causes debate. This debate has been a steady 
undercurrent in the literary corpus of terrorism studies through the years.   
 
In this study, examining 10 radical groups in Indonesia presents a varied vantage 
point by using the groups as a referent point in examining the process of radicalisation 
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and the sustenance of the group. The study shed light on common factors that 
provided the needed perspective whilst taking one step closer towards unearthing a 
synergy of factors that have influenced the radicalisation and subsesequent courses of 
action – violent or otherwise undertaken by the diverse spectrum of groups in 
Indonesia selected in this study. 
 
Exploring factors that initially contributed in the radicalisation of individuals on their 
journey of radicalisation towards violence has in turn shed light on the influence these 
very factors of ideology, leadership and group dynamics amongst the 10 groups 
examined. The exploring of 10 groups spanning across more than two decades 
provide added perspective on the unique threat landscape of terrorism and extremism 
in Indonesia. It additionally reinforces that in spite of the difference over the course of 
time and levels of radicalisation of the groups, the three factors of ideology, 
leadership and group dynamics were a common denominator between the groups. 
Bearing in mind the unique threat landscape in Indonesia as explored in Chapter 3 and 
coupled with the genesis and sustenance of the 10 groups selected. This study has 
contributed towards the understanding of driving factors behind the 10 groups 
explored. 
 
The study began with a hypothesis that there are several forces of influence that 
nudge a radical group along the pathway of heightened radicalisation leading to 
terrorism. Extreme political ideology, the inspirational and dominant presence of 
influential leadership and a deep-seated group dynamics that influence the general 
developments of the group are amongst the factors are form the thrust that the group 
receives. These three nodal factors were explored in greater detail in the earlier 
chapters where the crucial role they played and the impact on the pathways of 
increased violence within the groups were explored. It is a paradox that the very 
factors of ideology, leadership and group dynamic that could have escalated the levels 
of violence of the 10 groups such as JI, JAT and MIT for instance through the course 
of time were the very reason why the levels of violence in groups were at times 
mitigated and event reduced instances such as LJ and HT to some extent. 
 
When focusing on the individual as a referent, the study of radicalisation is typically 
seen as an exploration into the precursors of acts of terrorism of the individual. The 
aim therein is to explore and understand factors that would shed light on the way in 
which an individual can perhaps be stopped from joining a terrorist group or if the 
individual independently refrains from joining a terrorist group on their own accord. 
The hope was that through understanding the process of radicalisation, this would 
help nip the problem in the bud thereby reducing the propensity through which an 
individual would pursue activities that would lead them onto a path of terrorism.   
 
In this study, the referent is the group.  Hence with the group as a referent in the 
examination of the 10 radical groups as a collective, by extension, this would 
contribute towards the understanding of the journeys within radical groups and hence 
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shed light on the ways through which the group as a collective entity sustains itself 
through the very factors that herald the groups journey towards violence, back from 
violence or even in this case sustains the groups over the course of time. 
Understanding the manner through which terrorist groups sustain themselves through 
the years would shed light on the factors that can thereby be exploited within the 
parameters of the group that could ultimately cause the demise of the groups as a 
collective entity. Understanding the factors that contribute towards the escalation of 
violence in groups is pertinent not just to prevent one person on the path of violence 
but that of numerous individuals within groups.  
 
A JOURNEY FRAUGHT WITH TRIBULATION:   
OVERCOMING CHALLENGES  
 
Just as individuals made a considerable impact within the parameters of a groups and 
impacted the journeys of the group towards violence. The journey towards surfacing 
factors that have had a critical influence within the domain of groups is not without its 
own trials and tribulations. These challenges stem from the inherent obstacles within 
the literary corpus on terrorism research, the varying development of groups that were 
explored in this study and the necessity to embrace the existing puzzles within the 
process of radicalisation. The tribulation therein lies to acknowledge these obstacles 
and embrace these challenges as part of the subject matter explored amidst the search 
for a better understanding of the processes of group radicalisation. 
 
Limitations and Delimitations of the Study 
Beyond the time and spatial limitations of the study, there is an enduring limitation 
despite the best efforts in crafting the methodology. There remains an inherent 
difficulty in the ability to quantifying data when human respondents are central to the 
study, given the unpredictability of human behavior.  In addition, the number of 
respondents who belonged to extremist groups that were non-violent was significantly 
fewer in numers when compared to the interviews and questionnaires that members 
and former members of terrorist groups responded to. The imbalance albeit 
challenging was in part a result of the security climate wherein there is a deepseated 
fear that when documented, that they wn turn would be monitored. 
 
Several of the groups that are being examined are not static and as a result there is 
need to be cognizant of the fluidity of the group’s dynamics vis-à-vis the outcome of 
the study. The dynamic nature of the threat of terrorism stemming from emerging 
patterns globally will have a ripple effect on the developments in Indonesia. Most 
recent is the ongoing developments in conflict in Iraq and Syria with the Islamic State 
(IS) and the problem of foreign fighters from Asia, in particular Indonesia. There is a 
need as such to embrace the limitations resulting from the evolving and fluid nature of 
the group as a necessary evil of a subject that is to be analysed.  
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Perception of Stagnation in Terrorism Research 
The meandering course of terrorism research has been an area of great contestation 
and grave debate. The principal discussions and dominant themes in the field of 
terrorism studies were explored in greater detail in Chapter 1. Marc Sageman issued a 
rather scathing critique on what he perceived as a stagnation of terrorism research was 
based interrelated premise that there was a lack of research using primary source data 
and that the Intelligence Community dominated access on primary data. As such the 
inability of academia to come up with a definitive answer to the question ‘What leads 
a person to turn to political violence?’479  
The notion of increased level of violence is central to the discussions of this study.  
Alex Schmid defending the current state of terrorism research acknowledged that “the 
quality of research on terrorism has greatly improved in the last decade compared to 
the three decades before 9/11.”480 As such he opined that he did not see the stagnation 
that Marc Sageman had alleged was present. Max Taylor in defense of the current 
state of terrorism research asserted that “academic knowledge must always be 
privileged over practical intervention, because innovation and effective intervention if 
evidenced based depends upon knowledge generation, not the other way round.”481 
Hence albeit Sageman was critical that no solution was found Taylor’s argument was 
anchored in the notion that academia’s primary function is as a generator of 
knowledge. As David H. Schanzer noted, while the success of the field in terrorism studies 
as a field of study should not be based on the ability to respond to one question, it is hoped 
that just like scholars before, this study will in its own way also “illuminate our 
understanding and guide our decision making in the perilous years to come.”482 
This study hope that in its own way, through its mixed methods of both quantitative 
and qualitative research based on interviews with terrorist and extremists provides 
insights through using primary source data. This study can contribute towards the 
understanding of an under explored milieu of the group within the larger study of 
radicalisation and factors that sustain and influence the group’s dynamics. 
Varying Levels of Development of the Terrorist and Extremist Groups in Indonesia 
Chapter 3 explored the challenging role of political Islam in Indonesia and the 
bourgeoning number of terrorist groups in Indonesia. In the process of conducting the 
study, the challenges that arose was two-fold. First there was the disproportionate 
level of literature that that was present on the larger more developed groups such as 
LJ, DI, NII, JI, MMI and JAT. In comparison groups such as AQI and MIT that are 
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smaller and newer groups have arisen from the now metastasised threat of terrorism in 
Indonesia. The newer and smaller groups that have surfaced in recent years show a 
more violent face of terrorism in Indonesia with these groups espousing and 
threatening increasing levels of violence in order to achieve their stated objectives and 
aspirations. Second, as many of the groups in Indonesia that are explored in the 
course of this study are still operational and continue to evolve, the challenge therein 
lies in the ability to reflect as accurately as possible the current position of the group 
vis-à-vis the group radicalisation.  
The varying development of groups and the disproportionate literature, present an 
understandable challenge. With the exception of LJ, the other groups are still 
operational and have members who form part of the intricate web of terrorist and 
extremist groups in Indonesia. In an ever evolving terrorism threat landscape, this is a 
necessary challenge not only experience in this study but it also remains a challenge 
that has to be embraced in the field of terrorism studies writ large. 
Mysterious Puzzle of Radicalisation 
As explored in greater detail in Chapter 2, broadly the subject of radicalisation is 
situated within the larger root cause debate in terrorism studies. The factors identified 
under the root causes debate are more pronounced in radicalisation pathways of 
individuals. The radicalisation pathway of groups on the other hand, operates under 
the premise that the group is already established. It can almost be loosely considered 
the second tier of the radicalisation debate. The fact that individual have been pulled 
towards joining groups presupposes the presence of pull and push factors that 
influence the individuals journey towards the group. Once they are part of the group, 
the individual is subject to the push factors of the group’s political ideology, the 
group’s strength of dominant and influential leadership and the group’s community 
affiliations and its subsequent impact on the group’s dynamics. These were 
expounded upon in greater detail in Chapter 5, Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 respectively.  
Chapter 2 explored in detail both the root causes debate that dominate the field and 
the puzzle of radicalisation based on radicalisation models from the 1980s until 2014. 
This study identified four phases through which the numerous radicalisation models 
and conceptual frameworks explored set an individual on a path of terrorism. This 
study was not aimed at finding the silver bullet and decoding the puzzle of 
radicalisation of the individual. Whilst the process of radicalisation of an individual 
still remains a puzzle, the processes of what sustained and inspireds a group as a 
collective entity on the other hand has been an area that has not been explored in 
greater detail, in part due to the difficulty in accessing the subjects who would be able 
to provide insight into the dynamics and the experience of the members of terrorist 
and extremist groups. This study’s provides a foray into an area that has been 
challenging but has provided insights based on primary resource - the very subjects of 
study that would be able to provide the experiences from within the group, both the 
leadership and members of both terrorist and extremist groups. What this study aimed 
to do from the start was to identify factors that would influence the dynamics within 
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the group that results in increased radicalisation or even leading up to heightened 
violence in a group.  
Based on the core themes that dominated the processes of radicalisation over 
approximately the last three decades, as showcased in the numerous radicalisation 
models and conceptual frameworks in Chapter 2, three factors whose presence greatly 
influence the journey of radicalisation in Indonesia were identified. The three factors 
namely, the role of ideology, role of influential leadership and role of community 
affiliation within the group were explored against the increased violence of the groups 
in Indonesia. As the study has shown, these factors have in the past and will in the 
future continue to influence groups in Indonesia, moving them on a trajectory of 
increased violence over time.  
A JOURNEY THROUGH TIME: INDONESIA’S UNIQUE THREAT 
LANDSCAPE 
Indonesia’s permissive environment and the unique and tenuous role of political Islam 
has been dominated the field since the 1940s. The complexity in managing Political 
Islam through the years has been challenging. In Chapter 2 these complexities were 
shown in greater detail. “Ultimately, it is the combined impact of a number of factors 
that pushes and pulls someone into becoming a terrorist, and these factors will vary 
depending on the culture, the social context, the terrorist group and the individual 
involved.”483  
The case study of Indonesia is no different. The difficulties that were entrenched in 
history, the evolving global threat of terrorism and a permissive security environment 
at present have kept the radical groups alive. The journey through Indonesia’s history 
coupled with the factors that helps in the sustenance of the 10 radical groups is a 
pertinent area of study in order to understand how to mitigate the threat of terrorism 
especially in Indonesia in the long term. 
A JOURNEY THROUGH COBBLED LANES: SURVIVAL AND SUCCESS OF 
TERRORIST GROUPS  
For terrorist and extremist groups in general, the ability of the group to survive and 
succeed is the two most important goals that the group possesses. The aims and 
ideology of the group was discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5. The sustenance of 
the group and the ability of the groups to survive in Indonesia are testament to the 
resilience of the group and its desire to survive. Counter terrorism operations against 
the groups coupled with the strong security parameters that have been built by an 
intricate network of agencies working in cooperation international community has 
increased the pressures faced by terrorist and extremist groups on their ability to 
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survive. For most terrorist groups this would involve escaping the state apparatus. 
Similarly for most extremist groups the challenges would be to avoid being caught in 
the security net that has been put in place to prevent acts of terrorism.  
In seminal study by RAND on How Terrorist Groups End, Jones and Libicki 
examined 648 terrorist groups that existed between 1968 and 2006. They identified 
“five major ways in which terrorist groups end: policing, military force, splintering, 
politics, or victory.”484 Their study found that based on the terrorist groups studied, 
there were two primary ways in which terrorist groups ended dominated. These 
principal reasons were that the groups either “decide to adopt nonviolent tactics and 
join the political process, or local law-enforcement agencies arrest or kill key 
members of the group.”485 In the course of explaining the manner through which 
terrorist groups usually ended, Jones and Libicki identified five explanatory variables 
that could influence ultimately either the sustenance or demise of the group. The five 
factors were “ideological motivation, economic conditions, regime type, the size of 
groups, and the breadth of terrorist goals.”486 This study expands on the five factors 
that were raised by Jones and Libicki as factors that would influence how long a 
group lasts and adds to the list of factors the role of group dynamics. The unique 
confluence of a politicised ideology, presence of influential leadership and group 
dynamics have ensured that groups survived over the test of time.  
In Indonesia, as shown in Chapter 5, the similarity in the ideological motivation and 
the similarity in the goals between and amongst the groups in instituting Islamic Law 
and an Islamic state is shared amongst almost all the groups in Indonesia. The 
economic conditions of the country and the presence of Pancasila as the core tenet of 
the regime has influenced to some extent the reasons why individuals joined the 
groups. These were explored in greater detail in Chapter 7. The size of the groups 
varies with the more established groups, as noted earlier having a more elaborate 
hierarchy but with the smaller groups threatening a greater intensity of violence in 
order to achieve their stated objectives.  
Jerold Post aptly highlights the importance of group identity within the workings of a 
terrorist organisation as it emphasises the social context within which groups exists 
within society.  
“The importance of collective identity and the processes of forming and 
transforming collective identities cannot be overemphasized. This fact in turn 
emphasizes the socio-cultural context, which determines the balance between 
collective identity and individual identity. Terrorists have subordinated their 
individual identity to the collective identity, so that what serves the group, 
organization, or network is of primary importance.”487 
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The group dynamics in this instance could explain the sustenance of the groups 
through the sense of camaraderie built from training in Afghanistan, an intricate 
network of family, brotherhood and kinship and strength of leadership to provide the 
necessary direction for the groups. In the absence of these factors that move the group 
towards violence. The economic and other social factors including existing regime 
type will remain but factors that affect all walks of Indonesian society and not 
terrorist and extremist groups alone. The confluence of the three factors provide the 
foundations upon which group dynamics is built and the group sustain themselves 
through the course of time.    
Sustenance of terrorist groups 
In a separate but influential study, the Global Transnational Terrorist Project in as 
early as 2006 studied the rise of the militant minority in JI and admittedly this 
“militant minority study is important because it demonstrates empirically that terrorist 
organizations are not always unified, hierarchical organizations that remain static over 
time.”488 Benjamin Acosta highlights that the survival and sustenance of a group over 
time does not necessarily translate to the group succeeding and achieving its stated 
objectives.  
“Although many militant organizations survive for long periods of time, carry out 
numerous attacks, or even accomplish various tactical and symbolic feats, only a 
few organizations succeed in achieving the goals that spawned and justify their 
existence.”489  
Acosta identifies four general pathways that militant groups take in order to achieve 
success, the first is to remain be active against the state actor until a political solution 
is met, second is the achievement of a decisive military victory, third the militants 
attempt a quick victory against a weaker opponent and finally by just waiting for the 
current state of affairs to change.
490
 Ultimately the “differences in the operating 
conditions of adversary type, external support structure, and receptiveness to tradeoff 
explain why many militant organizations survive for long periods of time yet only a 
few achieve the goals that justify their existence.”491 Martha Crenshaw noted that 
while a,  
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“group might splinter into two new groups or merge with another group; the original 
group would formally “end” but terrorism would not. In other words, the collapse of 
a group and the end of terrorism are not necessarily the same thing.”492 
Crenshaw’s assessment has held true over the course of time. In the case study of 
Indonesia, this could not have been truer. In Chapter 3, the number of terrorist and 
extremist groups that have gained considerable prominence in Indonesia over the last 
seven decades. Chapter 5 showcased the ideology of the groups in Indonesia over 
time. The metastases of the groups in Indonesia reiterate the fact that although several 
groups may have form and them splintered and faded into the background, the threat 
of terrorism in Indonesia continues unabated. Louise Richardson similar explores a 
similar them on the difficulty on winning the war on terrorism.
493
 Indonesia has seen 
the demise of groups such as LJ the group, however, former members then today are 
part of groups that present a more virulent threat in Indonesia.   
JOURNEY TOWARDS THE THREAT MATRIX:  NON-VIOLENT EXTREMISM 
TO TERRORISM  
  
The factors that influence a group’s movement from extremism to terrorism form but 
one part of the whole equation. The threat matrix looks as shown in the methodology 
diagramme and Figure 2 in Chapter 3 show three factors that need to converge in 
order for a terrorist attack to occur. Whilst the groups all by and large possess the 
necessary intention, their training within the group or in the case of the Afghan 
alumni and perhaps the alumni at present from Syria and Iraq would equip them with 
the necessary skills and capability, but the third factor needs to be present – the 
opportunity. The opportunity in this instance refers to the chance that can be 
capitalised and a gap in the security framework that the group can exploit in order to 
conduct an act of terrorism.  
While the journey is for the group is fraught with challenges of sustenance and 
survival, the ability to conduct an act of terrorism is dependent on an opportune 
moment that they can then capitalise on. If there is a final moment that the group can 
be stopped from making that leap – it is the moment when these three factors 
converge. However more often than not, by this point it would be too late.  
CONTRIBUTION TO THE FIELD OF COUNTER TERRORISM 
This study aims to question the inherent assumption within existing literature on 
radicalisation that the factors that drive the radicalisation of individuals and the 
factors that drive the radicalisation of groups from non-violent ideological extremism 
to terrorism are one and the same. In an examination of the 10 radical groups, this 
study has shown that the very factors that often influences the radicalisation of 
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individuals on the pathway of terrorism – ideology, charismatic leadership and 
community affiliation through group dynamics also in turn influence the course of 
action of groups as a whole. 
 
The strength of this study lies in its use of primary source research through interviews 
of terrorist and extremist leaderships and an extensive survey that terrorist and 
extremist members responded to in order to substantiate its findings and shed light on 
the unique processes of group radicalisation. Interviews with the detainees in 
Indonesia form an integral part of the primary research data. The detainees offered 
unique insights into the nature of group dynamics as well as their impressions on 
persons that they felt held the reins of power in their respective organisations. The 
insights from the detainees have proven crucial in the ability to glean insight into the 
reasons behind the movement of groups to heightened trajectories of violence. The 
findings are sound and add value to a topical area in the field of terrorism studies. 
The findings will help the terrorism practitioners better understand the nuanced nature 
of the threat landscape in Indonesia. This will enable a more enlightened 
understanding of terrorist groups not only in Asia but in Europe, the Middle East and 
North Africa as well. The broad similarities of terrorist groups, including the presence 
of alienated margins, charismatic leaders, nature of recruitment and sustained 
ideological infrastructures will enable the findings of the study to resonate deeply 
with efforts to understand the radical pathways of groups. As a corollary to that, this 
study will add to the understanding of the process of radicalisation vis-à-vis the 
ongoing work in the International Relations sub-field of security studies. 
Future research can be undertaken to explore other factors in the group that would 
sustain the group and inspire action from within. Separately, a larger cross section of 
respondents could be sought not only to provide balance to the opinions of member 
from terrorist groups, but a study could be done to tease the finding from existing 
surveys further wherein the discussion on the themes raised would be explored in a 
more detailed manner.  
As a whole, this study will additionally enable the policy community to formulate 
new and better policies to enhance strategies to counter terrorism and extremism 
through a better understanding of the factors from within that lead and inspire radical 
groups into violent extremism. 
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APPENDIX B 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
TERRORISM IN INDONESIA:  
AN EXAMINATION OF 10 RADICAL GROUPS 
 
QUESTIONS FOR PARTICIPANTS 
History of Joining the Organisation 
PART 1 
A.  Please think back to the period of time BEFORE you joined the organisation and 
answer each of the following questions. 
1.  Please describe, in detail, how you came to join the organisation. 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________ 
2.  Who recruited you to the organisation? Please tick [✓] the most appropriate.  
No. Person [✓] 
A Friend  
B Family Member  
C Member of Organisation   
D Joined on my own  
E Teacher  
F Ustaz  (Religious Cleric)  
G Other (Please Elaborate)  
 
3.  How many people in the organisation did you know before you joined? 
___________________ 
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4.  Of these people, how many were your close friends? _____________________________ 
5.  How many people did you introduce to the organisation? _________________________ 
6.  What age were you when you joined? ____________________ 
7.  Were you married when you joined?     [Married / Single / Divorced / Widowed]    
8.  Did you have children when you joined? If yes, how many?  [Yes/No] 
_______________________ 
9.  What is your birth order in your family? ______________________ 
10.  Did your family know that you were going to join the organisation? If yes, who? 
[Yes/No] __________ 
11.  At the time of joining, were you employed?  If so, what was your occupation? 
____________________ 
12. What was your level of education at the time you joined? 
______________________________ 
 
B.  Please think back to the period of time BEFORE you joined the organisation and 
answer each of the following questions.  
Anger/resentment 
Using the following scale, circle the most appropriate answer: 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Never Occasionally 
(about 20% of the time) 
Sometimes  
(about 50% of the 
time) 
Usually 
(about 70% of 
the time) 
Always 
 
 
1.  Before you joined, to what extent did you feel personally upset with the Indonesian 
government? 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
2. Before you joined, to what extent did you feel personally upset with the way that Muslims 
were treated by non-Muslims in Indonesia? 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
3.  Before you joined, to what extent did you feel personally upset with the way that Muslims 
communities in the world were treated by non-Muslims? 
1 2 3 4 5 
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3.  Before you joined, to what extent did you feel personally upset with the Western world's 
attitudes toward Muslims? 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
4.   Before you joined, to what extent did you feel discriminated against because you were a 
Muslim? 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
 
Social rejection 
 
6.  Before you joined, to what extent did you feel ANGRY?   
1 2 3 4 5 
 
7.  Before you joined, to what extent did you feel LONELY? 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
8.  Before you joined, to what extent did you feel ISOLATED? 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
9.  Before you joined, to what extent did you feel ASHAMED? 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
10.  Before you joined, to what extent did you feel REJECTED? 
1 2 3 4 5 
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11.  Before you joined, to what extent did you feel DIFFERENT from others around you? 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
Community connectedness 
 
12.  Before you joined, how connected did you feel to the Muslim community? Please 
elaborate.  
1 2 3 4 5 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
13.  Before you joined, how connected did you feel to the general Indonesian community? 
Please elaborate. 
1 2 3 4 5 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Joining as purpose/honor seeking 
14.  Before you joined, to what extent did you feel it was your religious duty to join? 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
15.  By joining the organisation, to what extent did you feel that you were doing 
something for the greater good of the community? 
1 2 3 4 5 
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16. By joining the organisation, to what extent did you feel that you were bringing honor 
on yourself? 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
17. By joining the organisation, to what extent did you feel that you were bringing honor to 
your family? 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
Life circumstances influencing joining 
 
18.  To what extent were you satisfied with the job you held before you joined the 
organisation? 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
19.  To what extent did joining the organisation help you financially? 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
20.  To what extent did your family support your decision to join the organisation? 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
21.  How important was religion in your life prior to joining? 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
PART 2 
C.  Please think back to the period of time DURING which you were part of the 
organisation and answer each of the following questions 
Experiences in the Organisation  
Centrality within the organization 
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1.  How powerful/influential were you within the organisation? Why? 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. How central were/are you in the organisation? Why? 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
3.  How active are you in the organisation? Describe.  
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
Using the scale provided, please rate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each 
of the following statements. (Scale 1 - 5) 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree or 
Disagree 
Agree Strongly Agree 
 
 
Job Embeddedness 
4.  My beliefs fit well with the organisation’s goal(s)  
1 2 3 4 5 
 
5.  I had prestige within the organisation. 
1 2 3 4 5 
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6.  I was fearful about potential punishment if I left the organisation. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
7.  The organisation valued my contribution to its goal(s). 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
8.  The organisation cared about my well being. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
9.  The organisation cared about my opinions. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
10.  The organisation would help me if I had difficulties. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
11.  It would have been difficult for me to leave the organisation. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
12.  I felt a strong sense of belonging to the organisation. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
13.  When I was in the organisation, my life served a higher purpose. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
Family’s embeddedness 
14.  My family was proud that I worked for this organisation. 
1 2 3 4 5 
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15.  I felt that it would harm my family’s reputation if I left this organisation. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
16.  The organisation provided benefits to my family. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
17.  My family would have suffered had I left the organisation. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
18.  Members of the organisation often spent time with my family members.  
1 2 3 4 5 
 
Trust/confidence in organisation 
19.  I was confident in the organisation’s ability to fulfill its goal(s). 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
20.  I trusted the other members in the organisation. 
1 2 3 4 5 
PART 3.1 
D.  Please think back to the period of after you joined the organisation and answer each 
of the following questions. 
Organisation links 
1.  How many people in the organisation were highly dependent on you? ____________ 
2.  How many close friends did you have in the organisation? ____________ 
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Using the scale provided, please rate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each 
of the following statements. (Scale 1 - 5) 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree or 
Disagree 
Agree Strongly Agree 
 
 
Approval of violence 
3.  I approve of attacks on US military troops in Muslim countries.  
1 2 3 4 5 
 
4.  I approve of attacks on US civilians in Muslim countries.  
1 2 3 4 5 
 
5.  I approve of attacks on US civilians in the US.  
1 2 3 4 5 
 
6.  I approve of attacks on Israeli civilians.  
1 2 3 4 5 
 
7.  I approve of attacks on Israeli military troops.  
1 2 3 4 5 
 
Perceptions of armed Jihad 
8.  The concept of Jihad in Islam justifies the killing of civilians in some circumstances.  
1 2 3 4 5 
 
9.  Armed Jihad is a personal obligation of all Muslims today.  
1 2 3 4 5 
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10.  Suicide bombers will be rewarded for their deeds by God.  
1 2 3 4 5 
 
Muslim identification 
11. Muslims of Indonesia should help their oppressed brothers.  
1 2 3 4 5 
 
12.  I closely identify with other Muslims.  
1 2 3 4 5 
 
13.  I think of myself largely in terms of my religious beliefs.  
1 2 3 4 5 
 
Psychological well being 
14.  In general, I am happy these days.  
1 2 3 4 5 
 
15.  I often feel lonely these days.  
1 2 3 4 5 
 
Please indicate your general attitudes toward each of the following. Tick [✓] the 
attitude that best     describes your opinion of the country.  
No. Country Very 
Negative 
Negative Not 
Positive 
or 
Negative 
Positive Very 
Positive 
1 Indonesia      
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2 Malaysia      
3 Singapore      
4 Philippines      
5 Brunei      
6 US      
7 Israel      
8 European 
Nations 
     
9 African Nations      
10 Afghanistan      
11 Iraq      
   
Identify you the country/countries you least favour. Why do you dislike the 
country/countries? 
Country/Countries: _________________________________________________ 
Reason: 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
PART 3.2 
Using the scale provided, please rate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each 
of the following statements. (Scale 1 - 5) 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree or 
Disagree 
Agree Strongly Agree 
 
 
Individualism/collectivism 
1.  If a member of my group succeeded, I would feel proud. 
1 2 3 4 5 
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2.  The well being of my fellow group members is important to me. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
3.  It is my duty to take care of my fellow group members, even when I have to sacrifice what 
I want. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
4.  It is important to me that I respect the decisions made by my groups. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
5.  I’d rather depend on myself than on others. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
6.  I rely on myself most of the time; I rarely rely on others. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
7.  It is important that I do my job better than others. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
Trust 
8.  I often wonder what hidden reason another person may have for doing something nice for 
me. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
9.  It is safer to trust no one. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
Conformity 
10.  I often rely on, and act upon, the advice of others. 
220 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
11.  Basically, my friends are the ones who decide what we do together. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
12.  I’m influenced by other people’s opinions. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
13.  I am more independent than conforming in many ways. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
14.  I don’t give in to others easily. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
Social dominance orientation 
15.  It’s probably a good thing that certain groups are at the top and other groups are at the 
bottom. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
16.  Lower status groups should stay in their place. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
17.  It would be good if groups could be equal. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
18.  Some groups of people are simply inferior to other groups. 
1 2 3 4 5 
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19.  In getting what you want, it is sometimes necessary to use force against other groups. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
20.  It’s okay if some groups have more of a chance in life than others. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
21.  To get ahead in life, it is sometimes necessary to step on other groups. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
22.  If certain groups stayed in their place, we would have fewer problems. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
23.  Group equality should be our ideal. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
24.  Sometimes other groups must be kept in their place. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
25.  All groups should be given an equal chance in life. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
26.  We should do what we can to equalize conditions for different groups. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
27. We would have fewer problems if we treated people more equally. 
1 2 3 4 5 
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28. We should strive to make incomes as equal as possible. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
29. No one group should dominate in society. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
Fundamentalism 
 
30. God has given humanity a complete, unfailing guide to happiness and salvation, which 
must be totally followed. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
31. The basic cause of evil in this world is Satan, who is still constantly and ferociously 
fighting against God. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
32.  There is a particular set of religious teachings in this world that are so true, you can’t go 
any “deeper” because they are the basic, bedrock message that God has given humanity. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
33.  When you get right down to it, there are basically only two kinds of people in the world: 
the Righteous, who will be rewarded by God, and the rest who will not. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
34.  To lead the best, most meaningful life, one must belong to the one, fundamentally true 
religion. 
1 2 3 4 5 
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35.  The fundamentals of God’s religion should never be tampered with, or compromised 
with others’ beliefs. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
36.  God will punish most severely those who abandon his true religion.  
1 2 3 4 5 
 
37.  The only acceptable religion to God is Islam. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
38.  Islam is the only religion on this earth that teaches, without error, God’s truth. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
39.  Only good Muslims will go to heaven; people of other religions will not no matter how 
good they are.  
1 2 3 4 5 
 
40.  Non-Muslim religions have a lot of weird beliefs and pagan ways.  
1 2 3 4 5 
PART 4 
List the top 3 things you would like to change in Indonesia? 
(1)_________________________________________________________________________ 
(2) ________________________________________________________________________ 
(3)_________________________________________________________________________ 
Thank you for your participation! 
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